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Abstract 
This thesis is about the concept of personal autonomy. In particular, it is about how we 
might understand the claim that social relations are constitutive of autonomy, and 
whether, appropriately understood, it is true. Personal autonomy, broadly construed, can 
be understood as an individual's ability to govern herself: to interact with the world, 
deliberate about what to do, to choose, and execute her choice. We value autonomy not 
only because we value being self-governing, but also because the concept plays 
important roles in various theoretical frameworks: in grounding respect, in setting the 
bounds of legitimate paternalistic intervention, and in identifying the candidates for 
political participation. Recently, conceptions of autonomy that are 'relational' have been 
developed. Such conceptions make explicit reference to the social environment of the 
agent. This thesis assesses the prospects for an adequate relational conception of 
autonomy. 
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Introduction 
This thesis is about the concept of personal autonomy. In particular, it is about how we 
might understand the claim that social relations are constitutive of autonomy, and 
whether, appropriately understood, it is true. Personal autonomy, broadly construed, can 
be understood as an individual's ability to govern herself: to interact with the world, 
deliberate about what to do, to choose, and execute her choice. We value autonomy not 
only because we value being self-governing, but also because the concept plays 
important roles in various theoretical frameworks: in grounding respect, in setting the 
bounds of legitimate paternalistic intervention, and in identifying the candidates for 
political participation. Recently, conceptions of autonomy that are 'relational' have been 
developed. Such conceptions make explicit reference to the social environment of the 
agent. It is with the prospects for an adequate relational conception that I shall be 
concerned in this thesis. 
One aim of this thesis is to clarify the form of relational conditions, and hence 
gam a clearer view of the objections that such views may face. Can a relational 
conception adequately identify those individuals who are intuitively self-governing and 
to whom these normative benefits (of entitlement to respect, and so on) should be 
accorded? Do relational conceptions unavoidably incorporate values into the notion of 
autonomy? Does this mean that a relational conception cannot cohere with the 
normative frameworks that in part explain its significance? These are questions I shall 
address in this thesis. I will argue against existing theories of relational autonomy. 
However, I will ultimately argue that there are relational conditions for autonomous 
action. 
I start on this project here by setting out some of the frameworks in which 
autonomy plays a central role, and which, in part, explain its value. This not only 
motivates the thought that we should care about autonomy, but also sets out the key 
roles in which a conception of autonomy should be able to function. 
With a clearer sense of the concern, I turn, in the rest of the thesis, to look at 
some relational conceptions that have been formulated. It is useful, in doing so, to carve 
up the notion of 'autonomy' into its three aspects: autonomous choice, the standing as 
an autonomous agent, and autonomous action. Part 1 of the thesis considers and rejects 
a relational conception of autonomous choice. Part 2 assesses the success of relational 
conditions for being an autonomous agent, concluding that they should not be accepted. 
The conclusion of these first two parts serves to illustrate the difficulty of offering a 
relational conception that is able play the roles - protecting from paternalism, grounding 
respect, and so on - that explain autonomy's value. The positive argument of the thesis 
comes in Part 3, where I set out the benefits of recognising autonomous action to be 
relationally constituted. I outline a framework for thinking about how social relations 
can thwart or enable the exercise of autonomy, and motivate the further pursuit of this 
line of thought. 
2 
Chapter 1. The Value of Autonomy 
1.1. Why care about autonomy? 
Some hold that autonomy has intrinsic value. But autonomy also plays a central role in 
important normative frameworks. In addition to its purported intrinsic value, we care 
about autonomy because being autonomous - and, crucially, being recognised as 
autonomous - comes with certain 'normative benefits'. An autonomous agent is 
accorded a certain kind of respect; an autonomous agent is entitled to protection from 
paternalistic intervention; an autonomous agent is a candidate for political participation. 
These normative benefits not only account for why we care about autonomy; that 
autonomy has such a role makes clear just how important it is that an adequate 
conception of autonomy is formulated. An inadequate formulation may lead to 
diagnostic error, the practical import of which may be that some agents miss out on the 
normative goods to which they are entitled. 
1.1.1. Intrinsic value 
Commonsense morality (at least, of liberal western societies) esteems autonomy - self-
governance is valued. 1 When an agent is prevented from governing herself - by another, 
or by circumstance, or by some deficit on her part - we express concern. Being self-
governing is deemed to be valuable 'in itself'; not because of the ends it serves, or the 
likelihood that it will best serve one's interests.2 As James Griffin puts it: "Even if I 
constantly made a mess of my life, even if you could do better if you took charge, I 
1 I say little here about different value systems that may repudiate the value of autonomy. 
However, I intend all my claims here to be compatible with value pluralism; that is to say, I do 
not take autonomy to be the sole value, nor even the most important. Rather, I take it that 
autonomy is important, and insofar as it is, we should want to consider carefully the ways in 
which social contexts might thwart or foster it. 
2 See Mill, l.S. Utilitarianism, Warnock, M. (ed.), Mill: Utilitarianism and Other Writings, 
(Collins, Glasgow, 1962) for the unlikely claim that our ends will best be served if we are left to 
make our own decisions: "with respect to his own feelings and circumstances, the most ordinary 
man or woman has means of knowledge immeasurably surpassing those that can be possessed by 
anyone else", at p.207. This fails to take into account the enormous capacity for lack of self-
knowledge, motivated irrationality, and general ignorance. On such a view, autonomy has merely 
instrumental value. 
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would not let you do it. Autonomy has a value of its own.,,3 This thought is plausible; 
there is something objectionable about others determining one's choices and actions, 
and there is something valuable about self-determination. Note, though the strength of 
the claim here, from Griffm: even if self-governance led to a much worse outcome, in 
terms of personal well-being, than were one's autonomy to be overridden, it would be 
better to be self-governing than not. The claim, then, is not merely that autonomy is 
valuable, but that it is valuable to the extent that being self-governing might reasonably 
be chosen over avoiding 'making a mess' of things. Even if it thwarts our ends, there is 
value in being autonomous. Those who agree with Griffm may hold that autonomy has 
intrinsic value. This is not to say that autonomy can never be overridden, but simply that 
if it is, then justification is required - perhaps strong justification. If autonomy IS 
intrinsically valuable, then we have at least prima facie reason to care about it. 
F or the purposes of this thesis, I will take it that autonomy is valuable. I find 
Griffin's thought a plausible one. But it is certainly possible that some may not. This is 
why it is important to attend to the normative benefits to which autonomous agents are 
entitled: these further explain why autonomy is valuable and why we should care about 
it. If a conception of autonomy is ill-placed to play any such roles, then it becomes 
largely inert, robbed of its richness as a normative concept. We care about autonomy not 
only because we care about doing things for ourselves, but also because we care about 
what it means, normatively speaking, to be autonomous; namely, to be entitled to 
certain normative benefits. 
1.1.2 Respect, citizenship 
Two normative frameworks in which the notion of autonomy operates will not play a 
significant role in this thesis, but it is worth setting them out, briefly, here, in order to 
further explain the value of autonomy. 
The first normative framework is that of grounding respect. One of the most 
prominent philosophers to connect autonomy to respect is Kant, who, with his Formula 
of Humanity, prescribed as a categorical imperative that each must respect humanity -
the capacity for rational self-legislation - in oneself and in others.4 The relationship 
3 Griffin, 1. (1988) Well-being: Its Meaning, Measurement and Moral Importance, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, p. 67 
4 See Kant, I. Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals Gregor, M. (ed., transl). (1998) 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
between Kantian moral autonomy and personal autonomy is disputed.s But the thought 
that the distinctive capacity for reflective self-governance demands respect has 
persisted. 
Stephen Darwall describes as 'recognition respect' the "sort of respect which is 
said to be owed to all persons", in virtue of their standing as autonomous,6 contrasting 
this to the kind of respect that we might accord to the particular features or character 
traits of a person, manifested in certain pursuits - excellence in musicianship, or 
archery, say. John Christman too, talks of "autonomy [having] ... value simply because it 
constitutes, in part, the human agency and capacity for authentic choice that grounds 
respect for ourselves and others as persons".7 Likewise, we fmd the thought that there is 
an important value involved in making one's own choices in T.M. Scanlon's claim that: 
in a situation in which people are normally expected to determine outcomes 
. of a certain sort through their own choices unless they are not competent to 
do so, I may value having a choice because my not having it would reflect a 
judgment on my own or someone else's part that I fell below the expected 
standard of competence. 8 
Because of the relation of autonomy to respect, making one's own choice has a 
'symbolic' value. Like Griffm, Scanlon holds that agents may want to make their own 
choices 'for better or for worse'; this thought is in part explained by the claim that 
failing to choose for oneself involves failing to claim - or be regarded as having - status 
as a competent agent. 
Autonomy, then, plays a role in grounding respect; though the arguments that 
attempt to establish this will not be the subject of this thesis.9 That autonomous agents 
5 For discussion of the relationship between the two senses, see, for example, Gaus, G. (2005) 
'The Place of Autonomy within Liberalism' Autonomy and the Challenges to Liberalism 
Christman, J. and Anderson, J. (eds.) 2005, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp.272-306; 
O'Neill, O. (2003) 'Autonomy: The Emperor's New Clothes' Aristotelian Society Supplementary 
Volume 77(1), pp.1-21. 
6 Darwall, S. (1977) 'Two Kinds of Respect' Ethics 88 (1) pp.36-49. See p.38. 
7 Christman, 1. (2004) 'Relational Autonomy, Liberal Individualism, and the Social Constitution 
of Selves' Philosophical Studies 117, pp.143-164, see p. 153. 
8 Scanlon, T.M. (1986) 'The Significance of Choice' The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, 
delivered Brasenose College, Oxford, May 1986. Lecture 2, at p. 181. 
9 See e.g. Korsgaard, C. (1996a) The Sources of Normativity O'Neill, O. (ed.), Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, esp. ch.4; see also Korsgaard, C. (1996b) 'Kant's Formula of 
Humanity' in her Creating the Kingdom of Ends, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
pp.106-132. 
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deserve respect provides another explanation of its value - in particular, its 'symbolic' 
value. 
The second normative framework in which autonomy plays a central role is in 
picking out those agents who are candidates for political participation. Those agents 
who are autonomous are entitled to have their interests and values considered when the 
political principles, according to which those agents will be governed, are being 
determined. Insofar as the status of autonomous agent entitles an individual to have their 
interests and values presented in such processes, we can see why autonomy is valuable. 
Thus there are constraints on a conception of autonomy: the class of agents identified as 
autonomous should be coextensive with the class of agents who are entitled to such 
normative goodS.lO I will not focus in detail on these constraints in the rest of the thesis, 
leaving these issues for further exploration elsewhere. However, I intend the positive 
account I outline in the third part of thesis to sit with a conception of autonomy that can 
feature in these normative frameworks. 
1.1.3 Paternalism 
The thought, expressed by Griffin, that we would not want another to interfere in our 
choices even if it were for the sake of our good, is essentially an anti-paternalistic one. 
10 In political philosophy, the processes by which political principles of justice are ratified are 
sometimes conceived of hypothetically. A conception of autonomy also has a role in identifying 
and feeding into a theory the features that characterise the participants in the hypothetical 
process. For instance, on one picture the participating agents are self-interested agents, rationally 
concerned to secure the pursuit of their interests and values. (See e.g. Gauthier, D. (1986) Morals 
by Agreement, Oxford, Oxford University Press, as discussed by Christman, 1. (2005) 
'Autonomy, Self-Knowledge and Liberal Legitimacy' in Christman, 1. and Anderson, 1. (eds.) 
2005, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp.330-359.) 
On another picture, the agents recognise the rational commitment to respecting the 
expressed values of others, and hence seek the principles that best enshrine this respect. These 
differences reflect different conceptions of the traits by which autonomous agents are 
characterised. Christman attributes this view to John Rawls (see Rawls, J. (1971) A Theory of 
Justice, Cambridge, Harvard University Press; Rawls, 1. (1993) Political Liberalism, Columbia 
University Press). Christman discusses these different pictures of the agents that participate in 
processes of liberal legitimacy, and argues that we should accept the latter; agents lack the kind 
of self-knowledge and transparency required to take seriously the interests and values from 
which they bargain on the former view. 
This attention to the features of concrete agents is welcome: some theorists have 
objected that the association of autonomy with independence has lead to inaccurate 
representations of the hypothetically deliberating agents in this process. See Seyla Benhabib 
(1994) 'Deliberative Rationality and Models of Democratic Legitimacy' Constellations 1 (1),26-52. 
See also Okin, S. M. «(1989) Justice, Gender and the Family, Basic books, esp. Chapter 5) on 
concerns about who is included in Rawls' deliberative procedures: his original theory included that 
agents have the property of being heads of households; hence many women in the private sphere were 
excluded from the decision making process. I do not directly address this issue in the thesis. 
6 
Paternalistic interventions are those in which one agent judges that her assessment of 
what is best for another agent ought to override that agent's own decision or choice. 
But, building on the thought that autonomous agents deserve 'recognition respect', to 
override an agent's decision in this way - even with the agent's best interests in mind -
is (other than in exceptional cases) a failure to properly respect the autonomy of the 
agent. As Scamon claims, "we generally think that the fact that the affected parties 
chose or assented to an outcome is an important factor in making that outcome 
legitimate" .11 This point has application both with regards legitimacy of certain social 
and political institutions, and the legitimacy of particular interventions - by the state or 
individual agents. On occasions in which an agent has not assented to some outcome -
even some outcome concerned with her own good - this particular' legitimising factor' 
is not present. 
Thus (absent strong justification) autonomous agents should be protected 
from paternalistic intervention. This protection can be understood in a normative sense, 
and has following form: the burden of justification falls on any proposed intervention 
with an autonomous agent's decision or action. If no adequate justification can be given, 
then the intervention is morally criticisable. I2 This normative framework is one that I 
will focus on in detail in this thesis - the adequacy of relational conceptions of 
autonomous agency will be assessed in light of their ability to stand in this particular 
role. The question I will consider in Chapter 6 is whether relational conceptions of 
autonomous agency can make sense of the claim that certain interventions cannot meet 
the justificatory burden. As we will see, there are different views on which justifications 
are adequate. 13 Can some such interventions be justified whether or not the autonomous 
agent would assent to them (the hard paternalist view)? Or can omy those interventions 
to which the agent would consent, with further information, be justified (the soft 
paternalist view)? 
Whilst it may be true that "all agree ... that another function of the concept of 
autonomy is to mark out the parameters within which a person is immune from 
paternalistic intervention,,14 it remains a live question what kinds of intervention are 
11 Scanlon, T.M. (1986) Lecture 1, p.155. 
12 See Gaus, G. (2005) Op cit. He argues that a principle that has this form is a core part of 
liberalism. 
\3 For discussion, see Dworkin, G. (1972) 'Paternalism.' Monist 56 pp.64-84; Dworkin, G. 
(1983) 'Paternalism: Some Second Thoughts', R. Sartorius, (ed.) Paternalism, Minneapolis. 
University of Minnesota Press, pp.105-ll2. 
14 Christman, 1. (2004) Op Cit, p.157. 
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consistent with properly valuing autonomy. I will be primarily concerned with hard 
paternalism, for the purposes of this thesis. In particular I will be concerned with what I 
call 'the core cases' of hard paternalism; cases which any conception of autonomy 
should be able to diagnose as unjustified. The central concern here is whether relational 
conceptions of autonomy can do the work in picking out those agents who should be 
protected from paternalistic intervention. This is a benefit to which autonomous agents 
are entitled. Thus, we can see why autonomy, insofar as it creates a normative constraint 
upon interventions in agents' choices and actions, is valuable. 
1.1.4 Summary 
Thus far we have seen that the notion of autonomy plays key roles in a range of 
normative frameworks: grounding respect, identifying the participants (or features of 
hypothetical participants) in collective decision making, and - of particular interest in 
this thesis - protecting from paternalism. The role of autonomy in these normative 
frameworks means that being categorised as autonomous comes with important 
normative benefits, and this explains, in part, its value: autonomous agents ought to be 
respected, ought not have their choices and actions intervened with, and ought to be 
included in processes that legitimise political power. IS We can also surmise, from this 
brief survey of these normative frameworks, that the three roles are intimately 
connected: that autonomous agents ought to be respected means that their choices and 
actions ought not (absent strong justification) be interfered with, and that if they are to 
be subject to political power, this requires justification (which takes the form, in 
liberalism, of collective rational endorsement). 
The problem of how to accommodate, in social and political terms, the extent to 
which agents should be protected from paternalism, treated with respect, and be 'free to 
make up their own minds' is (part of) what Scallion refers to as "the political problem of 
free Will".16 It is important to distinguish this cluster of problems from that to which 
Scanlon refers as "the personal problem of free will" which concerns how we might 
explain the sense in which we 'own' some of our actions, rather than feeling 
"manipulated, trapped, reduced to the status of a puppet" - as we would when we 
15 This is not to say, of course, that autonomy has merely instrumental value in securing these 
benefits. 
16 Scanlon, T.M. (1986), Op.Cit, pp.156, 157. 
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discover we have been manipulated or hypnotised, say.I7 It is the former set of problems 
that provides part of the framework for the examination of autonomy in this thesis. 
Insofar as being autonomous means being accorded this range of normative 
benefits it is not difficult to see why it is, quite apart from any judgment about its 
intrinsic value, that we care about autonomy. We thus get a clearer sense of the structure 
of the concept: one might be self-governing to a greater or lesser degree. But there will 
be a relevant threshold above which agents are entitled to the normative benefits set out. 
The conditions for autonomy are those which must be met for the agent to meet this 
threshold; she may then manifest the traits required for this to a higher degree (be more 
autonomous) - but this will not mean that she has more of these benefits (although it 
may help to make it absolutely clear that she is entitled to them). 
In recent decades, the notion of autonomy has received much attention from 
feminist philosophers.I 8 In the following section, I set out what has motivated this 
attention to autonomy in particular, and the direction that the debate has taken. 
1.2 Towards relational autonomy 
The attention from feminist theorists has prompted the development of 'relational' 
conceptions of autonomy. A relational conception of autonomy is one which has 
"amongst its defining conditions requirements concerning the interpersonal or social 
environment of the agent".19 In this section, I clarify the kinds of conditions at issue, 
spell out some of the motivations for the attention to such conditions, and set in context 
the project of the thesis. 
17 Ibid, p.157. Note that Scanlon is concerned in particular with why 'the causal thesis' - namely, 
the thesis that there are external causes for all of our choices and actions - does not lead us to 
feel so alienated from all of our choices and actions. I am not concerned with the problems raised 
by causal determinism here. I address the connections between the debates about relational 
autonomy and the debates about free will in my paper 'The Metaphysics of Relational 
Autonomy' (forthcoming in Feminist Metaphysics Witt, C. (ed.).). 
18 See e.g. Code, L. (1991) "Second Persons" in What Can She Know? Feminist Theory and the 
Social Construction of Knowledge. L. Code. New York, Cornell University Press; Held, 
V.(l993) Feminist Morality, Chicago, University of Chicago Press; see also the essays in 
Relational Autonomy: Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy. Agency, and the Self, 2000, 
MacKenzie, C. and Stoljar, N. (eds.), Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
19 Christman, 1. (2004) Op Cit, p. 147. 
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1.2.1 Clarifying relational conditions 
It is important to distinguish the claim that autonomy is relational from another, similar 
claim, about the relational nature of agents. For example, in their volume, Relational 
Autonomy, Catriona MacKenzie and Natalie Stoljar characterise 'relational autonomy' 
as: 
an umbrella term, designating a range of related perspectives ... premised 
on a shared conviction that persons are socially embedded, that agents' 
identities are formed within the contexts of social relationships and 
shaped by a complex of intersecting social determinants such as race, 
class, gender, and ethnicity.20 
However, MacKenzie and Stoljar have here characterised conceptions of agents that are 
relational, rather than conceptions of autonomy. But there is an important difference 
between conceiving of agents relationally, and seeing autonomy as relational. One 
might agree that agents are indeed socially embedded and so on: but these claims may 
not have anything to do with autonomy. A conception of agents as relational may be 
accepted, whilst the conditions for autonomy may still fail to reference to the social 
environment of the agent. Conversely, an individualistic conception of agents might be 
held in conjunction with a relational conception of autonomy.21 
So, the question of whether the conditions for autonomy are relational is not the 
same as the question of whether 'selves' or agents are relational.22 The claim about the 
relational nature of autonomy is my concern here. How, then, might we understand this 
claim, and what has motivated attention to it? 
1.2.2 Motivations for relational autonomy 
Some feminist philosophers have expressed discontent with the notion of autonomy, 
claiming that it presupposes a view of agents that is unrealistic. Lorraine Code, for 
example, has suggested that the notion privileges a conception of autonomous agents 
that casts them as essentially independent units, for whom self-sufficiency and 
20 MacKenzie, C. and Stoljar, N. (2000) 'Autonomy Re-figured' in their Relational Autonomy: 
Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency, and the Self, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
pp.3-34, see p. 4. 
21 See Friedman, M (2003), Autonomy, Gender, Politics New York, Oxford University Press, for 
a view with this structure. 
22 For a discussion of the relational conditions for agents, see e.g. Barclay, L. (2000) 'Autonomy 
and the Social Self in MacKenzie and Stoljar (2000), pp.52-71. See also Louise Antony, who 
argues against conceiving selves relationally: Antony, L. (1995) 'Is Psychological Individualism 
a piece ofIdeology?, Hypatia 10 (3), pp.157-173 
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detachment from others is the ideal.23 As characterised by Diana Meyers, this critique 
holds that "self-governance has been taken to presuppose unfettered independence from 
other individuals, as well as from the larger society".24 
This has prompted theorists to consider closely the ways in which social 
relations impact upon autonomy. The thought is that if it turns out that social relations 
are in some way necessary for autonomy, then it will be clear that the presupposition of 
'unfettered independence' is false. Now, Marilyn Friedman points out that critiques of 
autonomy such as Code's are targeted against something of a straw man. She observes 
that, in fact, some existing conceptions do take into account the social relations that are 
required for autonomy. For example, some views draw attention to the fact that 
"socialization is crucial to the development of the capacity to be a chooser".zs Likewise, 
Thomas Hill Jnr. notes that we can value autonomy "without in any way implying that 
self-sufficiency, independence, and separation from others are goals worth pursuing". 26 
There are two points, here: first, no plausible view should deny that there are 
some causally necessary social conditions for autonomy. As human beings, we are 
dependent upon others for much of early life for the development of a range of skills -
23 See Code, L. (1991) Op. Cit. Those concerned that autonomy privileges the value of 
independence point out that many in positions of dependency exercise much careful self-
governance. See, e.g. Meyers, D (1987) 'Autonomy and the Paradox of Feminine Socialization' 
The Journal of Philosophy 84 (11), pp.619-628. 
Other theorists have been attentive to the different kinds of virtues that might be 
manifested in a purportedly non-autonomous life, arguing for that too much attention to 
independence and self-sufficiency fails to acknowledge these other important traits. See Gilligan, 
C. (1994) In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development, Harvard 
University Press. Gilligan argues that Kohlberg' s model of moral development (See Kohlberg, 
L. (1984) The Psychology of Moral Development: The Nature and Validity of Moral Stages, 
Harper Collins) fails to recognise the value of the distinctive style of reasoning 'care reasoning' 
that women use. The care perspective is ranked lower on the scale of moral development, whilst 
'men's' style of moral reasoning (justice thinking) is the apex of the scale. 
For a summary of empirical criticisms of Gilligan's view, see Saul, J. (2003) Feminism: 
Issues and Arguments Oxford, Oxford University Press. Esp. chapter 7. Saul's chapter also 
discusses philosophical problems with Gilligan's claims. For more on the latter, see Friedman, 
M. 'Beyond Caring: The Demoralisation of Gender' in An Ethic of Care: Feminist and 
Interdisciplinary Perspectives, Laraabee, M.J. (ed.) Routledge, pp.258-275; Card, C. (1995) 
'Gender and Moral Luck' inJustice and Care, Held, V. (ed.) Westview Press, pp.70-100. 
24 Meyers, D. (2000) 'Intersectional Identity and the Authentic Self?: Opposites Attract!' in 
Relational Autonomy MacKenzie and Stoljar, eds. pp. 151 - 181, see p.152. 
25 Friedman, M. (2003), p. 90. She references as views that give some attention to the social 
conditions that may be causally necessary for autonomy: Benn, S.1. (1982) 'Individuality, 
Autonomy and Community' in Community as a Social Ideal, Kamenka, E. (ed.) New York, St 
Martin's Press, pp.43-62; Dworkin, G. (1988) Op.Cit.; Hill, T. Jnr. (1991) Autonomy and Self-
Respect, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
26 Hill Jnr., T. (1991) 'The Importance of Autonomy' in his Autonomy and Self-Respect, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 43-51, p.49. 
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including the skills needed for self-governance. If this is all that is meant by the claim 
that autonomy is relational, then we should accept the view. The second point addresses 
the compatibility of autonomy and dependency: valuing autonomy "does not deny 
anyone the choice to share with others, to acknowledge one's dependency, to accept 
advice, or even to sacrifice for the interests of others,,?7 It seems that the concerns that 
originally motivated the formulation of 'relational' views of autonomy are misplaced: 
there are causally necessary relational conditions for autonomy, and autonomy is not 
reserved for only those who are independent and self-sufficient. 
But some theorists have argued for a stronger kind of relational view. Paul 
Benson, for example, argues that causally relational conceptions of autonomy "imply 
that the character of our interpersonal or social situation ... can only affect our free 
agency accidentally, by virtue of its potential influences on our capacities." 28 Social 
relations might impact upon an agent's autonomy-relevant capacities, but the connection 
is merely contingent. Indeed, it is important to note that we might accept the claim that 
there are causally necessary conditions for autonomy, whilst maintaining that the 
conditions for being autonomous are not relational. That is to say: becoming 
autonomous might require certain social relations, whilst, subsequently being 
autonomous does not. 
But what might the claim that social relations are constitutive of autonomy 
amount to? Should we accept the claim, appropriately understood, that some of the 
constitutive conditions for autonomy make reference to the social environment of the 
agent? These are the questions that I will be concerned with in this thesis. 
1.2.3 The project of the thesis 
The question, then, is whether a conception of autonomy should acknowledge not 
merely causally, but also constitutively necessary relational conditions: 
are social relations merely causal conditions that are necessary to 
bring autonomy about but are external to autonomy proper, rather 
like sunshine causing plants to grow? Or are they somehow partly 
. . f t ?29 constitutive 0 au onomy. 
27 Ibid, p.49. 
28 Benson, P. (1994) 'Free Agency and Self-Worth' The Journal of Philosoph}' 91(12) pp.650-
668, see p. 666. 
29 Friedman, M. (2003) Op.Cit. p.96. 
12 
Marilyn Friedman writes: 
This unresolved issue is one major philosophical concern that continues 
to divide, on the one hand, feminists who advocate a [constitutively] 
relational account of autonomy from, on the other hand, theorists who 
acknow ledge that social relationships contribute [ causally] to 
autonomy.30 
She goes on: 
Relational, or constitutively social, accounts of autonomy such as these, 
I believe, set the stage for the next round of feminist explorations of 
autonomy. A crucial aim of these explorations should be to determine 
what it could mean to say that autonomy is intrinsically or 
constitutively social. Another crucial aim should be to determine 
whether feminism really needs to regard autonomy as intrinsically or 
constitutively social.3l 
This thesis undertakes this next round of exploration, critically assessing existing views 
of what it is for social relations to be constitutive of autonomy (Part I and Part II). 
Finding these wanting, I set forward, in Part III of the thesis, some constitutively 
relational conditions for autonomous action. It will be clear that all theorists, not only 
feminists, need to regard autonomy as constitutively social in this way. 
Now, with regards the concern about 'unfettered individualism': will adopting a 
constitutively relational conception make clear the falsity of this presupposition? Even 
though no theory in fact demands substantive independence, it might nonetheless be 
that too much independence is a bad thing. So a critique of too much independence 
might be desirable. Friedman suggests that, whilst this is so, a conception of autonomy 
will not provide the grounds for such criticism: 
a critique of substantively independent behaviour will have to be based 
on something other than the ideal of autonomy. We cannot fault 
autonomy theories for failing to do what might lie beyond their proper 
scope.32 
30 Ibid, p.96. 
31 Ibid, p.97. 
32 Ibid, p.93. 
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One of the aims of the third part of this thesis is to argue that autonomy does not, when 
properly conceived, promote or presuppose the value of independence.33 I shall 
ultimately argue that not only is dependency compatible with autonomy, it is sometimes 
required for its exercise. This claim goes beyond the observation, from Hill, that 
dependency is compatible with autonomy; and, contra Friedman, we will see that the 
notion of autonomy can provide the basis for a critique of substantive independence as 
an ideal. This will be argued for in the third part of the thesis. 
My project, then, is initially to explore whether there is good reason to accept 
constitutively relational conditions for autonomy; my initial [mdings will suggest that 
there is not. However, in Part III of the thesis, I will argue that there are, in fact, 
relational conditions for autonomous action. Thus the project, ultimately, might be 
understood as continuous with that of aiming to 'refigure' the notion of autonomy, 
taking into account the way in which social relations are necessary for autonomy. 
1.3 Aspects of autonomy 
The concern to take into account the social dimensions of autonomy might focus on 
different aspects of autonomy. For example, Natalie Stoljar, whose account I examine in 
chapter 2, looks at the impact of social conditions upon the autonomy of an agent's 
particular choices. Paul Benson and Marina Oshana focus on the potential for social 
relations to thwart autonomous agency (considered in chapter 5). Few theorists 
explicitly separate out these different dimensions. But the separating of autonomy into 
its three aspects - agency, choice, and action - is instructive, and central in this thesis, 
where I consider whether there are relational conditions for each aspect in tum. 
Failing to treat each aspect separately may result in some of the conditions for 
autonomy being missed. We should not expect the conditions for autonomous agency to 
be the same as those for autonomous choice. The former pertains to the capacities that 
the agent possesses. The latter pertains to the agent's exercise of those capacities on a 
specific occasion. Likewise, the conditions for action will make reference to, for 
example, the agent's bodily movements. Such considerations will not be relevant in the 
same way to autonomous choice or agency. Consider the following examples: 
33 I will, however, accept that it is 'individualistic' in a non-problematic way - namely, that it is a 
property of individuals. See Friedman (2003) Op. Cit. (Chapter 1) for discussion of this claim. 
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Brain Manipulation: suppose that manipulation is an autonomy 
undermining factor. Gonzalez is an autonomous agent: he has the capacity 
for autonomous deliberation, choice and action. He is (unbeknownst to 
him) subject to neural manipulation, such that whenever he seeks to buy a 
soft drink, he chooses cola (suppose that prior to the manipulation, he 
would rank other drinks as preferable). With a busy schedule, he has to plan 
carefully his weekly shop. When he does so, it is clear that he is exercising 
his capacities for rational deliberation and choice: his autonomy-relevant 
capacities. When he enacts the plan, and takes from the shelf apples, 
broccoli, and so on, he chooses autonomously, and acts autonomously. 
However, when he puts the cola in the basket, his choice of product is not 
autonomous. 
In such a case, we should say that although Gonzalez is an autonomous agent, and is 
shopping autonomously, his choice for coca-cola is non-autonomous. But having made 
the choice for this soft drink (non-autonomously), his self-governance in carrying out 
the choice is exemplary. 
Spasm: Suppose that autonomous action, plausibly, requires that one can 
execute the bodily movements necessary to carry out one's choice. Gina is 
doing a weekly shop. She too has carefully planned and coordinated when 
to shop, and what to buy, having exercised her autonomy-relevant 
capacities. Unlike Gonzalez, Gina has avoided all neural manipulation. 
When she chooses to buy cola, she does so autonomously. However, when 
she reaches the soft drinks aisle, she is momentarily struck by a spasm, 
knocking a four pack of cola into her basket. When she recovers, she 
continues on to the checkout. Although her choice of product was 
autonomous, the action of putting the cola in the basket was not 
autonomous (although the outcome was, incidentally, the same as it would 
have been had she acted autonomously). 
Gonzalez and Gina both experience problems of autonomy, but the problems are quite 
different, and attach to different aspects of their autonomy. Both are autonomous agents. 
Each shops autonomously. But one of Gonzalez' particular choices is non-autonomous, 
although he is' otherwise an exemplary self-governing agent. One of Gina's actions is 
non-autonomous, although none of her choices are. These examples show the way that 
the three aspects of autonomy come apart. Given the different nature of choice, agency 
and action and given that, accordingly, the necessary conditions for each aspect will be 
different, they should be investigated separately. 34.35 At each juncture, it may be that 
34 There is a precedent for this in the literature on moral responsibility, where it is commonplace 
to consider whether agents are morally responsible, and then consider the further issue of 
whether, for any particular action or choice, the agent was responsible for that action or choice 
(the presence of reasonable but false beliefs may mitigate responsibility for a particular choice, 
say). 
35 Note also that this approach is consistent with Hornsby's rejection of those views according to 
which "characterising self-detennined agency is a matter of marking out a special class of events 
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there are relational conditions for autonomy. But it is important to note that there may 
be relational conditions for one aspect, and not another. 
1.4 A framework 
The considerations raised above show us the importance of a conception of autonomy 
satisfying the following desideratum: 
(A) a conception of autonomy must be able to cohere with the normative 
frameworks that in part explain its value. 
We will also be considering whether we should accept a conception of autonomy 
according to which: 
(B) the conditions for autonomy are constitutively relational. 
Now, if the notion of autonomy is to cohere with the normative frameworks, a further 
constraint is presented, namely: given intuitions about the class of agents entitled to 
these benefits, a conception of autonomy must be in accord with these intuitions. Of 
course, intuitive support is a desideratum for any conception. 
It is important to note, though, that there are some specific intuitions that 
theorists developing relational conceptions have aimed to capture. Some theorists have 
expressed intuitions to the effect that choosing and acting in accordance with oppressive 
norms is non-autonomous. Such choices do seem to be problematic in a way that many 
everyday choices do not.36 Some theorists aim to distinguish between (for example): 
[autonomous actions]" (p.lO). On this view, autonomous agency is identified by delineating the 
class of autonomous actions an individual perfonns. Her concern is that this view fails to make 
enough room for agents in a conception of self-detennined agency. See Hornsby, 1. (2004) 
'Agency and Actions' in Steward, H. and Hyman, J. (eds.) Agency and Action, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, pp.I-23. 
Likewise, my strategy is in line with James Stacey Taylor's rejection of 'the assumption 
of transitivity of autonomy'. On this assumption, if a choice is autonomous, the action that 
follows from it is also autonomous. Taylor argues, with reference to cases of coercion, that this 
assumption is incorrect. I hope the brief discussion of the examples here also shows the 
assumption to be false. See Taylor, 1.S. (2003) 'Autonomy, Duress and Coercion', Social 
Philosophy and Policy 20 (2), pp.127-155, see esp. pp.133-138. 
36 See, e.g. Stoljar, N. (2000) 'Autonomy and the Feminist Intuition' in Relational Autonomy: 
Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy and Agency, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp.94-111. 
See also Benson, P. (1991) 'Autonomy and Oppressive Socialisation' Social Theory and 
Practice 17, pp.385-408. It is important to note that Benson's view in this paper is different to 
his later view which I consider in Chapter 5. 
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Troubling: Annie chooses to become a deferential housewife. 
Ok: Clyde chooses to become an art dealer. 
Those who find Troubling troubling seek to capture these intuitions. Indeed, as we shall 
see, some have claimed that only a relational conception can make sense of them. The 
motivation to take into account intuitions is a central aim of some such conceptions, 
then. So the third part of our framework is: 
(C) A conception of autonomy should cohere with commonsense intuitions 
about who is autonomous and who is not. 
In particular, a constraint is set by the normative frameworks in which autonomy 
figures: intuitions about who deserves the normative benefits must be respected. At 
least, any departure from common sense intuition must be motivated and justified.37 
These three considerations will be relevant to our assessment of the views I examine 
, 
and guide our evaluation of them. With this in mind, I now briefly outline the strategy 
of the thesis. 
1.4.1 Part 1: On relational (substantive) conditions for autonomous choice 
One way in which a condition might be constitutively relational is by building 
substantive value constraints into an account of autonomy. Choices that do not accord 
with the specified value are not autonomous. Certain social conditions may hinder 
choice in accordance with the specified value; or certain social options may not be 
consistent with the value. I consider two explicitly 'value-laden' views of this kind: the 
first from Natalie Stoljar (Chapter 2); the second from Thomas Hill Jnr., and defended 
by Marcia Baron (Chapter 3). Having set out the problems that each of these specific 
views face, in Chapter 4 I argue that no substantive condition can do the work required 
of it. Specifically, such a condition is unable to make intuitive discriminations between 
choices that are intuitively autonomous, and those that are not (see (C), above). This is 
so despite the stated aim to capture intuitions about agents whose autonomy is thwarted 
by oppressive social contexts. Thus constitutively relational conditions for autonomous 
choice such as this remain unmotivated. 
37 Because, of course, some feminist theorists have made claims that, at the time, did great 
violence to common sense intuition. For example, the suggestion that women could work in the 
public sphere rather than be confmed to the home would once have been in tension with common 
sense intuition. (Thanks to Jimmy Lenman for pointing this out.) 
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1.4.2 Part 2: On relational conditions for autonomous agency 
Constitutively relational conditions might, rather, be understood to demand that the 
agent stand in certain social conditions or relations. This is the strategy of Paul Benson 
and Marina Oshana, whose views I consider in Chapter 5. It is here we see the difficulty 
of offering a relational conception that can stand in the desired normative frameworks· , 
Benson fails to offer constitutively social conditions (so I argue); yet an account such as 
Oshana's which posits this kind of condition cannot play the normative role of setting 
the bounds for paternalism. The argument of Chapter 6 is a general one, the conclusion 
of which is that any constitutively relational conception of autonomous agency will fail 
in this way; only causally relational conditions for autonomous agency should be 
accepted. 
1.4.3 Part 3: On relational conditions for autonomous action 
Now, the kinds of views I consider in the first two parts of the thesis are 'value-laden', 
in that they incorporate, with the relational conditions, certain values or ideals. This 
kind of value-laden condition has been identified, by John Christman, with 
constitutively relational autonomy itself.38 Given the arguments of these earlier chapters, 
if he is right, this means that no account could both meet both parts of the framework, 
(A) and (B): that is, no account that is constitutively relational could play the normative 
roles that account for autonomy's value. But in Part III of the thesis we see that this 
conflation of relational conditions with value-laden conditions is wrong. 
An aspect of autonomy alluded to in many accounts, but rarely explicitly 
discussed, is that of autonomous action. In this part of the thesis (Chapter 7), I argue 
that social relations are constitutive of autonomous action. We will see not only that 
such a view is well placed to identify the social conditions required for autonomous 
action, but that incorporating such conditions does not also incorporate values or ideals; 
thus the other normative roles can be fulfilled. I sketch a particular condition that can 
make good sense, if filled out, of how oppressive social contexts can thwart autonomy. 
Even in outline form, the work of this chapter should make it clear that a proper 
understanding of relational autonomy is of importance to everyone, not just, as 
Friedman suggests, to feminist philosophers. 
38 See Christman, J. (2006) Book Review: Marilyn Friedman, Autonomy Gender, Politics (2003), 
in The Journal a/Value Inquiry 40, pp.137-143. 
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Chapter 2. Substantive account I: Stoljar 
This part of the thesis is concerned with autonomous choice. We can start with a 
commonsense understanding of autonomous choice as follows: 
(CHOICE) an agent's choice is autonomous when the agent exercises self-
governance over her deliberations and subsequent choice making. 
According to substantive conceptions of autonomy, if an agent fails to choose in 
accordance with a certain value, she fails to be properly self-governing. Such conditions 
identify certain social environments as incompatible with autonomous choice: those 
which are in conflict with the specified value. Before looking at the argument for the 
substantive relational conception outlined by Natalie Stoljar, it will be useful to set out, 
in brief, the kinds of accounts to which these views are proposed as alternatives. 
'Content-neutral' conceptions of autonomy hold that, with respect to its objects, any 
choice can in principle be autonomous, so long as the agent has made that choice in a 
way that meets the necessary conditions on the process or procedures by which she 
made that choice; or, perhaps on the structure of her motivational or psychological 
states.1 
In contrast, the kind of relational conceptions with which we are here concerned, 
namely, substantive conceptions, place constraints not merely on the process, but on the 
substance of the choice. These conceptions are characterised by Paul Benson as follows: 
substantive accounts of autonomy ... [are] those in which the contents of the 
preferences or values that agents can form or act upon autonomously are 
subject to direct, normative constraints .,. there must be some things that 
autonomous agents cannot prefer or value without sacrificing some 
I See e.g. Christman, 1. (1991 a) 'Liberalism and Individual Positive Freedom' Ethics 10 1 (2),. 
pp.343-359; Christman, 1. (1991 b) 'Autonomy and Personal History' Canadian Journal oj 
Philosophy 21, pp.I-24: Dworkin, G. (1988) Op. Cit. for procedural accounts. See Frankfurt. H. 
(1971), 'Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person' The Journal of Philosophy 68( 1), 
pp.5-20; Watson, G. (1975) 'Free Agency' The Journ~l. of Philosophy, 72(8) pp.205-2~O for 
structural accounts. Procedural and structural conditions are not mutually exclUSive -
Christman's account, for example, posits both procedural and structural requirements. 
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autonomy, where this restriction depends immediately on the substance of 
such preferences or values.2 
On this view, in addition to the necessary processes, the agent is not properly self-
governing unless she also chooses in accordance with certain values.3 The claim is that 
only an account that incorporates values in this way can make sense of intuitively non-
autonomous choices of agents in oppressive social contexts. 4 Indeed, Natalie Stoljar 
claims that: 
to vindicate the feminist intuition that the subjects [who acted ill 
accordance with 'false and oppressive nonns'] are not autonomous 
feminists need to deVelop a strong substantive theory of autonomy.s 
It is quite clear, then, that the ann is to diagnose what is taken to be intuitively 
problematic about the choices of certain agents, operating in social contexts in which 
2 Benson, P. (2005b) 'Feminist Intuitions and the Nonnative Substance of Autonomy' in Taylor, 
I.S. (ed.) Personal Autonomy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp.124-142, p.133. The 
kind of substantive account that is characterised here is often referred to as a strong substantive 
account. Others, which do not place constraints directly on the choice, but rather build nonnative 
content into an account of autonomy elsewhere, are called 'weak substantive' accounts. An 
instance of this account is considered in Part II, although I avoid this tenninology throughout the 
thesis. 
Note also that Benson talks of preferences or values. Thus it is not clear whether we 
should understand this characterisation as pertaining to non-autonomous choice (choice infonned 
by those preferences or values) or non-autonomous agents (who hold those preferences or 
values). I will understand his claim as pertaining to choice, although my claims should hold 
concerning agents also. As we will see, the kinds of claims from Stoljar and Hill Inr. make this 
focus on choice natural. Whilst there is rarely clarity about which aspect of autonomy is under 
consideration, I think this is how best to interpret their claims. 
3 Those who offer substantive constraints often say little about the precise nature of the content-
neutral conditions to which they envisage the substantive condition be added. Stoljar, for 
example, runs through various procedural and structural conditions, showing none of them to 
capture intuitions about the autonomy of the individuals in her examples. But she does not say 
whether she endorses any of them as part of a set of jointly sufficient conditions. 
4 A narrower understanding of substantive conditions can be found in the literature. Marina 
Oshana (2006, Personal Autonomy in Society, Hampshire, Ashgate Publishing Ltd, p.4l) 
endorses the understanding set out (but not endorsed) by Marilyn Friedman: an agent is 
autonomous "only if she choosers] in accord with the value of autonomy itself, or, at least, 
choosers] so as not to undennine that value" (2003, Op.Cit p.19). I set aside this understanding 
here for the following reasons: first, the arguments I consider here incorporate values other than 
that of autonomy. Second, the argument I give in chapter 4 addresses conditions that demand 
choice in accordance with any value - this will include the value of autonomy as well as the 
others considered - so a broader understanding of substantive condition both represents the 
literature, and serves our present purposes, better. Third, given that the theorists say little about 
which content-neutral conditions the substantive condition is intended to supplement (see 
footnote above), it is not clear exactly what is meant by the claim that agents must choose in 
accordance with the value of autonomy. If it means that the agent must choose in accordance 
with (the value of) the content-neutral conditions, this will not provide the kinds of restrictions 
that substantive theorists seek. Choices for oppressive modes of behaviour, or for roles of 
deference, substantive theorists concede, can meet all the content-neutral conditions. 
5 Stoljar, N. (2000) Op.Cit.p.109. 
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gender inequality exists, and ill which gender socialisation IS deemed to have 
oppressive effects.6 
In the following I set out an example of the choices that trigger Stoljar's 
'feminist intuition', and outline the content-neutral conditions that she takes to be 
inadequate in diagnosing the (purported) non-autonomy of the choices. Stoljar merely 
sketches the kind of relational condition she envisages; I will argue that there is little 
reason to suppose that a more detailed filling out of this sketch would do the work 
required of it. 
2.1 Stoljar's 'feminist intuition' 
Stoljar draws on a set of interviews with women who had taken contraceptive risks, and 
subsequently sought abortions.7 In these interviews, the women reported on the reasons 
for which they had engaged in such risky behaviour, and the author of the study, Kristin 
Luker, argues that, having considered the reasons offered, we should conclude that these 
women were not simply foolish or irrational. Rather, she claims, they had "engaged in a 
process of tacit bargaining with themselves over the costs and benefits of using 
contraception",8 and the choice to take a risk won out. Some of the costs involved were 
those of informal sanctions that might attach to behaviour that did not conform to a set 
of social norms concerning sexual behaviour. These norms, as reported, include: 
(nl) it is inappropriate for women to have active pre-marital sex lives 
(n2) women should not plan for or initiate sex 
(n3) fertility increases a woman's worth 
(n4) women are only valuable as wives if they can bear children9 
Accordingly, insofar as these norms and the likely costs of norm violation were taken 
into account in deliberations, these women should be understood as rational bargainers 
rather than irrational risk-takers. An example (based on the study that Stoljar discusses) 
will be useful for getting clear on the kinds of deliberation and choice that are at issue 
here (I note in the example where some of the norms are playing a role in her 
deliberations ): 
6 The claims about oppressive socialisation and oppressive social contexts need not be restricted 
to the dimension of gender. . . 
7 See Luker, K. (1975) Taking Chances: abortion and the declSlon to contracept, Berkeley, 
University of California Press. 
8 Stoljar, N. (2000) Op.Cit, p.96. 
9 Ibid. p.99. 
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Deliberation: Suppose that Almaz, who has had an upbringing in a strongly Catholic 
community, has been seeing her partner Brad for a few months, and is considering the 
possibility that they might have sex sometime soon. She wonders whether to seek out 
some contraception. The following thoughts occur to her in her deliberations: 
I.could go to the doctors and ask for a prescription for the contraceptive 
pIll. If I go to the doctors and ask for a prescription, the doctor will think 
I'm having pre-marital sex. And this is a small community; others might 
find out too ... there'd be a lot of talk ... [nl, n2]. I'd feel a bit embarrassed 
and perhaps ashamed to ask, though that shouldn't stop me from asking. 
Anyway, the Church says that pre-marital sex is wrong [nl]; and 
that contraceptive use is wrong; most people around here think the same. 
I don't want to face censure from them. 
But the risk... the worst case scenario would be getting pregnant. 
But if that happened we could get married perhaps. Settling down and 
having children would be one way of sorting things so it'd all tum out ok. 
And it's not certain I'd get pregnant anyway.lO 
In this example, we see that the norms about premarital sex and women's sexual agency 
are operative in her community, such that violating these norms - by having pre-marital 
sex, and using contraception - would be met with social censure. These norms are 
supported by religious authority, as well as being widely socially accepted. Thus 
concerns about the informal sanctions or censures that she might face, were she to seek 
out contraception, figure prominently in Almaz' reasoning about what choice to make. 
Seeking out contraception would be seen to violate the norms that many in her 
community adhere to. The costs of getting contraception, when weighed in the balance, 
are given weight such that not getting contraception - taking a risk - appears to be the 
less costly option, and this option is chosen. (For simplicities' sake, I have focused on 
norms nl and n2 in the example above, but we can imagine how norms n3 and n4 might 
serve to make the choice she makes - of taking a risk - more palatable: becoming 
pregnant will demonstrate her fertility, and hence worth as a woman; her value as a wife 
will be proven.) 
Now, it is clear that Almaz' reasoning is not an exemplar of practical reasoning. 
We might be strongly inclined to say that she, and the women like her in the study, 
made a mistake in the weighting of the outcomes, say. But given the beliefs held about 
the outcomes and the values placed on these, it is not implausible to hold that Almaz is 
rational - at least to the degree that many of our choices are: that is, imperfectly, 
10 This example is re-constructed from the examples that Stoljar discusses. 
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rational. Indeed, Stoljar acknowledges that the choices that these women made might be 
rational. However, she claims that there is a 'feminist intuition' that the women in the 
study, like Almaz, are nonetheless "non-autonomous because they are overly influenced 
in their decisions ... by stereotypical and incorrect nonns of femininity and sexual 
agency"ll - nonns such as (nl-n4). 
Now, the nonns set out above (nl-n4), are clearly criticisable from a feminist 
point of view, as Stoljar claims. But that they are operative in the women's social 
context means that it is not irrational for the women who will be judged by them to 
consider such nonns, and the costs of non-compliance, in their decisions about 
contraceptive use. What it does mean, Stoljar holds, is that the women who are 
influenced by these nonns in their choices to engage in risky contraceptive behaviour 
are non-autonomous in so choosing. 
There are two steps in Stoljar's argument: fITst, that women like Almaz are non-
autonomous in their choices; second, to explain the non-autonomy of the women in their 
choice-making, a strong substantive account is required. One might reject the fITst step. 
Indeed, Paul Benson reports having quite different intuitions about the women in the 
study and their choices. Moreover, he objects to the thought that there is such a thing as 
'the' feminist intuition, suggesting that a diverse range of views on the matter would be 
consistent with feminist commitments. l2 For present purposes, I grant Stoljar the claim 
that the women are non-autonomous. I want to consider whether even if we grant this, 
her condition can succeed where, she claims, content-neutral accounts cannot. First, I 
set out, briefly, the kinds of conditions in the existing literature that Stoljar argues 
cannot make sense of the non-autonomy of choices the women whose choices were 
infonned by oppressive nonns, like Almaz'. This serves as an overview of some of the 
prominent views in the recent literature on autonomy, and we see in more detail what 
motivates the relational view propounded. However, I will suggest that content-neutral 
conceptions may yet have the resources to make sense of her intuition. 
2.2 Some content neutral conditions 
The following content-neutral conditions may be necessary for autonomous choice. But, 
Stoljar argues, they cannot be sufficient conditions: the agents in the study meet these 
II Stoljar, N. (2000) Op.Cit.p. 98. .' . 
12 See Benson, P. (2005b) Op.Cit. The mtUltIons that Benson has are consonant with his 
conception of autonomy, which I consider in chapter 5. 
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conditions but are nonetheless non-autonomous. In setting out her arguments, I suggest 
that we should not be so quick to reject some of the content-neutral conditions as unable 
to diagnose as non-autonomous the women's choices. I then turn to her proposed 
substantive condition. 
2.2.1 Structural: 
Structural conditions for autonomy demand that the agent's choice stems from a 
motivational set that has a certain structure. One kind of structural view posits 
conditions that pertain to the coherence of the agent's other motivational states with her 
choice. A second view focuses on the higher order attitude that an agent takes towards 
her choice. 
a) Coherence. 
On this view, an agent's autonomy is a function of the coherence of a particular choice 
with the rest of her motivational and mental states. If a choice is 'well-integrated' into 
the agent's motivational set, then she is autonomous in so choosing. What it means to be 
'well-integrated' varies according to different accounts. One version of this condition is 
Christman's, who demands that there be "no manifest inconsistencies among the beliefs 
and desires in the set of beliefs and desires that contribute to the processes of 
reflection". 13 
Stoljar claims that the women in the study would, for the most part, meet 
Christman's condition: the subjects in the contraceptive study do not show 
inconsistency to the extent that it would count as a "manifest violation of the internal 
coherence condition".14 That is to say, there is no case in which the agent's obviously 
believe, or desire, p and fJ. Stoljar's claim is that the agents do not have conflict which 
"constitutes a manifest breakdown in the. capacity for critical reflection" and this seems 
right - the agents are not conflicted to the extent that they lose their capacities for 
.. 1 fl t' 15 cntlca re ec IOn. 
13 ehri tm J (1991b) Gp.Cit. See Stoljar's discussion in her (2000), Gp.Cit. p.103. A stronger 
s an, d" . b fiound in Arpaly N and Schroeder T. «(1999) 'Praise, Blame and the coherence con Ihon can e , . , 
If Ph '/ h' / Studl'es 93 (2) pp 161-188) who demand that we look not only to Whole Se I asap lea , ,. '. _. _ 
. f: d d' th t are utilised in the process of retlectlOn, but to all of the behefs and those behe s an eSIres a .., .. 
. . th t' motI'vational set - not J'ust those that enter mto the dehberatlve process. desIres In e agen s 
14 Stoljar, N. (2000) Gp. Cit. p.104. 
15 Stoljar, N. (2000) Gp. Cit, p.105. 
However, it does appear that the agents are somewhat ambivalent. But rather 
than demonstrating faulty agency, this appears to demonstrate acknowledgement of the 
tension that arises from the norms. Consider Almaz' s reasoning again: she considers the 
pros and cons of taking a risk, or taking precautionary steps. Some of her beliefs and 
value commitments pull in conflicting directions: her beliefs about the authority of the 
church, say, and the views of those in positions of social authority (such as the doctor, 
who she might feel "ashamed to ask") are in tension with her self-interests _ she 
acknowledges that feelings of shame "shouldn't stop [her] from asking", and that "the 
worst case scenario would be getting pregnant". 
The demands of the norms appear to be in tension with Almaz' self interest, and 
hence she is ambivalent about which to give precedence to. This seems reasonable, 
given the set of norms that she has to take into account; it seems that some ambivalence 
is not always problematic, and that such ambivalence or conflict in the face of 
conflicting norms is understandable and perhaps justified. 16 
b) Hierarchical, 
A hierarchical account focuses on the distinctive capacity of persons to take a reflective 
stance towards the motives they find themselves with. The hierarchical view appeals to 
the role that an agent's higher order endorsements play, in resolving conflict of lower 
order desires. When an agent finds herself with a manifest conflict of desires at the first 
order, say, she can nonetheless be autonomous if she chooses to act in accordance with 
one of these conflicting desires. Her autonomy depends upon the conflict being resolved 
at a higher order: insofar as at (say) the second order, one (but not both) of the 
conflicting (first order) desires is the object of a second order desire, then this is 
sufficient for autonomy in choice and subsequent action. For example, if an agent 
desires to smoke and desires not to smoke, and upon reflection finds herself endorsing 
the desire to smoke, then when she chooses to smoke, she is autonomous in her choice. 
This is so despite the conflict of frrst-order desires, and even if her addiction is such that 
16 See Westlund, A. «2003) 'Selflessness and Responsibility for S~lf, Th~ Journal .of 
Philosophy 112 (4) pp.483-523) for a similar claim to the effect th~t ambivalence 10 def~rentIal 
individuals, with respect to their deference, seems to temper Judgments about their. non-
autonomy. Such claims challenge the thought, exp~essed by Fr.ankfurt,. H. (~1999) 'The Fa10test 
Passion' in his Necessity Volition and Love Cambndge, Cambndge Umverslty Press. pp.95-107) 
th t b · lence always poses a problem for autonomy. Marina Oshana, also. expresses doubL~ a am Iva h Id' I bl' 
b t h bivalence is a threat to agency. Ambivalence, she 0 s. IS on y a pro em 10 a ou w en am hi' I '1 
" onfll'cted values desires and kindred psyc ooglca states curtal autonomv extreme cases: c ' ., . . -. 
h th ender conflict of a sufficiently comprehensive k10d to render any semblance ot were .. , ey eng . fl' h . . 
. 'bl "(2006 O'P Cit p 31). This kmd of con Ict, we ave seen. IS not present 10 an agent In1POSSI e. ,." 
Almaz or the women like her in the study. 
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she could not choose otherwise. The agent's higher order endorsement resolyes the 
conflict in a way that authorises her subsequent choice and action as one that is, in a 
significant sense, her own. 17 Such a view has been influentially argued for by Harry 
Frankfurt.18 Likewise, if an agent chooses to take contraceptive risk, then insofar as she 
reflectively endorses this choice, she is autonomous in so choosing, despite her first 
order ambivalence. 
According to Stoljar, the women who have been influenced by oppress lye 
norms show that a motivational structure of higher order endorsement that resolves 
lower order conflicts cannot be sufficient for autonomous choice. Some of the agents 
meet the hierarchical endorsement condition, she claims, but nonetheless the intuition 
remains that they lack autonomy in choice. Stoljar claims that the women's choices to 
take contraceptive risk are, in many instances, endorsed at a higher order desire and so 
they meet the Frankfurtian endorsement condition. Consider the following first order 
desires: 19 
(dl) desire [not to plan for sexual activity] 
Insofar as seeking contraception is a kind of planning for sexual activity, this implies: 
(d2) desire [not to seek contraception] 
But the agent also desires: 
(d3) desire [not to take contraceptive risk] 
Given the agent's belief that she is not in possession of contraception, and that she will 
not find contraception by other means than seeking it our herself, there is a conflict in 
first order desires here. Her desire not to take contraceptive risk and her desire not to 
k t t· nnot both be satisfied It is this kind of conflict of first order see con racep IOn ca . 
desires that the higher order endorsement can resolve - by 'authorising' one of the 
conflicting desires. 
. "11 to the fore in part III of the thesis. Note here the emphasis is 
17 ~he notIOn of authon~ ~~ ~~~~ I return in more detail in chapter 5. ~ith an examination of 
on mtrapersonal authonty'I 'd' t rpersonal authorising and its role m autonomous actIOn. 
I B " w Later conSI er me. . . Pau enson S VIe . . N th t F ankfurt makes clear that he intends hIS condItions to 
18 Frankfurt, H. (1971) Op.Clt. ote a r 
. b ssary for autonomy (see p. 19). 
be suffiCIent ut not nece th f desire at work in Frankfurtian accounts IS that of 
19 .' rt t to note that e sense 0 ..'h It IS Impo an . h· h ha' a desl·re if one is motIvated to act. I us one 
. . . . dmg to w IC one s ' . dlsposltlOnal desrre, accor. d " t do A in the dispositional sense, even If one has no 
. rfi . an actIon A eSlre 0 .. h 
may, m pe orm~ng ~o do A Noting this may help make plausible the claim t at 
phenomenal deSIre (urge, say), . . this docs not require that she has a phenomenal urge. 
Almaz desires not to seek contraceptIOn - , 
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Now, Stoljar thinks it plausible to understand the women as having in their 
motivational sets higher order endorsements of both of these desires. Suppose that 
Almaz is certain she does not want to get pregnant; it is plausible then to hold that she 
endorses the desire not to take contraceptive risk. But she really does give weight to the 
costs of seeking contraception, such as being held in ill-repute by members of her 
community whom she esteems. So she endorses the desire not to seek contraception, 
and thus has the following higher order desires: 
( d2 *) desire [desire [not to seek contraception]] 
(d3*) desire [desire [not to take contraceptive risk]] 
Insofar as there is endorsement of the first order desires, Stoljar claims, there is no 
conflict between the first order and higher order desires. Their motivational sets contain 
endorsements such that "both first order desires are endorsed at a second-order level".20 
According to Stoljar, if Almaz were to act upon her desire (d2), as endorsed by (d2*), 
she would meet the sufficient conditions for autonomy, as set out by the hierarchical 
account. She maintains that because there is higher order endorsement, she and women 
like her in the study, can be regarded - by the lights of the Frankfurtian condition - as 
autonomous. And this diagnosis, she claims, is wrong. 
c) Problems 
We should not accept Stoljar's rejection of the hierarchical condition as sufficient for 
autonomy, for Frankfurt's view in fact can make sense of the non-autonomy of the 
women's choices. We have seen that it is plausible to hold that the women experience 
conflict between first order desires. This conflict at the first order of desires requires 
resolution at the second order. In endorsing both of these first order desires at the 
second order (with (d2*) and (d3*», there is no resolution of the conflict; it has merely 
been elevated a level. There may be endorsement of the frrst order desires at a higher 
order, but the higher order desires of the agent (d2 *) and (d3 *) themselves conflict. We 
cannot say that (d2) is endorsed in the relevant way, because there is both a desire in 
favour of it - (d2*) - and a desire that repudiates it, (d3*). 
Now, Stoljar notes that this reiteration of connict at a higher order poses 
c. F nkfurt's account - the well-documented regress of le\'ds of problems lor ra 
I H er she must also acknowledge that the agents do not meet endorsement ooms. owev , 
20 Stoljar, N. (2000) Op.Cit. p.106. 
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Frankfurt's sufficient conditions for autonomous choice. Stoljar has not done enough to 
show that the hierarchical structural conditions for autonomy cannot account for the 
agents who have been 'overly influenced' by the oppressive norms. If such a view can 
account for the intuition - and I have argued that it can - then part of the motivation to 
adopt the substantive relational condition is undermined. 
2.2.2 Historical 
Another well-documented problem with this kind of hierarchical structural account 
however, is that it fails to take into account the histories of the agent's motivational set. 
An agent who meets the structural conditions could do so as a result of having this 
structure induced by a clever neurologist or hypnotist or whatever intuitively autonomy-
undennining entity is posited.21 This is counterintuitive, and prompts the addition of 
historical conditions. The historical condition posited by Christman, demands that: 22 
i) the agent was in a position to reflect upon the processes involved in the 
development of the desire. 
ii) the agent did not resist the development of the desire when attending 
to this process of development, or would not have resisted, had 
he attended to that process. 
iii) the lack of resistance to the development is not due to the influence of 
factors that inhibit self-reflection23 
This kind of condition is intended to deal with the problems that face hierarchical 
accounts: agents whose motivational structures have been induced by hypnosis and the 
like will, most likely, resist the formation of a desire brought about by this process of 
development if they attend to it - or would have resisted the formation of the desire, 
had they attended to it. If an agent resisted, or would have resisted, the formation of a 
desire in this way, then this accounts for their lack of autonomy when choosing on the 
basis of that desire at a later time.24 Can such an account speak to Stoljar's intuition 
about the non-autonomous choices of the women in the study? Stoljar holds that the 
agents would not have, even had they reflected upon this process, resisted the 
21 See Slote, M. (( 1980) 'Understanding Free Will' The Journal of Philosophy, 77 (3) pp.136-
151), for discussion of such problem cases. 
22 See Christman, 1. (1991 a) and (1991 b), Op. Cit. for argument for and defence of these 
conditions. 
23 See Christman 1. (1991a), p. 347. . . 
24 '. d rse preferences formed due to processes such as hypnotism: tor An agent may sometunes en 0 ~ fl' h d 
. fi not to smoke for example. Insolar as. upon re ectlOn, t ey 0 the sake of formmg pre erences .' .. 
. tho th th an be autonomous With respect to thl~ preference. 
not resist IS, en ey c 
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development of the desires or values that now inform their choices. Her claim IS 
difficult to make sense of, so I set it out here. She claims that: 
it is unlikely that they would have [resisted the formation of these preferences 
when reflecting upon the process of development] precisely because the habits 
of deference and the internalised norms, that is, the values that govern the 
agent's motivational structure, would themselves justify holding the relevant 
desire?5 
Stoljar's claim seems to be this: suppose that Almaz has internalised habits of deference 
(or values that encourage this) and a set of norms (nl-n4). This means that, when she is 
undergoing the process of developing relevant preferences (the preference not to seek 
contraception that informs the choice for contraceptive risk, in this case) she would not 
resist the process. This is because the values and norms (nl-n4) are internalised, and 
govern her preference formation and subsequent choice. The habit of deference -
presumably, a habit to avoid being too critical or free-thinking in making choices -
consolidates the role that the internalised norms play in the formation of the preference. 
So had Almaz thought more carefully about the process by which she came to her 
preference and choice, she would not have resisted it. 
Stoljar contends that the agent might be "in the grip of feminine norms about 
the dependency of women on men in sex, pregnancy and marriage,,26 such that she does 
not, and would not have, resisted the formation of the preference and subsequent choice 
to take contraceptive risk. Indeed, Stoljar writes that "the fact that the norms are 
internalised blocks the capacity of the agent to resist the development of preferences 
based on the norms".27 So the agent does not resist, and would not have resisted, the 
formation of the preference. So it appears that she meets Christman's historical 
condition. 
a) Problems 
It is not clear, however, that Christman's historical condition is unable to account for 
Stoljar's intuition that the resulting choices are non-autonomous. The reason for which 
the agents would not have resisted, Stoljar claims, is because they were 'in the grip' of 
the norms that governed their deliberations. Might being 'gripped' by norms in this way 
mean that the agent in fact fails to meet Christman's conditions? Christman's historical 
25 Stoljar, N. (2000) Op. Cit, p.1 01. 
26 Ibid, p.1 02. 
27 Ibid, p.1O 1. 
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condition, as he states it, requires that the agent "was in a position to reflect upon the 
processes involved in" the development of the preference.28 According to Christman, 
this kind of reflection involves: 
being in a position to focus on the processes and conditions that led to the 
adoption of that desire. That is, a relevantly full description of the steps of 
reasoning or causal processes that led her to have this desire is available 
for her possible consideration. This reflectiveness assumes that the agent 
can become aware of the beliefs and desires that move her ... [that is] to 
bring to conscious awareness a belief or desire, and concentrate on its 
meaning.29 
(By this latter claim, we should take Christman to mean something more like 
'significance', rather than just the literal meaning of the propositional object.) If the 
agent is in the grip of a norm, then it may be that the agent is not in a position to 
adequately reflect upon the processes by which she forms the relevant desire or 
preference - perhaps the grip of the norm is such that she is unable to bring it to 
consciousness and concentrate on its meaning. As characterised by Stoljar, then, it is not 
clear that the agents would meet the historical condition that Christman sets out. 
Moreover, insofar as the intemalisation of the norms has blocked the agent's 
capacity to resist, then it appears that she will not meet Christman's third condition, 
which pertains to the explanation for the lack of resistance. Any lack of resistance to the 
formation of the preference, according to Stoljar's description, is not due to the 
endorsement of the preference; rather, it is due to the 'blocked capacity'. So described, 
Christman's historical condition seems to be able to diagnose the agents' choices as 
non-autonomous. The agents 'in the grip of norms', or for whom the preference 
formation is 'irresistible' fail to meet Christman's historical condition. 
However, it seems to me that Stoljar need not have made the strong claims 
about the women such as Almaz being 'gripped' by the norms that informed their 
choices. Rather, on a more straightforward understanding of the women's deliberation 
and choice, it is plausible that Christman's conditions will be met by some of the 
women in the contraceptive studies. What Stoljar should have said with respect to these 
cases is the following: because the process of preference and value formation at issue is 
run of the mill socialisation, and deliberation on the basis of the deliverances of this, it 
28 Christman, J. (l991a) Op.CU p.347. 
29 Ibid, p.347. 
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is unlikely that the agents would have resisted this process of preference fonnation. 
There is no reason to suppose that resistance is warranted with respect to these 
processes: most of our preferences are fonned in this way, and there is little intuitively 
problematic about this.30 
Whilst we should reject Stoljar's explanation of why Christman's condition will 
be met by the women in the study, then, we should nonetheless accept her conclusion 
that his account will most likely fail to diagnose at least some of the women in the study 
as non-autonomous. 
2.2.3 Competence: reflective inhibitors, self-knowledge 
One of the concerns that Stoljar seems to be getting at with her worries about the 
historical view is that the conditions under which the agents fonn preferences or appeal 
to them in deliberation may be such that the agents are insufficiently competent to 
properly reflect upon them. Agents may have developed preferences in conditions that 
inhibit reflective competence, for example. Two versions of such competence 
conditions are discussed by Stoljar. 
a) Reflective inhibitors 
Preferences might be fonned III conditions that prevent the agent from properly 
reflecting upon the preferences or values that she is fonning. For example, a woman 
who has fonned preferences for the role of housewife in a context in which any other 
role is regarded with disdain and faces sanction may fail to consider or fonn any 
preferences for other options. This failure to consider other preferences inhibits 
reflection upon this preference - because no other 'live' option was on the table for 
comparison, say. Subsequent choices in which such a preference figures will inherit this 
problematic lack of reflection. Such is an example of external factors inhibiting the 
agent's reflective competence. 
30 Of course, socialisation itself might be thought to be problematic. In the literature on free will, 
there is much literature addressing the fact that we are not - due to such necessary socialisation -
responsible for our character - the issue of our responsibility for the choices and actions that 
flow from it then arises. See Wolf, S. ((1980) 'Asymmetrical Freedom' The Journal of 
Philosophy, 77 (3), pp.151-166) for a good overview of the problem, and her proposed way of 
dealing with it. I do not address this issue here, but rather start from the thought that most of our 
everyday choices are autonomous in a way that grounds respect, anti-paternalistic principles. and 
so on. 
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Internal factors, such as addiction, may similarly impair an agent's reflective 
abilities. They may prevent an agent from exercising reflective competence m 
evaluating her desires, as well as interfering with the role they might play m 
deliberation. In these cases, the choices that the agent makes on the basis of those 
preferences should not be deemed autonomous. This kind of 'reflective competence' 
condition is incorporated into Christman's account. 
Now, on the one hand we have seen Stoljar's comment that the women may be 
'in the grip' of norms in a way that inhibits reflection on the preference formation. In 
assessing this competence condition, however, Stoljar claims that we should not think of 
the women in Luker's study as suffering from defects in reflective competence in such a 
way as to impair their autonomy. Her claims here seem to be right; and indeed, I have 
suggested that Stoljar need not make strong claims about the agent being so 'gripped' 
by the norms. Rather, the agents demonstrate a level of reflective competence. Recall 
Almaz and the process of deliberation that we supposed she undertook. This process 
involved reflecting on the options, and their consequences: 
If I go to the doctors and ask for a prescription, the doctor will think I'm 
having pre-marital sex. And this is a small community too, and others might 
find out too ... there'd be a lot of talk ... I'd feel a bit ashamed asking, though 
that shouldn't stop me from asking. 
It certainly does not appear that Almaz IS prevented, by external factors, from 
considering options other than taking a contraceptive risk. Indeed, in deliberation she 
considers the pros and cons of doing so in comparison with the alternatives. Neither is 
she impaired by internal factors; we need not think that she is gripped by social norms 
any more than the rest of us usually are. 
As Stoljar suggests, whilst the conditions in which preferences have been 
formed are far from ideal, it is implausible to suppose that the women's critical 
capacities are seriously impaired. Indeed, that we should consider the women - in line 
with Luker's recommendation - as rational bargainers, albeit imperfectly rational, 
requires that we acknowledge the reflective capacities of the women. This conclusion 
seems right. 
b) Self-knowledge 
32 
There might be other ways in which an agent's competences as a deliberator can be 
impaired, such that although she remains rational, she is nonetheless non-autonomous. 
One such way might pertain to the agent's self-knowledge. Such a self-knowledge 
condition for autonomy is endorsed by Diana Meyers. 31 Stoljar suggests, for example, 
that an agent should not be self-deceived about her preferences; nor should she be self-
deceived about the process by which her preferences developed.32 The women in the 
study, for example, may be self-deceived in failing to acknowledge themselves as 
sexual agents. Perhaps in not wishing to seek contraceptive, Almaz is failing to 
acknowledge certain desires that she has (for sex) and therefore lacks self-knowledge. 33 
If lack of self-knowledge undermines autonomy, then this lack will explain the intuition 
that these women's choices are non-autonomous. 
Note that there are two ways to understand the demand that agents meet the 
self-knowledge condition with respect to their preferences (neither Stoljar nor Meyers 
make clear this distinction). First, it might demand that the agent know what her 
preferences are. If an agent has preferences that she does not believe herself to have, 
then she lacks the self-knowledge required for autonomy. This lack means that, for 
instance, she cannot make choices that take into account how best to satisfy such 
preferences. Second, a weaker version of the self-knowledge condition might require 
that an agent has no false beliefs about her preferences.34 This is consistent with her 
failing to believe that she has certain preferences that she in fact has. For example, an 
agent might fail to believe that she has a preference for sexual relations (when she in 
fact does). But this does not mean that she believes that she has a preference for not 
having sexual relations. On this second way of understanding the self-knowledge 
condition, the women may fail to recognise that they have certain preferences and 
values, but still meet the condition. 
31 See Meyers, D. ((2002) Gender in the Mirror: Cultural Imagery and Women's Agency Oxford, 
Oxford University Press. Esp. Chapter 1), for a competence account that places emphasis on the 
agent's self-knowledge and abilities to introspect. 
32 See Christman, J. (199Ib) Op.Cit. and Stoljar, N. (2000) Op.Cit. at 102 for discussion. 
33 See Anderson, E. ((2002) 'Should Feminist's Reject Rational Choice Theory?' in A Mind of 
One's Own Witt, C. and Antony, L. (eds.) Westview Press, pp.369-387) for this claim. 
34 Of course, this issue could be complicated by considering the case of an agent who lacks 
knowledge of preferences that she does have, and also believes 'that I know about all of the 
preferences I have'. This entails that she believes 'that I do not have preference for p, for q' and 
so on. The distinction between the case of failing to have true beliefs, and having false beliefs, 
might then collapse. However, most agents are aware that they may lack full knowledge of their 
preferences, so I set aside this wrinkle. 
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The fIrst way of understanding the condition is too demanding: it is surely the 
case that we have many preferences that are not readily available for epistemic access, 
and that we accordingly fail to attend to in deliberation and choice. For example, a short 
while ago I discovered that a fruit called guanabana exists. Now I presume I might like 
to try it, although I do not know if I would like it. Until I try it I shall not know. But 
surely this lack of self-knowledge does not mean that I lack autonomy in choice until I 
ascertain what my preferences are - even in fruit related choices. If the self-knowledge 
condition were to demand that agents knew all of their preferences, then many agents 
like myself and like Almaz will fail to meet the necessary condition for autonomous 
choice, and the kinds of distinctions that Stoljar is aiming for could not be drawn. The 
second, 'no false beliefs', condition, then, is the more plausible one. 
This second way of understanding the self-knowledge condition is not discussed 
by Stoljar. She argues that the women in Luker's study may be deceiving others about 
the extent to which they violate norms that govern their sexual activity, but, she claims, 
they do not deceive themselves. If she is right about this, then the self-knowledge 
condition cannot deliver the verdict about the women's autonomy that Stoljar believes is 
required. It seems that Stoljar is right: in contemplating getting contraception, Almaz is 
acknowledging her desire for sex. However, a stronger case is available to Stoljar. Even 
if the women fail to acknowledge to themselves their preferences for sexual agency they 
may nonetheless meet the condition on its most plausible reading. If the women fail to 
believe that they have preferences for sexual agency they might still meet the self-
knowledge condition insofar as it demands only that the agent have no false beliefs 
about her preferences (rather than that the agent have, for each of her preferences, true 
beliefs about it). 
Indeed, Stoljar notes that some - although not all - subjects in the study do 
acknowledge their preferences for sexual agency, although they also acknowledge that 
they should not be seen to be sexual agents. For instance, one woman reported: "[I 
didn't get a prescription] Because of my father ... we live in a small town ... and I 
couldn't go to another doctor without his finding out". Of this woman, Stoljar writes: 
"although the agent is influenced by norms of sexual agency to the extent that she 
wishes to be seen to be observing them, she is not deceiving herself,.35 Thus at least 
some of the agents about whom Stoljar has the feminist intuition (namely, that they are 
non-autonomous) meet this weaker self-knowledge condition. Absent good reason to 
35 Stoljar, N. (2000) Op.Cit.p.l03. 
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accept the stronger version of the condition, it is plausible that the self-knowledge 
condition could be met by the women. This kind of condition cannot account, then, for 
the intuitive non-autonomy of the agents.36 
2.2.4 Summary 
One aim of this discussion was to survey some of the content-neutral conditions that are 
offered, and to which the relational conditions are supplemented. These kinds of 
conditions - structural, historical, competence - are candidates, according to the 
content-neutral theorist, for what brings an agent to the threshold for autonomy; beyond 
which the agent is entitled to certain normative benefits; for example, the entitlement to 
have her choices protected from paternalistic intervention (absent strong justification). 
Stoljar's claim is that none of these conditions can adequately make sense of the 
intuitive non-autonomy of the women who chose in accordance with oppressive norms. 
I have suggested that whilst most of these conditions appear to be met by the women -
the coherence, historical, and both competence conditions - it is not clear that the 
hierarchical condition is met. Thus content-neutral conditions may yet be able to 
account for Stoljar's 'feminist intuition'. If this is so, then much of the motivation for 
adopting a substantive, relational condition is removed. I now tum to consider the 
proposed substantive condition. If this condition is plausible, then there may be reason 
to accept it independently of the adequacy (or not) of the content-neutral conditions. 
However, I will argue that it is not. 
2.3 Stoliar's substantive condition 
Recall that Stoljar's aim is to develop a conception that takes into account the social 
aspects of agency, and explains in particular 'the feminist intuition', according to which 
those choices influenced by oppressive norms are non-autonomous. Having argued that 
no content-neutral conception of autonomy can achieve this, Stoljar sets out the 
structure of the substantive conception she thinks is required. Stoljar claims that it is 
simply because the agents "are motivated by oppressive and misguided norms that are 
internalised as a result of feminine socialisation" that they are non-autonomous.37 She 
endorses the claim that: 
36 Note that in Chapter 4, I raise doubts about whether we should accept that there are epistemic 
conditions for autonomy. In light of this, the conclusion of this section might be read as: if there 
are any self-knowledge conditions, then at least some of these women meet them. 
37 Stoljar, N. (2000) Op. Cit.p.98. 
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the effective internalisation of false or irrelevant nonns together with the 
fact that such nonns are false or irrelevant diminish or extinguish agents' 
capacities for autonomy with respect to decisions governed by the 
nonns.38 
The problem for an individual who has internalised and chooses on the basis of such a 
nonn, she claims, is that their deliberation and choice "is infonned by oppressive and 
misguided nonns and hence is not autonomous".39 We can make sense of this non-
autonomy, she claims, by placing substantive constraints on the contents of autonomous 
choice. This builds in a relational dimension to the conditions: insofar as the object of 
choice is for an option, practice or relationship that is inconsistent with the substantively 
specified value, the choice is non-autonomous.40 Can such a condition deliver the 
verdict she seeks about the lack of autonomy of such women? 
2.3.1. A constraint: false and oppressive nonns 
As Stoljar admits, her proposal is underdeveloped. Indeed, as it stands, there are two 
ways of understanding her claims. One reading is suggested by the comment that 
"because of the internalisation of the [false and oppressive] nonn, they do not have the 
capacity to perceive it as false".41 On this reading, her account is a kind of competence 
condition, which, in fact, could be content neutral. On such an account, anything could, 
in principle, be chosen autonomously insofar as it is possible for the agent to adequately 
reflect upon the choice. Some of Stoljar's claims suggest that the problem arises when 
certain nonns - false and oppressive ones - impede the ability to reflect upon the nonn. 
As a matter of contingent fact, those choices that are infonned by or accord with false 
and oppressive nonns are not autonomous. Insofar as Stoljar is aiming to sketch a 
substantive constraint, she presumably does not intend her claims to be understood in 
this way. Still, perhaps her claims here are correct, so this understanding is worth 
considering further. 
a) A competence condition 
38 Ibid, p.108. 
39 Ibid, p.108. 
40 In chapter 3 I explore more fully what 'choosing in accordance with', or 'choice inconsistent 
with' might in fact involve, with respect to this part of the substantive account. I there argue that 
no plausible account of this can be given. 
41 Stoljar, N. (2000) Op.Cit. p.l09. 
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On this understanding the claim is that agents cannot competently choose in accordance 
with false and oppressive norms or values. When an agent accepts a false norm, the 
claim must go, her capacity to reflect upon the truth or falsity of that norm is 
undermiried. Autonomy requires an adequate level of reflection that these false norms 
impair. Understood in this way, though, it seems false that, as a matter of empirical fact, 
the falsity of a norm prevents the agent from seeing that it is false, as Stoljar claims. 
Recall the claim, from Stoljar, that the women "accept something false. And because of 
the intemalisation of the norm, they do not have the capacity to perceive it as false". 
Suppose we understand what it is to intemalise a norm in a weak sense: as the effective 
incorporation of a belief about what one ought to do into an agent's belief corpus. So, 
the effective intemalisation of the norm 
(nl) women ought not be active sexual agents 
will involve the effective incorporation of the belief 
(bl) I (as a woman) ought not be an active sexual agent 
into the agent's belief corpus. Is there any reason to suppose that the falsity of a belief 
prevents agents from reflecting upon the false belief? It seems not. Some false beliefs 
will be easily reflected upon - and rejected. For instance, my false belief that "the man 
by the bus stop is Mr. Zalatimo" can be swiftly rejected, upon the acquisition of new 
perceptual evidence. Others may be more deeply entrenched, and hence less easily 
reflectively rejected. But in such cases this is not a function of falsity. If the ability to 
reflect on false beliefs is undermined, there is no reason to suppose that this is due to the 
belief s falsity; perhaps it is rather due to its entrenchment. 
Indeed, intemalisation might involve something stronger than I have so far 
supposed, such as the entrenchment of a belief about what one ought to do in an agent's 
belief corpus. The well-entrenched nature of a belief may prevent the agent from 
engaging in adequate reflection upon it- and this may be so with respect to beliefs about 
what one ought to do. But if we take this to be what presents a threat to autonomy, then 
many agents who act in accordance with the true and the good will fail to meet the 
conditions for autonomy - having well entrenched beliefs about the world and beliefs 
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about norms is a feature of many agents on many occasions of deliberation and choice 
(and surely not always an undesirable one, at that).42 
We should not accept Stoljar's claim that the falsity of the norm prevents the 
agent from adequately reflecting upon it. Nor should we reinterpret her condition as 
pertaining to the entrenched nature of the norm. Perhaps the problem pertains only to 
those norms that are both false and well entrenched? Once again, it is not clear why a 
norm that is well entrenched and false would prevent reflection upon it. For example, 
suppose that, due to limited experiences and an insular, village life, Eklas believes that 
women are naturally suited to domestic work, and ill-equipped to work in the public 
domain. Thus she accepts the false norm "women ought not work outside the home", 
and this is well entrenched. Then her village gets a Television set. She watches 
programmes that show women working in a range of roles, and starts to reflect on 
whether she is right to believe that women ought not work outside the home.43 The 
falsity and entrenchment of this norm does not seem to hinder in any way her ability to 
reflect on this norm: indeed it may even be that its falsity helps her to reflect upon it -
because she bumps up against states of affairs that conflict with the dictates of the norm, 
and which prompt her to reflect upon whether to accept it. 
So we should reject Stoljar's claims about the falsity and entrenchment of 
norms undermining competence. And were we to accept these claims, then we should 
reject the claim for which Stoljar purports to be arguing: that only a substantive account 
can make sense of the feminist intuition. A competence condition, were we to accept it, 
is content-neutral, demanding only that the agent have the ability to reflect upon her 
deliberation and choice. This is compatible with the agent operating with false and 
entrenched norms. 
b) A substantive condition 
A second way to understand her account is as directly constraining the contents of 
autonomous choice. Stoljar envisages her proposed condition as "one which places 
restrictions on the contents of agents' preferences".44 Understood in this way, the 
condition that she offers places a straightforward constraint on the contents of 
42 It is this entrenchment, and the fact that we often operate on such nonns unreflectively that 
rrompts theorists to offer counterfactual conditions, such as Christman's (1991b). 
3 See Waldfogel, 1. (2007) 'TV Is Good for You, if you are a woman in rural India, at least' at 
http://www.slate.comlidl2172474/ for a report on women in rural India whose attitudes changed 
having been exposed to different portrayals of women's lives. 
44 Ibid, p.95. 
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autonomous choice, rather than making a claim about the impact of the norms upon an 
agent's capacities. We have seen Stoljar's claims that a choice is non-autonomous when 
it is in accordance with norms that are false and oppressive. Choices, then, must not be 
in accordance with false norms - conversely, they must be in accordance with true 
norms. Nor must an agent's choice be in accordance with oppressive norms; rather, they 
must be in accordance with the non-oppressive, or good. Supposing that we take 'in 
accordance' to mean 'not in conflict with' - then those choices that are in accordance 
with the neutral or non-oppressive will not conflict with the true or the good (although 
they may not be choices for true and good things - they may be choices for lacking-
truth-value or neutral things). Such choices will be in accordance with the true and the 
good. So we can put Stoljar's condition in positive form, as: 
(RelChoicel) a necessary condition for autonomous choice is that the agent 
choose in accordance with the value of the true and the good. 
This condition captures the thought that, insofar as agents choose in accordance with 
false and oppressive norms, their choices cannot be autonomous. Note that there is 
another version of the condition in the offing. Sometimes Stoljar talks of norms that are 
false and irrelevant posing a threat to autonomy: "the fact that such norms are false or 
irrelevant diminish or extinguish agent's capacities for autonomy with respect to 
decisions governed by the norms".45 This claim suggests the following version of the 
condition: 
(RelChoicel *) a necessary condition for autonomous choice is that the 
agent choose in accordance with the value of the true and the relevant. 
This version of her claim is not illuminating for present purposes. Insofar as a norm is 
operative in a particular context, such that it is reasonable for the agent to take it into 
account in deliberation, the norm is not irrelevant. In the context of deliberation about 
contraceptive practices, a norm that says "one ought to take shoes off when entering the 
house" is irrelevant. A norm that says "women ought not engage in pre-marital sex" is 
not irrelevant (although we may think it should not be heeded). One might think that it 
ought not be relevant. But if it is a norm that the agent will in fact be judged according 
to, and faces potential costs for violating, then it is not irrelevant to her decision making. 
(ReIChoicel), then, is the substantive condition that I will focus on in the following. 
45 Ibid. p.l 08. 
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According to (RelChoicel), choices that accord with the false and oppressive 
cannot be autonomous. In the absence of the (competence related) claims about the 
impact of the intemalisation of false norms upon the agent's capacities, what arguments 
are offered for this condition? The main claim in support of this direct constraint is the 
appeal to 'the feminist intuition'. This argument seems to take the form of inference to 
the best explanation. Stoljar has the intuition that the women are non-autonomous. What 
best explains this intuition - having attempted to rule out the explanatory adequacy of 
the content-neutral conditions - is that the women are choosing in accordance with false 
and oppressive norms. 
i) Explanatory inadequacy 
In this respect, there are three points to note. First, not all will accept the intuition, and 
so many will not accept the need for such an explanation. As we have seen, Benson 
notes that "feminists need not accept the intuition on which Stoljar founds her 
position".46 I have, for the sake of argument, granted Stoljar this intuition. Second,some 
of the content-neutral conditions that Stoljar rejects may, in fact, be able to explain the 
non-autonomy of some of the choices - so I have argued. Third, it is not clear what 
explanatory power the claim "because the agent chooses in accordance with false and 
oppressive norms" has. The ftrst conjunct does not seem to do much explanatory work; 
agents on many occasions make choices informed by false beliefs ('that accord with the 
false') and this does not seem to undermine the agent's autonomy of choice.47 When an 
agent chooses to buy crystals to create energy flows in his house; when an agent 
mistakenly believes that kidney beans upset his constitution, and so chooses not to eat 
them; when an agent chooses to drive without a seatbelt, believing the inconvenience to 
be more hassle than it is worth: all these are instances in which it might well be the case 
that the agent acts in accordance with 'the false'; that is, on the basis of false beliefs. 
Yet it is far from clear that these agents are non-autonomous. In cases of failing to wear 
seat-belts, Stoljar herself admits as much. So choosing in accordance with the false is 
not intuitively autonomy undermining. Moreover, were choosing autonomously in 
accordance with the false impossible, then one could never autonomously make 
mistakes of this kind, and that seems wrong. 
46 Benson (2005b) Op.Cit. p.125 
47 In chapter 4 I return to, and say more about, the issue of the epistemic conditions for 
autonomous choice. 
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So, the conjunct that does the work in explaining Stoljar's intuition that such 
agents are non-autonomous must be that which pertains to the oppressive nature of 
certain norms: it is because the agent is choosing in accordance with the oppressive that 
she is non-autonomous. Setting aside difficulties about how one is to understand 'the 
oppressive', it is hard to see precisely what explanatory story could be offered here, 
also. One can grasp that choosing to act in accordance with the oppressive might be 
incompatible with flourishing agency, or with agency that promotes well-being or 
interests. But it is not clear how it is incompatible with autonomous choice - her ability 
to properly govern her deliberations and subsequent choice. For example, consider an 
agent who deliberates carefully about and finally chooses to take a job as a stripper in 
order to have enough money to feed her children. One might think that such a choice 
accords with oppressive values, and is incompatible (at least in current social 
conditions) with flourishing agency, or agency that promotes (overall) well-being. But it 
is not clear that this is incompatible with autonomous choice. Indeed, that the agent has 
deliberated carefully about what, given the difficult circumstances, the prudential option 
is suggests that she is perfectly able in her governance of her deliberations and 
subsequent choice.48 
A similar conclusion about women's choices in restrictive and oppressive social 
contexts is drawn by Vma Narayan. With reference to the Sufi Pirzada Muslim women 
who engaged in practices of purdah (seclusion) in Old Dehli, she writes that we should 
not understand the women who engage in these practices as forced into oppressive lives 
against their wills, or as blinded by culture and tradition (as 'prisoners of patriarchy' or 
'dupes of patriarchy' respectively). Rather she claims they should be seen as 
'bargainers': they cooperate with some cultural norms whilst acknowledging the 
centrality of the practices to their religion and traditions; they complain about the 
restrictions and inconveniences; but they also acknowledge the benefits of their roles, in 
terms of financial interest and social standing. That the practices are in many respects, 
ones that we would judge to be oppressive does not mean that the choice to comply with 
them is non-autonomous, she claims: 'a person's choice could be autonomous even if 
made under considerable social or culture pressure' .49 Choice in accordance with 
oppressive norms, she claims, should not be considered non-autonomous simply 
48 One might be tempted to hold that autonomous choice is undermined in such a case due to the 
coercive pressures faced in such a situation. But we need not adopt a substantive condition to 
make sense of this problem - a historical condition will serve to make this diagnosis. 
49 Narayan, U. (2002) 'Minds of Their Own: Choices, Autonomy, Cultural Practices and Other 
Women', in A Mind o/One's Own: Feminist Essays on Reason and Objectivity, Antony, M. and 
Witt, C. (eds.), Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, pp. 418-432, at p. 429. 
because of the presence of oppressive nonns. Absent further argumentation, and given 
the contested status of the feminist intuition, I suggest that we should not accept 
Stoljar's strong substantive condition (ReIChoicel). 
ii) Contrary intuitions 
I have said that for the sake of argument I would grant Stoljar the intuition that the 
agents who act in accordance with the false and oppressive nonns are non-autonomous. 
However, now that we have seen her condition to be unmotivated, and explanatorily 
inadequate, it is worth noting that there are compelling intuitions to the contrary. Diana 
Meyers has highlighted the capacity for autonomous choice and agency that can be 
exercised in conditions of oppression, and emphasised the importance of recognising 
this, claiming that "feminists must account for the control women exert over their lives 
under patriarchy, for their opposition to subordinating social nonns and institutions, and 
for their capacity to bring about emancipatory social change". 50 (Indeed, she suggests 
that those who are oppressed may well be better position to exercise autonomy of choice 
when it comes to issues of justice and policy.) 
To add plausibility to Meyer's claim, consider the following example: suppose 
that Edna occupies a traditional role, and is dependent upon her husband for economic 
support. Suppose that she endorses this role. But having reflected upon her own 
experiences, comes to believe that, because of the position of dependency that many 
women occupy, it is incredibly important that women are able to control when, and on 
how many occasions, they have children. So Edna campaigns actively for women's 
reproductive rights, and policies such as access to abortion for all. Now, it may well be 
that in her opposition to some oppressive nonns (such as "women ought not abort, it is 
their duty to be mothers" and so on), she makes reference to other oppressive nonns, 
such as "primary care givers should be women", and "women should take primary 
responsibility for domestic matters". If we accept Stoljar's claim that choice in 
accordance with false and oppressive nonns is non-autonomous, then we cannot claim 
that the choice of this woman, to campaign for pro-choice laws, is autonomous. This 
seems counter-intuitive. Despite her beliefs about women's roles, Edna seems 
autonomous in her choice to campaign - indeed, as the example is set up it is in part 
50 Meyers, D. (2000) Op.Cit. p.152. Paul Benson «2000) 'Feeling Crazy: Self-worth and the 
Social Character of Responsibility' in Relational Autonomy, MacKenzie and Stoljar (eds.) pp.72-
94) makes a similar point. 
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because of her beliefs about women's roles that she so actively campaigns for women's 
reproductive rights. 
If we accept Stoljar's substantive condition, then the possibility of recognising 
the autonomous choices of agents in contexts of oppression is severely limited. Agents 
whose deliberations and choices make reference to norms that are 'false and oppressive' 
simply cannot be autonomous, on Stoljar's view. And this would appear to rule out from 
the class of autonomous many of the choices made by agents who are influenced by 
oppreSSIve norms. 
Meyer's claim that those in social conditions of oppression can exerCIse 
autonomy in choice is very plausible, and it seems very problematic to claim otherwise. 
It is a troubling consequence of Stoljar's substantive condition that this is not possible. 
These considerations are not conclusive. This is in part because the condition that 
Stoljar develops is, as she admits, underdeveloped. But I suggest that these 
considerations recommend against developing it further. 
2.4 Summary 
We have seen the first attempt to offer a condition for autonomous choice that attempts 
to take into account the relational aspects of autonomy, by building in substantive 
conditions. This account explicitly aims to make discriminations, in accordance with 
the 'feminist intuition', in a way that makes sense of those agents whose choices, it is 
claimed are non-autonomous having been negatively affected by gendered social 
relations. 
I have argued that we should reject Stoljar's claims; first she does not do 
enough to show that content neutral conceptions cannot diagnose those whom she 
wishes to as non-autonomous; second, the substantive conception she proposes is 
explanatorily inadequate, as it is not clear what explanatory work can be done with the 
claim that it is because of the accordance of the choice with values that are false and 
oppressive that these women's choices are non-autonomous. Third, there are good 
reasons to reject the intuitions about non-autonomous choice that motivate Stoljar's 
account.51 Indeed, the contrary intuition garners support from Meyers' claim that many 
51 And of course, if the intuition is rejected, it will not be seen as a failure of content-neutral 
conditions that they to fail to make sense of it. 
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in oppressive social contexts exerCIse significant self-governance, not least in their 
attempts to bring about social change. 
It is worth noting, however, that whilst we might reject the intuition that such 
agents are non-autonomous, it seems that there is nonetheless something troubling about 
choices that are influenced by norms which are, at least from a feminist point of view 
(although I hope beyond, also), criticisable. Accepting that the problem is not a matter 
of non-autonomous choice does not mean that other diagnoses or criticisms cannot be 
offered, although I shall not attempt to do so here. But there is more yet to be said about 
substantive conditions. One might, for instance, incorporate a different value into the 
substantive constraint on autonomous choice. I tum to consider a view which posits 
self-respect as the constraining value on autonomous choice. 
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Chapter 3. Substantive account II: Hill Jnr., Baron 
We have seen one attempt to incorporate into a relational condition into a conception of 
autonomous choice, from Stoljar. I here look at another, assessing whether it fares 
better. Like Stoljar's the condition offered by Thomas Hill Jnr. is an attempt to 
substantively constrain the contents of autonomous choice. l This yields a conception of 
autonomy that can purportedly make sense of why certain social relations are 
incompatible with autonomy. 
The choice for a deferential role has been taken, by a range of theorists, to be 
paradigmatically non-autonomous.2 Feminist philosophers too have found women's 
choice for and occupancy of the role of the deferential wife troubling.3 Thus, if we are 
to determine a plausible substantive constraint on the objects of autonomous choice, a 
look at the characteristics of the choice for deference seems to be a good place to start. I 
here look at one prominent account, according to which, first, such choices are judged to 
be non-autonomous, and second, the non-autonomy of these choices is diagnosed and 
explained by a substantive conception of autonomy. This substantive condition is 
specified as: 
(RelChoice2) a necessary condition for autonomous choice IS that the 
choice is in accordance with the value of self-respect. 
Now, the theorists who propound and defend this condition do so in a context that 
precedes the recent debate about the nature of 'relational autonomy'. The main 
motivation is to make sense of what is deemed to be intuitively problematic about these 
1 See Hill Jnr., T. (1991) 'Servility and Self-Respect' in his Autonomy and Self Respect, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp.4-18. Originally printed in Wasserstrom, R.A. (ed.) 
(1979) Today's Moral Problems, 2nd Edition, pp.133-147. (References are to the 1991 version.) 
His view is defended against criticism from Friedman, M. ((1985) 'Moral Integrity and the 
Deferential Wife' Philosophical Studies 47 (1), pp.141-150), by Marcia Baron (1985), 'Servility, 
Critical Deference and the Deferential Wife' Philosophical Studies, 48 (3), pp.393-400. 
2 This is not uncontroversial: a range of theorists - those with content-neutral accounts -
maintain that deferential roles, such as slavery, can be chosen autonomously. See Dworkin 
(1988) Op. Cit. for such claims. Again, for the sake of argument I initially grant the intuition that 
such agents are non-autonomous. 
3 See Westlund, A. (2003) Op.Cit. See also Superson, A. (2005) 'Deformed Desires and the 
Informed Desire Test' li.lpatia, 20 (4) pp.109-126. 
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choices, and to distinguish them from choices that are not, intuitively, problematic. 
However, the focus of Hill's original article can plausibly be understood as an attempt 
to make sense of how social conditions, namely, conditions of social disadvantage, 
might be non-conducive to the kind of self-respect that is necessary for autonomous 
choice.4 
In this chapter, I explore whether the substantive condition proposed is able to 
make sense of the reported intuitions, and thus diagnose the problem with the 
deferential individual. I will argue that it cannot. Any support for a substantive 
condition that such a diagnosis might have offered, then, cannot be relied upon. 
3.1 The problem with deference 
The diagnosis of Thomas Hill 1m. and (in defence of Hill) Marcia Baron, of the problem 
with a choice for deference, is Kantian in nature. Thus it has a distinctive moral tinge to 
it. The failing is understood as a failing of autonomy; but proper self-governance, in 
Kantian terms, requires that an agent govern herself in accordance with the moral law . It 
is no surprise, then, that such a conception of autonomy will incorporate substantive 
content. Indeed, at this level of generality the substantive constraint can be formulated 
as: 
(RelChoice2*) a necessary condition for autonomous choice IS that the 
choice is in accordance with (the value of) the moral law. 
Unpacking what the moral law requires is no small task. Here, I focus on just one aspect 
of the substantive constraint that may be entailed by the moral law - that intended to do 
the work in diagnosing the defect of the deferential individual: namely, the requirement 
that autonomous choice is in accordance with the value of self-respect. For an agent to 
choose autonomously, she must do so in accordance with the value of respect for 
humanity, and this "amounts to having a kind of self-respect [which is] incompatible 
with servility". 5 
4 See Hill, T. (1991) Op.Cit. pp.5-7. 
5 Hill, T. (1991), Op. Cit. p.13. Note that this strategy - of setting aside the specifics of the moral 
law - is consistent with Hill's. As Susan Mendus' review observes, Hill's "essays do not engage 
in detailed analysis of Kant's texts. Rather, Hill begins with some everyday problems of moral 
life, and shows how, in order to solve these problems, we must appeal to Kantian insights". See 
Mendus, S. (1992) Review: Autonomy and Self-Respect, Hill Jor., T. Philosophy. 67 (262) 
pp.561-563. My strategy here is to show that Hill's Kantian insights cannot help in diagnosing 
the problem with deferential choices, at least. 
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What is at stake here is not deferential behaviour simpliciter: there might 
sometimes be reasons, consistent with self-respect, for behaving deferentially 
(prudential reasons, epistemic reasons, and so forth). It is being deferential, or servile, in 
attitude that is problematic. An example will help to clarify the kind of deference that is 
deemed to be problematic (although as we shall see, spelling out more precisely what 
this attitude consists in is extremely difficult): 
Deference: having completed her university degree in maths, Rose is 
deliberating about whether to pursue further research, or whether to get 
married to Chad and take on the role of housewife. Marriage would mean 
turning her back on further education and a career, and would require her to 
put all her energies into looking after her husband, maintaining the 
household, and bringing up their children. Both Rose and Chad have had 
upbringings, and live in communities in which typically, the man makes the 
important decisions for the family, and the woman has little input other 
than in the daily execution of the husband's legislation. Both believe that 
this is a good way to structure a family. After some careful deliberation, in 
consultation with Chad, but also independently, Rose decides that she 
would like to settle down and get married. From then on, Rose is ''utterly 
devoted to serving her husband. She buys the clothes he prefers, invites the 
guests he wants to entertain, makes love whenever he is in the mood ... she 
is quite glad and proud, she says, to serve her husband as she does.,,6 
Making such a choice, and occupying such a role, is not consistent with the kind of self-
respect required for autonomy, Hill and Baron both claim. Let us suppose that Rose 
meets all of the content-neutral requirements that might be demanded (an overview of 
which we saw in the last chapter): she endorses her choice; she formed her preference in 
a way that she would not resist; she does not have inconsistent beliefs or desires that 
lead to a breakdown of critical faculties; her reflective powers are not inhibited; she has 
a normal level of self-knowledge, and is free from coercion and manipulation when she 
makes her decision. If she is non-autonomous in so choosing, then, it must be due to 
something else - perhaps due to the substantive content of her choice. 
This is the contention of the Kantian substantive view, as defended by Hill and 
Baron. The servile person's choices fail to be autonomous, on this view, because they 
fail to meet the following necessary condition: 
(ReIChoice2) a necessary condition for autonomous choice IS that the 
choice is in accordance with the value of self-respect. 
6 Ibid, pp. 5-6. 
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The claim is that this condition is derivable from the moral law: it is entailed by the 
necessary condition (ReIChoice2*). The moral law demands that agents must possess 
"a certain attitude concerning one's rightful place in a moral community".7 This 
attitude, in particular, is one according to "which [s]he is equal with every other 
person".8 That is to say: all persons must be respected as equal in their moral status; so 
the moral law demands. The 'all' here applies universally - so in addition to respecting 
others, an agent must also respect herself, and see herself as equal, with regards her 
moral standing, to others. 
It might appear that with this condition we can already diagnose the problem 
with deference - for it is intuitive that the deferential agent such as Rose does not see 
herself as equal to others - in particular, with those to whom she defers. But we cannot 
yet reach this conclusion: the dimension along which one must take oneself to be equal 
is that of moral status. Whilst the deferential person might not see herself as a social 
equal, or equal in tenns of expertise, say, why should we think that the deferential 
person fails to treat herself as a moral equal, as failing to treat herself as occupying her 
'rightful place' amongst moral agents? In order to see this, we need to ask: 4What does 
self-respect involve'? 
3.1.1 Two ways of lacking self-respect 
The Kantian view provides us with the following answer. Having the requisite self-
respect consists in according: 
SUFFICIENT WEIGHT TO SELF: S must accord appropriate weight to her interests, 
preferences, or rights. 
Now, one way to understand the claim that one must give appropriate weight to one's 
rights or preferences is as a procedural matter: one must have true beliefs about the 
value of one's preferences, and in the process of deciding what to do, one must not 
violate nonns of deliberative rationality failing to weigh one's rights or preferences in 
accordance with these beliefs about their value. Understood thus, the self-respect 
requirement does not amount to a substantive constraint, and the account collapses back 
into a procedural, content-neutral account. 
7 Ibid, p.6. 
8 Ibid, p.9. 
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But this does not seem to be the way that Hill or Baron intend the account, and 
we should not understand it in this way. Rather, the claim is that agents have a certain 
value, and from this value is generated the value that attaches to their interests, 
preferences and rights. An agent's choice must be in accordance with the value of her 
agency and this means not allowing others to trample on her rights or override her 
preferences. Insofar as acting deferentially involves this, it is not consistent with the 
value of agency, of self-respect, or of the rights and preferences of the agent. 
That is, having the kind of self-respect demanded by the moral law requires that 
one choose in accordance with the value of one's agency - one's interests, preferences 
or rights. A constraint on autonomous choice is that one must choose in accordance with 
this value. There are two glosses on this condition. According to Hill, the deferential 
agent fails to meet (ReIChoice2) because she is guilty of "a failure to understand and 
acknowledge [her] own moral rights".9 The deferential person "tends to deny or 
disavow [her] own moral rights because [she] does not understand them or has little 
concern for the status they give [her]".l0 In choosing deference, and subsequently being 
deferential, Rose fails to choose in accordance with the value of her rights. In so failing, 
she does not display the requisite self-respect. Thus Hill's specification of the 
substantive condition is: 
(RelChoice2a) a necessary condition for autonomous choice is that the 
choice is in accordance with the value of her moral rights. 
Baron, in her defence of Hill's claims, focuses rather on the other disjunct of 
SUFFICIENT WEIGHT TO SELF, such that the specification of the condition is: 
(ReIChoice2b) a necessary condition for autonomous choice is that the 
choice is in accordance with the value of her interests or preferences. 
In wearing what her husband prefers, rather than what she prefers, Rose fails to 
choose in accordance with (the value of) her preferences, for example. This is a failing 
of self-respect. In the following, I consider whether either of these conditions is able to 
do the work required of it, in terms of capturing the intuitive non-autonomy of her 
deferential choices. 
9 Ibid, p.9. 
IO Ibid, p.13. 
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3.2 Moral rights 
Hill's claim is that the individual who chooses deference does not properly understand-
or care for - her moral rights, namely, her moral right not to defer. If this is a moral 
right, then being treated as deferential may constitute a rights violation, and one 
inconsistent with respect for the agent. Does this mean that in taking on such a role, and 
allowing others to treat her as deferential, an agent lacks self-respect? This is not clear: 
an agent can choose to waive her rights, or not to exercise them. Why should the 
deferential individual be seen as misunderstanding her rights, rather than legitimately 
waiving them? If we are to accept Hill's claim that in choosing deference an agent fails 
to respect her moral rights, and hence fails to meet (ReIChoice2), we need to see, first, 
that the right not to defer is derivable from the moral law, and second, that such a right 
is unwaivable. 
It is claimed that the right not to defer is "derivable from one's duty to respect 
the moral law", 11 but the argument for this is not explicit. It can be reconstructed as: 
Argument 1: an argument for the right not to defer 
1. Treating others as servile, or deferential, fails to treat them with respect 
2. The moral law demands that one treats all persons with respect - persons have a 
duty to treat others with respect. 
3. Persons have a duty not to treat others as servile, or deferential 
4. Each person has a right, corresponding to this duty, not to be treated as servile, 
or deferential. 
This argument establishes that each has the right not to be treated as deferential. And if 
one has a right not to be treated as deferential, then one has a right not to act 
deferentially, or occupy a role of deference; not to defer (compare: if I have a right not 
to be treated as team leader, I have a right not to act as leader, or occupy the team leader 
role: that is, a right not to lead). 
This may be, then, how right not to defer is derivable from the moral law. But 
for deferring to be a failure of self-respect, we need to see that this is a right that cannot 
be waived. If an agent can waive the right to defer, then she can remove from (certain) 
others the duty not to treat her as deferential. In order to see that allowing others to treat 
her in this way is a failing of self-respect - a case of allowing others to 'trample on her 
II Baron, M. (1985) Op. Cit, p.394. 
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rights', as Hill puts it - we need to see either that this right is unwaivable, or that there 
is some intrinsic moral failing in allowing herself to be so treated. The following 
argument is reconstructed from Hill (see pp.9-14): 
Argument 2: first argument for the right not to defer being unwaivable 
1. Each person ought to respect the moral law 
2. Respect for the moral law requires not only acting in accordance with the moral 
law, but also respecting - treating as valuable - "the provisions of morality". 12 
3. The provisions of morality include the principles, ideals, rights and duties 
derivable from the moral law. 
4. So each person ought to respect and value the rights derivable from the moral 
law, including the right not to defer. 
5. So each person ought to respect and value the right not to defer, by not allowing 
others to trample on this right, and by not waiving this right. 
The thought here is that to waive the right not to defer is not to properly value it. In 
failing to properly value her right, an agent who waives it fails to properly value herself 
- namely, she lacks self-respect, so fails to meet (ReIChoice2). However, argument 2 on 
its own cannot establish this. We need an independent argument to see that all rights 
derivable from the moral law are unwaivable. Otherwise, it is quite consistent with 
valuing one's rights that one waives it. For example, suppose I have a right that others 
not inflict pain on me. I can waive this right, permitting others to inflict pain on me; 
perhaps in undergoing an endurance test for medical research, or in having a tattoo. 
Waiving this right, on these occasions, is consistent with me valuing very much and 
quite properly the right that others not inflict pain on me. 
The rights that cannot be waived, Hill tells us are those that are grounded in an 
agent's "inner freedom"; 13 that is, grounded in the capacity for autonomy that 
individuals have. But the point here cannot amount to the claim that the right not to 
defer is unwaivable because so deferring involves a failure of self respect, and so non-
autonomy in choice. This is precisely what argument 1 & argument 2 have been trying to 
show. If the arguments for the conclusion that deference and autonomy are incompatible 
rely on the presupposition of this very claim, then they will be problematically question-
begging. Independent support for this claim about the incompatibility is required, if it is 
12 Hill, T. (1991) Op. Cit, p. 13. . . 
13 Kant, I. The Metaphysics of Morals, (1797/1996) Gregor, M. (ed.), Cambndge, Cambndge 
University Press, see esp. [6:407-6:408], at pp. 165-166. 
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to support the claim that the right not to defer falls into the class of rights that cannot be 
waived. 
A further argument can be garnered from Hill's comment that "a man who 
consents to be enslaved ... thereby displays a condition of slavish mentality that renders 
his consent worthless".14 This argument is made explicit by Baron: 15 
Argument 3: second argument for the right not to defer being unwaivable 
1. failing to properly understand one's moral status - including the value of 
one's moral rights - indicates lack of autonomy. 
2. consent that is non-autonomously given is not valid consent. 
3. if an agent e.g. treats herself as deferential, allowing others to treat her as 
deferential by waiving her right not to defer, then an agent does not 
properly understand her moral status. 
4. so if an agent treats herself as deferential, allowing others to treat her as 
deferential by waiving her right not to defer, then she is non-autonomous in 
doing so. 
5. so an instance on which an agent waives her right not to defer and allows 
others to treat her as deferential is an instance in which the agent's consent 
is not valid. 
6. rights can only be waived with valid consent. 
7. the right not to defer cannot be waived. 
If valid, this argument could establish that the right not to defer cannot be waived, and 
that any attempt to do so is a failure of self-respect such that (RelChoice2) is not met. 
We would have a condition that could make sense of the intuitive non-autonomy of the 
choice for deference. But this argument too is question-begging. Premise 3 of argument 
J is: 
3. if an agent treats waives her right not to defer, then an agent does not 
properly understand her moral status 
But if the justification for this claim is the thought that an individual who did 
understand her rights properly would recognise that the right not to defer is unwaivable, 
14 Hill, T. (1991) Op.Cit. p.15. 
15 Baron, M. (1985) Op.Cit. pp.396-397. 
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the premise is assuming what the argument is aiming to establish. Hill's arguments, 
then, appear to be beset by circular reasoning. We cannot fmd a non-circular grounding 
for the claim that the deferential individual fails to respect her moral rights. A diagnosis 
of Rose's choice as non-autonomous cannot be grounded in the claim that she fails to 
respect her moral rights, and hence lacks self-respect. 
An alternative way to make sense of the claim that the choice for deference is 
incompatible with the value of self-respect might be found in Baron's suggested 
interpretation: that the individual who chooses a deferential role fails to accord 
appropriate weight to her interests or preferences. I tum to this interpretation now. 
3.3 Interests or preferences 
Baron's understanding of the constraint on autonomous choice, recall, takes the 
following form: 
(ReIChoice2b) a necessary condition for autonomous choice is that the 
choice is in accordance with the value of her interests or preferences. 
There is an intuitive sense of what it is to fail to choose in accordance with one's 
preferences. This is what Baron has in mind with her example of a wife, such as Rose, 
who gives insufficient weight for her preference not to wear make-up: 
we say to her 'oh so you prefer wearing make-up to not wearing it?' 'No', 
, , 16 
she replies, '1' d rather not wear it; but my husband would hate that. 
Here I want to examine what substance we might give to this intuition, and whether we 
can make sense of the way in which the deferential individual might fail to give 
appropriate weight to her preferences such that she fails to meet (RelChoice2b). If good 
sense can be made of this claim, then the following argument could be made: 
Argument 4: for self-respect requiring appropriate weight to preferences 
1. An agent treats herself with self-respect, in accordance with her status as a 
moral equal with others, if she treats her preferences as having (prima facie) 
equal weight with the preferences of others 17 
16 Baron, M. (1985) Op.Cit p.395. 
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2. the moral law demands that all persons are treated as moral equals - that all 
persons treat everyone (including themselves) with respect 
3. if an agent is deferential, she fails to treat herself as having equal moral 
status - because she takes her interests and preferences to have less (prima 
facie) weight than those of others. 
4. if an agent is deferential, then, she fails to treat herself with self-respect, in 
accordance with her status as a moral equal with others 
If this argument can establish that agents who are deferential fail to properly recognise 
their moral status argument 3 can then run, utilising the claim that waiving the right to 
defer cannot be autonomously performed. Or a more direct argument could be 
constructed: if an agent attempts to waive the right, she does not properly understand 
her moral status. Failing to understand that this status and the rights that it entails is a 
failure of self-respect. Hence an agent who chooses deferential roles fails to meet 
(RelChoice2). However, I will suggest that it is very difficult to make sense of the 
seemingly intuitive thought that might support premise 3 of argument 4. 
3.3.1 Intrinsic/first order desires 
A first attempt to make sense of the intuitive claim might state that an individual who 
chooses a deferential role fails to give adequate weight to her own desires: in that role 
her choices and actions will primarily be geared towards the satisfaction of the desires 
of others. This thought is challenged by Marilyn Friedman, who writes that: 
the fact that a person takes, as the preferences which she will act to satisfy, 
preferences which happen (originally) to be those of other persons, does not 
entail that she acts on preferences which are not (in the last analysis) her 
own. ... [She] takes the preferences of certain other persons for her own; 
18 they become her preferences. 
The thought here is that the deferential individual may nonetheless act on preferences 
that are - having become - her own. Baron finds this claim wrong-headed, responding 
that; 
17 Th I'fier 'prima facie' is required here, because one might, upon reflection decide that 
e qua 1 1 ......h h ' . 
someone else's preference to spend therr spare .ttme ~avmg dolphms IS more welg ty t at one s 
own preference to spend one's spare time watchmg BIg Brother. 
18 Friedman, M (1985) Op.Cit p.144. 
to say that A accepts a view which leads her or him (cheerfully) to abide by 
someone else's wishes (preferences) is not to say that A adopts this 
person's preferences. Of course A might come to adopt the other's 
preferences; but it is quite possible - and extremely common - for such a 
person not to .19 
One way to understand the claim here is that the deferential individual fails to give 
weight to her intrinsic desires. She chooses in accordance with her husband's 
preferences - say, wearing a red shirt, when she has an intrinsic desire for a blue shirt. 
Her desire for wearing the red shirt is merely instrumental: instrumental to the 
satisfaction of her desire to please her husband. Thus she fails to accord appropriate 
weight to her intrinsic desire (for the blue shirt). But it is difficult to see what is 
problematic with choices that have this structure. I have an intrinsic desire to sit in the 
sun and eat mango. My desire to stay inside and write is instrumental- instrumental to 
the satisfaction of my desire to write a chapter that will be part of an interesting thesis, 
which is instrumental to the satisfaction of my desire to be a good candidate on the job 
market. .. and so on. I forsake sitting out eating mangoes for the sake of the instrumental 
desire to write my thesis. This is quite normal, and there is nothing troubling with a 
structure of preference and choice in which an agent forsakes the satisfaction of an 
intrinsic desire for an instrumental one. 
Alternatively, Baron's thought might be understood as the claim that the deferential 
individual fails to give appropriate weight to her first order desires. However, on one 
widely accepted view of moral psychology, when an agent chooses and acts, there is, of 
necessity, a motivating desire on which she acts. On this view, the standard Humean 
view, if an agent performs action x, she has a desire to do X.20 Such a claim about 
motivating desires is not the solely held by Humeans: it is also accepted by prominent 
Kantians. Korsgaard, for instance, writes that: 
Kant thought that every action involves some incentive [desire] or other, for 
there must always be something that prompted you to consider the action
21 
19 Baron, M. (1985) Op.Cit p.396. . ." 
20 This view has its roots, naturally, m Hume, who claimed that reason alone can never be a 
motive to any action of the will ... Abstract or demonstrative reaso~ing, therefore, neve.~ 
. fl ences any of our actions, but only as it directs our judgment concermng causes and effects ~ ;reatise of Human Nature «(188811978) Nidditc~, P.H. (ed.), 2nd Edi~ion, Oxford. C~~rendon 
P ) B k II Part III at pp. 413-414). If an agent IS to be moved to action, then, a passion - or ress 00 h 'b l' f d' . , 
d . _ t be present to give the motivational push. Thus we have tee Ie - eSlre pair eSlre mus hi' \" f 
view of action, that informs much moral psychology, as well as the 'folk psyc ooglca new 0 
human action. . ' , "'I 
21 K d C (2002) 'Practical Reason and the Umty of the Will Locke Lecture II, p._-+ 
orsgaar, . k 0 "'OL Available online at: httn>' www.people.fas.harvard.edui-korsgaar :~Loc eo- ecture". 
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and: 
every action must involve both an incentive [ desire] and a principle22 
On this view, when the deferential individual acts, even in cases where she chooses to 
act deferentially, she does act on a first order desire or preference that is her own. Thus 
she gives weight to her first order desires. When Rose buys a red shirt rather than a blue 
one, because Chad prefers red to blue, she gives weight to her first order desire for a red 
shirt (and does not give weight to her first order desire for a blue shirt).23 So this cannot 
be the right way of making intuitive sense of the thought that such an individual fails to 
give appropriate weight to her preferences. 
3.3.2 Higher order desires 
A natural progression, then, would be to look to the agent's attitudes toward her first 
order desires; her reflective endorsements or rejections of the desires that move her to 
action (a view we encountered in the previous Chapter, in assessing Frankfurt's account 
of higher order endorsements). Perhaps the problem with the deferential wife is that she 
fails to accord sufficient weight to what she really wants, namely, those wants that are 
supported by her reflective endorsements. On this view, whilst the deferential individual 
may want to do x (where x is determined by the individual to whom she defers), she 
does not want to want to do X.24 Her first order desire lacks the kind of supporting 
higher order attitude (desire) that can serve to tum her run of the mill first order desire 
into a preference in the sense required for her to meet (ReIChoice2b). On this view, 
preferences are the desires behind which an agent stands (with her higher order desire), 
as it were. Self-respect requires that an agent must give weight to her preferences in this 
sense. 
Again, this is an intuitive understanding of the notion of a preference, but not 
one that could do the work in establishing the claim that the problem with the individual 
who chooses deference fails to accord her preferences adequate weight. It is plausible to 
suppose that the deferential individual wants to want to do what the person to whom she 
defers legislates: if she is to act in accordance with the dictates of another, she must 
22 Korsgaard, C. (2002) 'Autonomy, Efficacy and Agency' L~~-ke Lecture III, p.23. Available 
online at: http://www.people.fas.harvard.edul-korsgaar/#Locke /o20~ectu~~s. . 
23 Recall, from chapter 2, that first order desires are understood dISpOSltlOna~ly: thus It makes 
sense to attribute desires to Rose for both, even if she feels a phenomenological urge to buy a 
blue shirt. 
~4 See Frankfurt, H. (1971) Gp. Cit. p.9. 
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surely want to have the motivating desire that can move her to so act. For instance, Rose 
has fIrst order desires for both red and blue shirts. Which of these first order desires 
does she want to move her? She endorses the desire for the red shirt, because she knows 
her husband will be happy if she buys the shirt he prefers, and this is her main goal. If 
Rose fails to give appropriate weight to her preferences in such choices, this cannot 
amount to a failure to give appropriate weight to those desires that are endorsed at a 
higher order. Likewise, insofar as the agent has a higher order desire for the deferential 
role in making her initial choice - as Rose does, we assumed - she does not fail to give 
weight to her preferences in this sense. 
3.3.3 Evaluative endorsements 
The notion of 'a preference' seems to contain some evaluative content; the agent prefers 
x when she is motivated towards x and when she takes x to be valuable or important to 
her. The fault of the deferential individual, then, might be that she fails to give 
appropriate weight to she takes to be valuable. Her preferences consist in a subset of her 
desires; those that accord with what she values.25 She takes y to be important, but fails 
to give weight to this - fails to choose or act in accordance with it. Rather, she chooses 
and acts in accordance with z, which is what the person to whom she defers prefers. 
This might be true of some deferential individuals. But surely there will be 
some individuals for whom we cannot accept this as a diagnosis of her failing to give 
appropriate weight to her preferences. If Rose considered a career in maths important 
and failed to give weight to this, we could say she fails to give weight to her 
preferences. But it is entirely plausible that what an agent takes to be important is the 
role of serving her husband. Insofar as Rose values such a role itself, she will count as 
giving appropriate weight to her preferences. Such an individual will meet 
(RelChoice2b). The substantive theorist presumably wants to make sense of the non-
autonomy of all of those with a deferential attitude: those who evaluatively endorse it as 
well as those who do not.26 
25 See Watson, G. (1975) OpoCit for a view according to which the evaluative stance of the agent 
is important in determining 'where the agent stands' 0 0 ") 
26 As I have already noted, some theorists - Westlund, A. (2003) Op.Cll, Oshana, M. (_006) 
O c o 0 t 0 that an agent who fails to be wholehearted about her deference, who has 'Po It - mam am 0 o' 0 
fi fi th Ptions that go unsatisfied stnkes us as mtUlhvely more autonomous than pre erences or 0 er 0 ' 0 ' 0 0 c, 
h 0 h I hearted in her deferenhal role and falls e\ en to form prelerences of her an agent w 0 IS woe ' 
own. 
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3.3.4 A generalising strategy: 
It is difficult, then, to make sense of the way in which it is true of the deferential 
individual that she 'fails to give appropriate weight to her preferences'. The possibilities 
that I have run through are not, of course, exhaustive. But I take them to be illustrative 
of the way in which any such attempt will fail to make good sense of the claim: insofar 
as the agent chooses such a role, and in her subsequent deferential actions, she will have 
a desire, or appropriate motivating state, to do so. And insofar as she has reflectively 
chosen to act in a deferential manner, or to occupy a deferential role, because she takes 
this to be important or valuable, then she will be giving weight to her desires or 
evaluative judgments. 
These two features of an individual who chooses deference mean that diagnoses 
of any sense in which she fails to give weight to her preferences will have to spell out 
why it is that these preferences are not the right ones to which she should be giving 
weight. But this is to make a substantive judgment about what can be the object of 
autonomous choice, and the claim that the agent fails to give weight to her preferences 
is itself supposed to be what makes sense of the substantive constraint on autonomy: 
that the agent who chooses deferentially lacks self-respect, and, in failing to choose in 
accordance with this value, lacks autonomy. The prospects for this strategy of making 
sense of (RelChoice2), then, do not look good.27 
3.3.5 Preference formation 
A different tack is suggested by Baron's claim that part of the problem with a 
deferential individual is that she "may cease to develop her own interests".28 This might 
involve failing to form preferences of one's own, or failing to sustain and foster one's 
own preferences. In line with this thought, Baron imagines: 
27 In his 'Self-respect Reconsidered', Hill suggests that there is an~~her wa~ in which one might 
fail to manifest self-respect: by having personal standards, and fallmg to hv~ ~p to them. (One 
might also fail to have such standards at all, which Hil~ too ta~es. to be a f~llmg). BY'poersonal 
standards, Hill means a set of values that one wishes to hve o~e s h~e by, :vhllst recogmsmg that 
others may not and need not accept these particular values. Might thiS notl~n of s~lf-respect help 
. dO 0 th blem Wl°th the deferential individual? It seems not: hrst. Hlli makes clear III lagnosmg e pro 0 0 0 0 
that he intends his analysis that focuses on moral rights to remam m place as diagnostic of t~e 
i:. 01 0 f °l°ty Second insofar as the personal standards "form of self-respect would reqUire Lal mg 0 servl I . , 0 0 0 
h d I d llove by a set of personal standards by which one IS prepared to Judge t at one eve op an 0 0 
If' 0 0 I th t dei:.erential individuals - such as the subservient houseWife - may have onese It IS C ear a Ll 0 • 0 0 
10 h t d rds See Hill T (1991) 'Self-respect ReconSidered m hiS Au/onomoV and Ive up to t ese s an a 0 , 0 
and Self Respect, p.22 
28 Baron, M. (1985) Opo Cit p.396. 
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suppose that I loved singing in choruses, but gave it up when I married 
because my spouse doesn't like them '" or wants me to be at home in the 
evenings, or because in my town the chorus rehearses on the same evening 
that he wants us both to play bridge. Suppose too that I no longer wear 
some of my favourite clothing since learning that my spouse thought it 
ugly. And so on. Something seems wrong.29 
Perhaps, then, the agent fails to give weight to her preferences by failing to sustain and 
foster her own preferences, as in this example. This, too, is an intuitive thought, and one 
that might be given substance if we consider higher order policies: policies that agents 
might have about the role that their desires play in deliberation, or about the weighting 
of desires, or about the formation of intentions, or about the formation of desires. The 
deferential individual may have a policy which claims: 
(P) endorse fIrst order desire for x unless my husband wants not-x. 
Or, 
(P*) endorse fITst order desire for y x only if my husband wants x. 
Policy (P) does not seem particularly problematic: we often form, or give weight to 
desires on the basis of a conditional policy. For instance, Rosalind Hursthouse and other 
virtue ethicists find intuitive the following policy:30 
(PI) endorse desire for x (unconditional honesty in action) unless the virtuous 
person wants not-x (conditional honesty in action). 
Or, more mundanely: 
(P2) endorse desire for x (parsnip soup) unless prospective guest wants not-x 
(not parsnip soup) 
But we tend to find individuals who only sustain and develop their preferences in 
f 'd . 31 H alignment with what others want disturbingly lacking in a sense 0 1 entIty. owever. 
this kind of consideration is quite a different kind of worry from that expressed by 
(RelChoice2b). The worry here is not that the deferential individual gives insufficient 
29 Ibid, p.398. d U· . P E h 6 
30 See Hursthouse, R. (1999) On Virtue Ethics, Oxford, Oxfor mverslty ress. sp. c apter 
and 7 1 ·f th . . 
31 Although note that the policy '(PI *) endorse desire for x on y 1 e VirtuOUS person wants x 
does not seem so troubling either. 
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weight to her preferences, but rather that she fails to sustain her own preferences. But 
failing to sustain preferences cannot simply be understood as a matter of failing to give 
weight to one's preferences: agents frequently alter their preferences (I haven't 
sustained my preference for wine; I have sustained my preference for papaya). Often 
this is a laudable thing (many try hard to eliminate their preferences for smoking). So 
altering or 'dropping' preferences, or failing to sustain some of one's own preferences, 
is not in itselftroubling.32 
3.3.6 Doing without desires 
The views that I have considered so far have utilised a moral psychology that 
presupposes that if an agent acts to do x, then she has a desire to do x. This moral 
psychology fits most naturally with Baron's expression of the concern that she fails to 
give adequate weight to her preferences. However, it is also worth briefly considering if 
better sense could be made of the claim that the deferential individual fails to give 
weight to her preferences on a view that maintains a different basic moral psychology. 
On Scanlon's view, desires need not motivate. Rather, seeing r as a reason for doing x 
can be sufficient to move an agent to act. On this view, then: 
it is not the case that whenever a person is moved to act he or she has a 
desire... [W]hat supplies the motive for this action is the agent's 
perception of some consideration as a reason, not some additional element 
of 'desire' .33 
This provides us with the following way of making sense of the problem with the 
deferential individual: perhaps such an agent fails to give weight to the considerations 
that she takes to be reasons to act. 
So failing, however, is not in itself normatively significant: it is part of the 
process of reasoning and deliberating that, upon reflection, we do not attribute weight to 
some of the considerations that we initially held to be reasons to act. We must 
32 Mi ht a Kantian hold that an agent has a duty to fonn preferences? Perhaps, but two points a~e 
in orJer: first, understood one way, as demanding that we hone and deYelop our preferenc.es. thIS 
t b 'de duty - failing to fulfil it is akin to failing to (e.g.) be as generous as one mIght be. mus e a WI c 'I . d' 'd I S d This is not the kind of fault that Hill and Baron find with the delerentla m lVl ua., econ: 
I t· I th duty may be understood as to require that the agent form deSIres, The a tema lve y, e "d 0 hi I' 
d ' I'd' 'dual does this' failing to do so would surely amount to SUlCI e. r, t s me elerenha m lVI, , .' , 
ld ' ethl'ng to be said about what constitutes an adequate baSIS for tormmg one s wou reqUlre som ',. 
own preferences. It is not clear what thIS baSIS would amount to. ',' .. 
33 SIT M (1998) What We Owe to Each Other, Mass. Harvard Unl\,erslty Press. p.39-41. 
can on, . . 
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understand the problem, if it is one, as the deferential individual failing to give weight to 
the considerations that she takes all things considered to be reasons to act. 
Understood thus, though, we lack the ability to make any diagnosis of the 
problem. Suppose that Rose holds that her husband's preferences or command or 
request that she do x provides a reason to do x; and, when weighed with the other 
reasons in the balance, that her husband's preference gives her, all things considered, a 
reason to do x. In such a case she does not fail to give weight to the considerations that 
she takes to be, all things considered, reasons for action. We might criticise what she 
takes to be reasons for acting. But we have not yet seen an argument for the claim that 
choosing for bad reasons is incompatible with choosing autonomously. 
3.3.7 Anticipating epistemic issues 
I noted that some cases of deference seem unproblematic: choosing, or forming 
preferences in accordance with the dictates of the virtuous person does not seem 
troubling in the way that an individual who defers, say, to her husband does. It is 
tempting to think that the problem with the deferential individual in the latter case is that 
she has false beliefs about the authority of the person to whom she defers (rather than 
being anything to do with her desires or preferences). We defer to the proclamations of 
scientists, historians, grammarians, and so on, with relative frequency. One might think 
that what justified deference in these kinds of cases is that the person to whom we defer 
is a legitimate authority on the matter.34 In cases in which an individual chooses a role 
in which she is deferential to her husband, we are inclined to think that the agent has 
false beliefs about the authority of the person to whom she defers. 
If this thought is to makes sense of the problem with the deferential individual, 
then an account of autonomous choice would have to incorporate: 
(E) a necessary condition for autonomous choice is that the agent has t~e 
beliefs about the legitimate authority of any person to whom she defers m 
making her choice 
My response to this is in the form of a promissory note that anticipates an argument that 
appears in the next chapter, to the effect that there are reasons to doubt that there are 
such epistemic conditions for autonomous choice. It is worth, at this stage, noting the 
34 See Dworkin, G. (1988) Op. Cit esp. chapters 3 & 4. 
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following two points: fIrst, (E) looks implausible. Lily the geneticist wants to construct 
a good methodology for cloning in the lab. She believes Professor Whang Woo-Suk to 
be an authority on such matters, and having read his papers on the cloning advances he 
has made, she incorporates aspects of his methodology in her lab work. But her beliefs 
about his authority are false: his claims about cloning success are fraudulent.35 This does 
not seem to undermine her autonomy - no less her self-respect - in her choices of 
experiment structure. So (E) does not have intuitive plausibility. Second, in any case, 
such a condition will not help Baron in her argument for the condition (ReIChoice2b); it 
is not concerned with the weight that the agent gives to her preferences or interests.36 
3.4 Summary 
In this chapter, we have seen another attempt to substantively constrain the contents of 
autonomous choice. This attempt is primarily motivated to make sense of intuitions 
about the non-autonomous choices of the deferential individual. However, in this 
chapter, I have argued that it is very diffIcult to give any substance to the seemingly 
plausible claim that deferential individuals lack the self-respect required for autonomy. I 
argued that Hill Jnr.'s argument was problematically circular, and Baron's defence of 
his claims avoided circularity at the cost of plausibility: the claim that the deferential 
individual fails to give weight to her preferences could not be substantiated. 
Incorporating a condition such as: 
(ReIChoice2) a necessary condition for autonomous choice IS that the 
choice is in accordance with the value of self-respect 
into a conception of autonomous agency, then, cannot do the work required of it in 
terms of capturing intuitive distinctions between autonomous and non-autonomous 
agents. 
As with the discussion of Stoljar's substantive condition, though we are left 
with an intuition that appears in need of explanation: that there is something troubling 
35 S C S (2006) 'Scientist's Cloning claims Untrue .. 0 Except for the Dog' Independent 
ee onnor, . 
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about Rose's choice for a deferential role, although this may not amount to being a 
problem of lacking autonomy in choice. Other values - equality, justice - may be 
appealed to in explaining the intuition that there is something troubling here, but I 
cannot undertake this task here. At this stage, we can conclude that neither of the two 
relational conditions thus considered - both of which have taken the form of a 
substantive constraint on autonomous choice - can draw the intended distinctions 
between intuitively autonomous and intuitively non-autonomous choices. In the next 
chapter, I argue that no condition that has this structure can do so. 
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Chapter 4. A schematic argument against substantive 
accounts 
In the last two chapters, I looked at two substantive relational conditions for autonomy. 
These conditions constrain the scope of autonomous choice, demanding that the agent 
choose in accordance with a certain value if she is to meet the conditions for autonomy. 
These accounts provide one way of building relational content into a conception of 
autonomy: certain social relations or options that are inconsistent with that value cannot 
be autonomously chosen (for instance, those that involve deferential roles inconsistent 
with self-respect); or, social conditions that fail to foster appreciation of the value may 
be inconsistent with autonomous choice (for instance, those consistent with false or 
oppressive norms). 
Of the two prominent substantive views considered, one (Stoljar's) posited the 
value of the true and the good or non-oppressive; another (from Hill and Baron) posited 
the value of self-respect as necessary for autonomy. However, though motivated to 
make discriminations about certain intuitively problematic choices in oppressive social 
contexts, I argued that neither view succeeded in capturing the stated intuitions. 
Stoljar's condition was explanatorily inadequate, whilst neither Hill's nor Baron's self-
respect requirement could diagnose the problem with the deferential individual. 
In this chapter, I give a more general argument, to the effect that no account that 
incorporates a substantive condition of the following form should be accepted: 
(RelChoice) A necessary condition for autonomous choice is that the 
agent's choice is in accordance with value v. 
I will argue that such a condition cannot make the kind of intuitive discriminations 
between autonomous and non-autonomous agents required: it faces 'the problem of 
false negatives', namely, that seemingly autonomous choices are diagnosed as non-
autonomous. Thus the motivation to accept such a relational condition falls away. I 
argue for this conclusion by noting that the condition as it stands is underspecified. 
Once fully spelt out, the problems that face such a condition become apparent. 
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We will see the concern, from Christman, that conceptions of autonomy that 
incorporate value are not able to play the normative roles (of grounding respect, 
protecting from paternalism, and so on). Having considered a plausible line of response 
to this concern, I set out my argument for the claim that substantive accounts cannot 
capture the intuitions that proponents of such views set out to make sense of. This is 
important, because the substantive theorist might respond to the first objection that she 
is concerned with a different notion of autonomy. Irrespective of the legitimacy of this 
move, it will be of no use if the substantive condition can't capture the intuitions that 
motivate theorists to posit it. 
4.1 A concern about values 
John Christman has argued that substantive accounts should be rejected, because the 
value-laden content that is incorporated into the conditions for autonomy means that 
they are unable to play the roles in the normative frameworks that account in part for its 
value. These roles are part of the framework - consideration (A) - set out in Chapter 1 
that enables us to evaluate a conception of autonomy. His concern is that such a value-
laden conception brings with it the danger of "exclud[ing] from participation those 
individuals who reject those types of social relations demanded by those [substantive] 
views".! With regards to the claim that an agent who fails to choose in accordance with 
the specified value is non-autonomous, Christman remarks: 
To say that she is not autonomous implies that she does not enjoy the 
status marker of an independent citizen whose perspective and value 
orientation get a hearing in the democratic processes that constitute 
legitimate social policy.2 
Suppose an agent meets all the content-neutral conditions but fails to choose in 
accordance with the substantive value specified. Then, Christman claims: 
despite her authentic, competent, and 'sober' [choice] (by hypothesis), 
her lack of autonomy ... would allow other agents and representatives of 
coercive social situations to intervene to relieve her of this burden and to 
restore her autonomy (at least in principle). This implication should be 
troubling.) 
I Christman, J. (2004) Op.Cit. p.156. 
2 Ibid. p.157. 
3 Ibid. p.157. 
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Christman's concern is that it is troubling to hold that, simply because an agent does not 
hold a certain value commitment, she cannot be a participant in political processes, and 
is not protected from paternalistic interventions. Now, Christman's worry about value-
laden accounts is one that he thinks faces all constitutively relational conceptions, and I 
shall return to address this aspect of his worry in Chapter 7.4 For present purposes, 
however, the central worry is that insofar as a conception of autonomy is value-laden, it 
cannot stand in the normative frameworks required of it. Individuals are due respect not 
because of what they value, but because they have, for example, the capacity to value, 
and to deliberate about what to value. They are candidates for political participation not 
because of certain value commitments, but because of their ability to deliberate about 
what conception of the good to pursue. This thought underpins the claim that such 
agents should not have their actions unduly interfered with,5 even when the interference 
is motivated by concerns for their own good. It would be dangerous, and antithetical to 
an appreciation of a pluralistic set of values,6 to delineate the class of agents who have 
these normative benefits according to whether they choose in line with specific values. 
This aspect of Christman's concern seems right, and insofar as the substantive theorist 
cannot respond to it, this seems to provide good reason to reject such views. It is worth 
briefly considering some of the responses to this concern, however. 
4.1.1 A different stripe of autonomy? 
The substantive theorist might well accept Christman's claim that a value-laden 
conception of autonomy should not do the work of establishing entitlement to normative 
benefits. She might claim that the term 'autonomy' is broad, and can mean different 
things, and that Christman's notion of autonomy differs from that which is constrained 
by substantive values.7 
4 To antIclpate: I shall argue that he is wrong to claim that all constitutively relational 
conceptions are value-laden. 
5 Of course, there are some exceptions: intervention to prevent harm befalling others may be 
justified. 
6 This might be understood as a 'reasonable pluralism' in Rawlsian terms. The fact of reasonable 
pluralism is stated as the fact that there are an incompatible set of comprehensive views 
(accepted values, religions, aims and goals) each of which is the result of good reasoning about 
what comprehensive view to adopt and how to shape one's life. See Rawls, J. (1993) Political 
Liberalism Columbia University Press, Esp. Lecture 1, pp.4-46. 
7 See Arpaly, N. «2003) 'Varieties of Autonomy' in her Unprincipled Virtue, Oxford University 
Press, pp.117 -149) for discussion of some of the different senses of autonomy present in the 
literature. 
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One fonn this response can take is to claim that substantive values are relevant 
to autonomy in a 'personal authenticity' sense. Recall that in Chapter I we saw the 
distinction between what Scanlon called 'the political problem of free will' - namely, 
the problem of the extent to which agents' choices and conceptions of the good should 
be respected, protected from paternalistic intervention, not coerced by the state, and so 
on - and 'the personal problem of free will'. This latter problem is, in part, a matter of 
how to make sense of the causes that leave agents feeling 'alienated' from their actions 
- feeling "manipulated, trapped reduced to the status of a puppet". 8 The proponent of a 
substantive condition may claim to be concerned with a similar, personal authenticity 
sort of autonomy; with how socially oppressive contexts might leave agents feeling 
alienated from their actions in such away. A substantive condition, she might claim, is 
well placed to diagnose cases in which there is, intuitively, something problematic with 
an agent's autonomy, or 'personal authenticity'; namely, when she is choosing in a way 
that does not accord with the specified value (perhaps, the theorist will go on to claim, 
this is a value to which all agents are, authentically, committed). It does not follow from 
diagnosing a lack of autonomy in the 'authenticity' sense that we can intervene with the 
agent's choice, and so on. But it does follow that we can make some critical comments 
about the social contexts that thwart or make difficult this personal authenticity. 
Or, a theorist may claim, as Oshana does, that the objector is concerned with a 
'thinner' sense of autonomy than that which incorporates value-constraints, which is 
'personal autonomy' properly understood. She writes: 
it is not personal autonomy that is the subject of the liberal's concern as 
Christman presents it, but autonomy of some other (political) variety .... 
But accounts of political autonomy are generally too thin to illuminate a 
full account of self-determination. Personal autonomy is a marker of one of 
a wider range of lifestyles political liberalism accommodates, but there may 
be politically autonomous agents who fail to be personally autonomous in 
the manner I describe.9 
On this view, the concern about value-Iadenness only holds for those accounts intended 
to characterise a 'thin' notion of autonomy - one that characterises the markers that 
citizens must manifest to be candidates for participation, protected from interference, 
8 Scanlon, T.M. (1986) Op.Cit. p.157. As I have mentioned, he is concerned in particular with 
the way that we can understand some, but not all, of our actions in this way, given the causal 
thesis. 
9 Oshana, M. (2006) Op Cit. p.102. Note, however, that Oshana at other points insists that she is 
concerned with the same notion of autonomy (see her discussion of the 'apples and oranges' 
objection, (at pp.93-93) to which I refer in the next chapter). 
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and so on. But insofar as one is seeking to give an account of a richer phenomenon - "a 
full account of self-determination" - it may yet be legitimate to incorporate substantive 
values. Oshana writes that "it is one thing to say there are a variety of social 
arrangements that comport with well-being [to wit: those that individuals should be 
protected from undue intervention in so choosing], quite another to claim that each of 
these arrangements will provide a life of autonomy". 10 On this view, it does not follow 
from diagnosing a lack of autonomy in the 'full self-determination' sense (failure to 
choose consistently with the substantive value) that the agent fails also to possess the 
normative benefits to which she is entitled by her possession of the thinner stripe of 
autonomy. 
In these ways, then, the relational theorist might respond to Christman's 
concerns about value-Iadenness. This line of response faces challenges, not least in 
explaining the value and importance of the notion of autonomy - in the personal 
authenticity, or 'full' self-determination sense - once it has been hived off from the 
normative benefits that accrue to the notion of autonomy the objector is concerned with. 
I return to address some of the issues raised by Oshana in Chapter 6. Here, however, I 
show that neither of these lines of response will serve to help the substantive theorist. In 
the rest of this chapter, I block lines of response such as the two above, by showing that 
the substantive condition cannot make good sense of the intuitively non-autonomous 
choices. She cannot adequately discriminate between autonomous and non-autonomous 
choices, as is the stated aim of such views, whatever kind of autonomy or authenticity 
she purports to be concerned with. 
4.2 Three ways to understand the substantive condition 
So far, we have seen that substantive conceptions of autonomy supplement the 
necessary content neutral conditions with a condition of the form: 
(RelChoice) A necessary condition for autonomous choice is that the 
agent's choice is in accordance with value v. 
The thought is that whatever content-neutral conditions are deemed to be the correct 
ones, it is only in conjunction with a substantive condition of this form that we have 
10 Ibid, p.104. 
68 
conditions sufficient for autonomy.ll As stated, however, it is not clear precisely what 
the substantive condition demands: there are, as I will spell out, three ways of 
understanding it. 
Consider, first, Christman's characterisation of substantive conditions , 
according to which they: 
demand that particular values or commitments must be part of the 
autonomous agent's value or belief corpus. 12 
This claim suggests that the agent must believe that v - the value specified by the 
account - is a value (worth promoting/preserving, reason-giving, and so on). And, 
presumably, this belief must constrain the choice of the agent. If it is the epistemic states 
of the agent that are of interest, then one natural way to interpret (Rel Choice) is: 
(ERC) A necessary condition for autonomous choice is that the agent is 
committed to value v, and believes that her choice is in accordance with 
value v. 
Compare this rendering of the condition with Stoljar's claim, in her discussion of the 
alleged non-autonomy of women who chose in accordance with 'false and oppressive' 
nonns. There, she claims that 
because of the intemalisation of the [false] nonn, they do not have the 
capacity to perceive it as false. 13 
I have earlier argued that it is very difficult to make any sense of this claim. However, 
reading between the lines, we can see that what Stoljar has in mind here as constraining 
choice surely cannot be (ERC). Why not? Because Stoljar claims that the agents who 
accept the 'false nonn' cannot see its falsity. Accordingly, some agents who act upon 
'false nonns' will take themselves to be acting in accordance with the true and the good 
- it is plausible that such agents will believe themselves to be acting in accordance with 
the value specified by Stoljar's substantive account. Perhaps what matters, with respect 
to the autonomy of the agent's choice, is whether or not they are in fact choosing and 
acting in accordance with the true and the good. 
II See Chapter 2 for a spelling out of some of the content-neutral conditions to which substantive 
conditions are added. 
12 Christman, 1. (2004) Op. Cit. p.148. 
13 Stoljar, N. (2000) Op. Cit. p.108. 
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This suggests there is a second way of reading the condition, according to 
which the agent's choice must be 'world-guided', in that it must in fact accord with the 
value specified by the account: 
(WRC) A necessary condition for autonomous choice is that the agent in 
fact chooses in accordance with value V. 14 
Substantive theorists are not clear about which of these understandings of (ReIChoice) 
should be adopted. Some accounts appear to hold a combination of the two views. In the 
diagnosis of what is wrong with the deferential individual, for instance, Hill claims that 
the obj ectionable feature ... is his tendency to disavow his own moral 
rights [i.e. the right not to defer] either because he misunderstands them or 
because he cares little for them. ls 
The claim here concerns both what the agent in fact chooses (the disavowal of her 
rights), and how he understands the choice (in light of his false beliefs). Hill seems to be 
demanding that a) an agent commit to value v (self-respect, derivative from the moral 
law, in this case); b) believes herself to be acting in accordance with this value; and c) 
that this belief be true; the choice is in accordance with the value. Part of choosing and 
acting in accordance with this value is having true beliefs about whether the choices in 
question so accord: having false beliefs demonstrates a failure to properly appreciate the 
value.16 Thus on the table is also a hybrid understanding of the substantive condition: 
(HRC) A necessary condition for autonomous choice is that the agent 
commits to the value v, believes her choice to be in accordance with value 
v, and in fact is in accordance with this value. 
14 What is it to choose in accordance with some value? Again, this is often left unspecified. For 
present purposes, I take it that to choose in accordance with value v has two readings: weak 
reading - the choice does not conflict with (undermine, thwart) the promotion of this value; 
strong reading - the choice promotes the value (i.e. brings about more of it, or more appreciators 
of it). I am primarily concerned with the weak reading here, although my claims will apply to the 
stronger understanding also. 
15 Hill, T. (1987a) Op.Citp.13. 
16 It seems that there will be certain kinds of false belief that are not inconsistent with properly 
understanding the value. Consider a choice for slavery. Hill envisages a case where the agent 
misunderstands the value of her own humanity, and hence the value of self-respect, and so 
believes slavery to be compatible with this value. But there is another possibility: the agent might 
simply misunderstand what slavery involves. It is not clear, in cases such as the latter, that the 
agent also misunderstands the value of self-respect. It seems that she understands this value 
properly, insofar as she meets the following counterfactual condition: were she to acquire true 
beliefs about the nature of slavery, she would recognise that it is incompatible with the value of 
self-respect (and subsequently change her choice so that it accords with this value). 
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Having separated out these dimensions of the substantive accounts, in the following 
sections, I explore the prospects for each understanding. 
4.3 Epistemic conditions for autonomous choice 
The first way of understanding the condition is: 
(ERC) A necessary condition for autonomous choice is that the agent is 
committed to value v, and believes that her choice is in accordance with 
value v. 
This condition places an epistemic constraint on autonomous choice: the agent must 
have a certain belief about the relation between her choice and a certain value. That is, 
the agent must have, in her belief corpus, the following: 
(B) My choice is in accord with value vi is not in conflict with value v. 
Note that the agent must also be committed to the value. This commitment might 
involve caring in a certain way about the value, and also holding a belief about the 
value, such as: 
(C) V is valuable: worth pursuing, reason-giving, to be promoted, preserved 
etc. 
Adding the demand that the agent believes (C) also means not only that the agent must 
act in accord with the value, but also in fact be committed to the value. It appears that a 
substantive account should demand (C) as well as (B). Suppose that the good is the 
value in question, and one aspect of this is health. An agent chooses to eat papaya, 
believing this to be in accordance with the value of health. But her choice is not 
motivated in the slightest by health considerations; she does not take health to be 
something worth pursuing, and is merely concerned to satisfy her palate. In such a case, 
the fact that her choice is in accordance with the value may play no role in her coming 
to make that choice. (I return to such considerations below.) Thus there appear to be two 
epistemic demands on autonomous choice: the agent must believe both (B) and (C). 
How plausible is it to accept these epistemic conditions? By way of answer, I first take a 
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detour into the literature that discusses the plausibility of epistemic conditions for 
autonomy. 
4.3.1 Other epistemic conditions 
McKenna claims that there are no epistemic conditions on autonomous choice. 17 If he is 
right the substantive theorist faces serious problems in demanding that agents, in order 
to be autonomous in choosing, believe (B) and (C), above. McKenna takes himself to be 
disagreeing with Mele, who argues that there is an epistemic condition for autonomy. In 
the following I consider what we can learn from their arguments for and against 
epistemic conditions for autonomous choice. 
a. McKenna vs. Mele on epistemic conditions for autonomy of choice 
McKenna holds that there are no epistemic conditions for autonomous choice, at the 
stage of deliberations and subsequent making of choice. IS The example he uses to 
support this claim is as follows (I paraphrase): 
Tal recognises that the unconscious Daphne needs the medicine called 
The Good Stuff. He gives her a dose from the bottle marked 'The Good 
Stuff. Due to a pharmaceutical hitch that is nothing to do with Tal, this 
bottle in fact contains The Bad Stuff, and Daphne dies. 19 
McKenna's claim is that Tal's autonomy of choice is not compromised by his false 
belief (although we would excuse him from moral responsibility). There is nothing 
wrong with the way that Tal's deliberations are conducted, and he governs his 
deliberations, judgements, subsequent choice and action in a way consistent with good 
agency. Thus he is autonomous in his choice of action - to assist Daphne by giving her 
medicine - despite his woefully false belief (in virtue of which it is inappropriate to hold 
him morally responsible for Daphne's death). 
17 McKenna, M. (2005) 'The Relationship between Autonomous and Morally Responsible 
Agency', in Personal Autonomy, Taylor, J.D. (ed.), Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
pp.205-235. 
18 McKenna does accept that there might be some epistemic conditions on the formulation of the 
policies and principles that one utilises in making choices. If one is seriously misinformed when 
formulating the policies that one later utilises, this might undermine autonomous choice. But the 
constraint is not on the beliefs of the agent at the time of choice, but on the beliefs of the agent at 
the time of formulating principles. (One might worry that it is somewhat implausible to think of 
these processes as clearly distinct, but I set aside these concerns for now). 
19 See McKenna, (2005), Gp. Cit. pp.208-211. 
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McKenna takes himself to be disagreeing with Mele, who, by contrast, claims 
that there is an epistemic condition on autonomous choice and subsequent action. He 
claims that an agent must be in an 'informational state' such that she can "make 
informed decisions about how to pursue [her] ends" (of course, being in a position to 
make informed decisions does not require that the agent have no false beliefs; just that a 
significant portion of her relevant beliefs are true).20 An agent should be in an epistemic 
state - have sufficiently many true beliefs - such that she has control over the success of 
achieving her ends. Absolute control would be too much to demand; rather an agent 
should have control such that her choice of action "increases the likelihood of 
[achieving her ends] above that provided by mere chance".21 In cases in which an agent 
is so misinformed that executing her choice will in fact thwart her aims, the 
misinformation means lack of autonomy. Consider Tal: he has false beliefs such that his 
executing his choice decreases the likelihood of him achieving his aim of saving 
Daphne. This false belief renders him unable to control the relative success of his 
actions, and as such renders him non-autonomous, according to Mele. 
b. Resolving the disagreement 
Here we have two views; according to one, there is an epistemic condition for 
autonomous choice; according to the other there is not. The first thing that we should 
note, however, is that the disagreement is not straightforward. Mele and McKenna are in 
fact talking about different things, but using the term 'autonomy' to refer to both. 
McKenna is concerned with whether or not an agent is playing a governing role with 
respect to her deliberation, and the choices made on the basis of this deliberation. Mele, 
on the other hand, is concerned with whether the agent is able to be effective or 
successful in executing and achieving her aims through her action. Thus it appears that 
he is concerned rather with the agent's personal efficacy in action. 
The bearing of this on their dispute is that there need not in fact be any 
disagreement: it is possible and indeed plausible to claim that there is no epistemic 
condition on governance of deliberation and choice, but that there is an epistemic 
condition on personal efficacy of action - an agent will be thwarted in achieving her 
goals if she has certain false beliefs. An agent with some false beliefs may be a perfectly 
functioning deliberator and chooser, given the deliberative input she has - it's just that 
20 Mele, A. (1995) Autonomous Agents: from Self-Control to Autonomy. Oxford, Oxford 
University Press. See esp. pp.177-182. 
21 Ibid, p.181. 
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she won't be very effective in successfully achieving her ends when acting upon her 
choice if the choice is informed by false beliefs. It is plausible that we could accept both 
claims, then: that there is no epistemic condition for autonomous choice and that there is 
an epistemic condition on the efficacy of autonomous action. 
c. A further disagreement 
It is worth noting that at some points Mele does appear to be concerned with the 
deliberations and choices of the agent. In the context of examining the kind of 
'informational state' that autonomous agents possess, Mele asks: 
is it plausible that although [the systematically misinformed agent] is not 
autonomous in his efforts to [achieve his ends], he nevertheless is 
autonomous with respect to his deliberation about the means of doing 
this? Not at all. Deliberation is informed by the deliberator's beliefs. By 
controlling what [an agent] believes, [one] gains control over what 
deliberative conclusions [the agent] reaches.22 
Here Mele is concerned with whether an agent can be autonomous in deliberation and 
choice whilst possessing false beliefs - and we can presume the false beliefs in question 
to be relevant and wide ranging, given the systematic misinformation of the agent in the 
example. In focusing on the agent's autonomy in her deliberation and choice, Mele is 
here talking about the same aspect of autonomy as McKenna. So they are disagreeing, 
insofar as Mele holds that autonomous agents do meet certain epistemic conditions. On 
what basis does Mele argue for an epistemic condition for autonomy in deliberation and 
choice? In being misinformed, Mele claims, an agent lacks control over her beliefs; 
others have control over the content of her beliefs, and hence her deliberation and 
subsequent choice. Such an agent is non-autonomous. 
Should we accept Mele's claims on this point rather than McKenna's contention 
that there are no epistemic conditions on autonomous choice? The considerations I raise 
here will not be decisive, but I suggest that we should reject the case that Mele makes 
for an epistemic condition. There are two points here. The first pertains to what is doing 
the work in Mele's example: whether it is the deception by others, or rather the agent's 
state of having false beliefs. If it is the deception by others that is driving Mele's claim 
that the agent is non-autonomous, then his is an argument for the incompatibility of 
manipulation and autonomous choice, rather than for an epistemic condition for 
autonomy. 
22 Ibid, p.182. 
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The claim that being systematically misled undermines autonomy can be held 
whilst denying that there are epistemic conditions for autonomous deliberation and 
choice; it is the 'being misled' that undermines autonomy, not the false beliefs that 
(may) result.23 Whilst it is intuitive to say of an agent who has been systematically 
misled that 'her autonomy is undermined' or that 'she has had her autonomy violated', 
the sense of autonomy in these utterances is quite different to that of governance of 
deliberation and choice.24 That is, to say that an agent's autonomy is violated in such a 
context is not to say that her capacities for deliberation and choice are tampered with. 
Rather, it is to say that she has not been treated as she ought to have been.25 
However, we should not understand Mele in this way, because he accepts that 
natural phenomena (such as the electromagnetic fields of a Bermuda Triangle) may 
cause the agent to be in a state of misinformation in a way that undermines autonomy. 
This leads us towards an understanding of his claims as concerning how the possession 
of false beliefs might in itself undermine autonomy of deliberation and choice. 
Let us suppose, then, that it is not the misleading that is doing the work in the 
above example, and rather the false beliefs that the agent has. This brings us to the 
second point: thus understood, should we accept Mele's claims, above, as persuasively 
showing that agents with relevant false beliefs lack autonomy in deliberation and 
choice? The answer to this should surely be no. The consideration Mele appeals to here 
is that others are controlling the input (beliefs) to the agent's deliberation.26 But no 
agents have direct control over the input to their deliberation. Insofar as agents do not 
23 Note that an incompetence deceiver who has false beliefs may 'mislead' an agent into 
believing truths. 
24 This point is made by Hill, in 'The Importance of Autonomy' (l987c). His claim is that such 
talk of autonomy violation is best understood by conceiving of this sense of autonomy as a right; 
"it is to grant the person a right to control certain matters for himself or herself' (p.48). When 
deceived or manipulated, we can say that whilst the agent's autonomy qua legislator, or qua 
competent agent, is intact, her right to control her belief formation has been violated. Even this, 
however, cannot be quite right: as I claim below, we should not demand that agents have (direct) 
control over the input to their beliefs, or the belief-formation process. 
25 See Buss, S. «2005) 'Valuing Autonomy and Respecting Persons: Manipulation, Seduction 
and the Basis of Moral Constraint', Ethics, 115, pp.195-235) for claims to this effect. and how 
this challenges normative systems that claim that autonomy is the value that generates 
obligations. My claim does not address this latter claim; I merely emphasise that claims about 
autonomy violation are not, in this instance, claims about the violation of an agent's capacities 
for rational deliberation and choice. 
26 The nature of the control is relevant: if an agent is very regularly 'fed' with false beliefs, this 
appears more autonomy undermining than if she is given false beliefs an? then left alon~ to 
deliberate on the basis of them. But these intuitions do not support the clalm that false behefs 
undermine autonomy, but again, that manipulation does. 
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have direct control over the fonning of beliefs, they have little control over the input 
into deliberative processes. Moreover, agents should not have this kind of control. On 
occasions on which agents do exert control over their beliefs - engaging in wishful 
thinking, self-deception, confmnation-bias, and so on - we take them to be guilty of 
epistemic vice.27 
Thus Mele's argument for an epistemic condition seems problematic in the 
following two ways: fIrst, he relies upon an equivocal use of 'autonomy' in order to 
gamer intuitive support for the claim that systematic deception undermines autonomy of 
choice. Second, his discussion appears to suppose that lacking control over the input to 
deliberation undermines autonomy in deliberation. But this is implausibly strong: even 
ideally self-governing deliberators could not achieve this and, moreover, they should 
not. This argument from Mele cannot establish that there is an epistemic condition for 
autonomous choice that demands the agent's (relevant) beliefs be under her control. 
4.3.2 Back to the substantive condition 
We have seen, then, that it might be plausible to hold that there are epistemic conditions 
on being effIcacious in action such that one is effective in achieving one's ends. But it is 
more diffIcult to sustain the claim that agents must not have false beliefs if they are to 
be autonomous - that is, self-governing - in their deliberations and choice. Indeed, we 
have intuitive support for the absence of such epistemic conditions, from McKenna's 
examples, and no good argument for such conditions from Mele. How might these 
preliminary conclusions be relevant to the assessment of the epistemic condition (ERe) 
in the substantive account of autonomous choice? 
27 Further, it is particularly odd that Mele should take this line about control over deliberative 
input, as elsewhere (in his argument for agnostic autonomism (in (2005) 'Agnostic Autonomism 
Revisited' Taylor (ed.) Personal Autonomy, pp.109-124» Mele relies upon the claim that agents 
lack control over this input in his argument for a plausible libertarianism. His libertarianism is 
plausible, he claims, because it can withstand the objection that indeterminism in the agent's 
mental states or actions means that she lacks control (it is random, or chance, which mental state 
she has, or choice she makes, or action she performs). Mele's proposal is that, because the beliefs 
that we start deliberation from are mental states over which we have no control (often they just 
'pop into' our heads), if it turns out that there is indeterminism at this stage, then the libertarian 
account that commits to indeterminism places in the agent's hands no less control than that 
which the determinist accords her (whilst what thought pops into the agent's head is determined, 
it remains something that is not under her control). Thus the libertarian can avoid the concern 
that she gains freedom from determinism at the cost of relinquishing control. 
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If McKenna is right that there are no epistemic conditions for autonomous 
choice, then this seems to be bad news for this rendering of the substantive condition. 
But the first thing to notice is how different the conditions under consideration by Mele 
and McKenna are from the kind of condition we have with (ERC). Mele and McKenna 
are concerned not with whether autonomy requires any specific belief, but with whether 
a certain portion of the agent's beliefs must be true if the agent is to govern her 
deliberations and choice. The epistemic condition specified by the substantive account 
would be quite different, requiring that the agent believe a very specific propositional 
content, of the form: 
(B) My choice is in accord with value v. 
The views we have considered then, such as Mele's, could lend little support for a view 
that posits this kind of epistemic condition alone. Rather, if there are epistemic 
conditions for autonomous choice - a big if, given that Mele's argument for this claim 
was a bad one - this will only support the substantive theorist's claim that agents must 
believe (B) in cases in which that belief is true. The substantive theorist gains no 
support for the belief simpliciter, but rather support for the belief's role qua true belief. 
Even then, given that not all of our true beliefs are relevant to our choices, we 
would have to see why this specific belief is relevant. Many of my true beliefs - for 
example, my belief that clown loaches are scaleless fish - are totally irrelevant to both 
my deliberation and choice on many occasions. So an explanation of why the particular 
belief about coherence with some value is relevant needs to be given. At this stage, then, 
all we can claim is that the burden of proof to show that specific beliefs of this form are 
relevant to and necessary for autonomous choice resides with the substantive theorist. 
The two prominent accounts that I assessed in the previous two chapters failed to meet 
this burden. 
It is worth noting, moreover, that the implications of taking the (ERC) condition 
plus the content-neutral condition to be sufficient for autonomous choice are highly 
counterintuitive. In cases in which the agent's choice is not in accordance with the value 
specified by the account, the epistemic condition will demand that the agent form or 
sustain false beliefs, in order to be autonomous. The arguments for epistemic conditions 
that we have looked at are all concerned with whether the agent must have true beliefs. 
Considerations there were inconclusive. It seems even more problematic that a 
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substantive account might require that agents hold false beliefs. It is one thing to hold 
that false beliefs can be compatible with autonomous choice. It is quite another to claim 
that the addition of a false belief to a motivational set that meets all the content-neutral 
conditions is enough to make autonomous a choice that stems from such a psychology. 
Whilst it is not clear that true beliefs are necessary for autonomous choice, it is surely 
problematic to hold that content-neutral conditions plus a false belief is sufficient. There 
is no support for this kind of claim from the considerations raised by Mele. 
Let us see what would be demanded by an epistemic rendering of the 
substantive condition, if we plug in the values specified by the accounts we have looked 
at. A substantive account may demand that the agent believes: 
(KB) My choice is in accord with value of self-respect/ is not in conflict with 
value of self-respect 
Suppose that an agent chooses slavery. An account that took the form of (ERC) would 
demand that, as a necessary condition for autonomy, the agent believe that her choice is 
in accordance with the value of self-respect. Let us for now grant the claim of the 
Kantian substantive theorist that the choice for slavery is not consistent with the value 
of self-respect. Then the requirement that the agent believes her choice to be consistent 
with the value of self-respect would be a demand for the agent to form or sustain a false 
belief. This is highly counter-intuitive: even if true beliefs are not required, a 
requirement for false beliefs surely cannot be what makes the difference to an agent's 
choice being autonomous or not. 
I have noted that Stoljar's substantive condition should not be understood as an 
epistemic condition. Indeed, we can now see just how problematic it would be for an 
account that specifies as the value that the agent must believe herself to be choosing in 
accord with 'the true and the good' to take the form of (ERC). For such an account, 
meeting the epistemic condition might sometimes require falsely believing that one's 
choice is in accordance with the true and the good. An account of self-governance that 
gives central place to the value of the true and the good in autonomous choice is self-
defeating if it requires agents to sustain false beliefs in order to be autonomous with 
respect to her choice. 
Again, whilst holding false beliefs may not be incompatible with autonomous 
choice, it is surely theoretically problematic to hold that a false belief is what pushes a 
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deliberatively competent agent over the threshold for autonomy. Such a demand is so 
counter-intuitive that we can conclude this necessary condition - jointly sufficient with 
the content-neutral conditions - cannot be getting at what is taken to be important by 
substantive theorists. Surely what is important is that the agent's choice is in accordance 
with this value. This directs us to consideration of the world-guided understanding of 
(RelChoice), to which I tum in the next section. 
4.4 World-guided conditions for autonomous choice 
The world-guided understanding of the substantive constraint on autonomous choice 
was set out as: 
(WRC) A necessary condition for autonomous choice is that the agent in 
fact chooses in accordance with value v. 
This understanding of the substantive account will not be focused on what the agent 
believes to be the case with respect to the relation between her choice and the value v. 
Rather, it will be focused on what the relation in fact is between the agent's choice and 
this value. Accordingly, the demands that the epistemic rendering of the condition 
seemed to be committed to, in terms of requiring false beliefs to be necessary for 
autonomy, can be avoided. 
On this understanding, what is required is that the choice does accord with the 
value. Accordingly, a consequence of this kind of substantive condition is that the 
beliefs of the agent are not relevant to an assessment of her autonomy. Rather, what 
matters is simply whether or not the choice in fact is in accordance with the value 
specified by the account. However, the constraint specified by (WRC) , in conjunction 
with whatever content-neutral conditions are demanded for autonomous choice, cannot 
be what the substantive theorist has in mind as jointly sufficient for autonomy. To see 
why, consider the following case: 
Mistake: Claude believes that not dropping litter accords with the value of 
the good, in particular, the value of maintaining a clean and pleasant 
environment. But she doesn't care about promoting the good - in particular, 
she doesn't care about keeping her locality clean and pleasant, so she drops 
her banana skin in the park - an action which she believes conflicts with the 
value of the good. But she is mistaken: in dropping the fruit skin, she in fact 
contributes a good amount of phosphorous and potassium to the soil, thus 
improving the quality of planting soil in her local park. In choosing to drop 
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litter, then, on this occasion Claude chooses and acts in accordance with the 
value of the good. 
In Claude's case, the relation between her choice and the value v is purely accidental. It 
is a matter of fluke that she chooses in accordance with the value. Now we are unlikely 
to judge an agent to be non-autonomous. But insofar as the choices in accordance with 
some value are important to the substantive theorist, this is surely not the role that is 
envisaged for the value. This shows us, fIrst, that the world-guided condition ought to 
be modifIed to incorporate also the demand that the agent commit to the value in 
question: 
(WRC*) A necessary condition for autonomous choice is that the agent is 
committed to the value v, and in fact chooses in accordance with value v. 
Second, mistake shows us that an epistemic condition appears, after all, to be required. 
The world guided condition, with whatever content neutral conditions are necessary, are 
not jointly suffIcient. Third, this kind of case suggests that an adequate substantive 
condition must say something about the relation of the agent's belief to the choice that 
she makes. The substantive theorist needs to demand that the agent who chooses in 
accordance with the value, v, does so because of her (true) beliefs about the coincidence 
of her choice and the value (rather than due to fluke). 
In Claude's case, the problem is that she has false beliefs but her choice 
nonetheless in fact accords with the value. But the problem runs the other way also, and 
in a way that poses more problems for the substantive theorist. Consider the following 
case which challenges the necessity of the world-guided aspect of the condition, III 
which the agent's choice fails to accord with the value in question: 
Misfortune: Suppose for present purposes that the value, v, is specifIed 
as self-respect. Gus, a Kantian, believes that only an action that is 
morally right is consistent with self-respect. He faces a moral dilemma, 
and no matter how long he deliberates, he cannot determine what his 
moral duty consists in - it seems that either option involves a violation 
of humanity. He takes option A, an option which is not in accordance 
with self-respect, but which, after careful deliberation, he has decided is 
the way to act, in the diffIcult circumstances. 
Despite his careful deliberation, if (WRC) is a necessary condition, the substantive 
theorist must hold that Gus does not act autonomously, because his choice in fact fails 
to accord with the value of self-respect. This is counter-intuitive: the unfortunate 
circumstance may mean that Gus is not morally blameworthy for so acting as he might 
80 
otherwise be. But the circumstance does not make his choice non-autonomous· indeed , , 
such a challenging case, that demands careful deliberation, makes us more inclined to 
regard his choice as autonomous; it certainly manifests a higher degree of deliberation 
than many run-of-the-mill choices.28 Note that, were Gus in a different scenario in , 
which the options were very slightly different, such that (unbeknownst to Gus) one 
option was morally required, his choice (if it coincides with this option) would be 
autonomous. That a change in the world might make all the difference to Gus' 
autonomy seems wrong. Next, consider: 
Rude: Suppose for present purposes that the value, v, is specified as 
'the true and the good': an agent's choice must in fact accord with the 
value of 'the true and the good'. Suppose that Betty cares a great deal 
about observing etiquette, believing it to be part of the good to follow 
the norms of polite behaviour. But she has false beliefs about what, in 
a particular context, she ought to do (suppose that the etiquette book 
she consulted was out of date). She believes that it is polite to belch 
loudly after eating. And suppose that this is not the case: so she has 
false beliefs about the norms of etiquette in such context. When, after 
the meal, Betty belches, she believes that belching is in accordance 
with the true and the good. But her choice to do so is not in fact in 
accordance with the true and the good. 
Betty believes that her action is in accordance with the true and the good, but it is not. 
Nonetheless, whilst we might excuse her on the grounds of having made a mistake, we 
would not hold that she was non-autonomous in so acting. Despite choosing and acting 
in a way that did not accord with the true and the good, she maintained self-governance 
of, or control that she has over, her deliberations and subsequent choice. But, insofar as 
the (WRC) condition is necessary and is not met, Betty is not autonomous in her choice. 
Note, however, that had Betty been in a different context - one in which the norm is 
operative, and it is in fact polite to belch after eating - she would have been autonomous 
in her deliberation and choice. The difference in the world - in the operative norms in a 
particular context - are what makes a difference to her autonomy, in such a case. This 
again, is counter-intuitive. 
Insofar as the fact of the matter regarding the coincidence of the choice with the 
value is a condition for autonomous choice, autonomy seems hostage to the world in an 
undesirable way. When agents are in good shape, with respect to beliefs formed on the 
basis of evidence, and with respect to deliberation, it is counter-intuitive to suppose that 
28 Note though that he may fail to be autonomous in the Kantian sense of full moral autonomy, 
insofar as he does not act in accordance with the moral law. But moral autonomy is not the sense 
of autonomy at issue here. 
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unfortunate or unexpected features of the world could undennine their autonomy of 
choice. Of course, too many of these false beliefs, and the agent's personal efficacy in 
achieving her ends will be thwarted. But as I have already addressed above, this is a 
different matter from that of autonomous choice. 
To hold autonomy of choice hostage to the world in this way is problematic. 
Thus it is implausible to demand that the world-guided condition is necessary for 
autonomy in choice. We will see that this is ultimately deeply problematic for the 
substantive theorist: in order to make the diagnoses required, the world-guided 
condition has to do all the work in a substantive account. Given the implausibility of the 
(WRC) condition, this is a serious problem for the proponent of the substantive account. 
To recap: Mistake indicates that the world-guided substantive condition, in 
conjunction with the content neutral conditions, cannot be sufficient for autonomy. 
Whilst the epistemic condition (ERC) was problematic in demanding that false beliefs, 
on occasion, be sustained in order to achieve autonomy in choice, the considerations 
raised here show that the agent's epistemic states are in some way relevant to the 
autonomy of the agent in choosing. The agent's beliefs about the coincidence of their 
choice with the value must be relevant. Moreover, the considerations raised by 
Misfortune and Rude put pressure on the world-guided condition being necessary for 
autonomous choice. 
This pushes us towards the thought that the substantive theorist is after a hybrid 
condition that incorporates both epistemic and world-guided conditions, and speaks to 
the connection between the agent's beliefs about the relation of their choice to the value 
in question, in a way that can avoid the problems raised in this and the previous 
sections. In the following, I set out what this condition will have to look like, and then 
outline problems that this view faces, given what motivates substantive conditions. 
4.5 A hybrid condition 
A purely epistemic reading of the substantive condition leads to counterintuitive 
conclusions with respect to autonomous agents sustaining false beliefs. This surely 
cannot be a requirement on effective self-governed choice. And one of the problems 
with a purely world-guided rendering of the substantive condition was that it is unable 
to capture the kind of connection that is surely required between the agent's choice and 
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their beliefs about the coincidence of that choice with some value (as specified by the 
substantive account). Perhaps such problems can be avoided by incorporating both 
epistemic and world-guided considerations. 
Here is a first attempt at a more adequate specification of the substantive condition: 
(HRC): a necessary condition for autonomous choice is that 
a) the agent is committed to value v, 
b) the agent believes that her choice is in accordance with this value and , 
c) her choice in fact is in accordance with this value 
The considerations raised by mistake indicate that we should also add: 
d) The agent's beliefs about the value must play a causal role in the 
agent's choice. 
This condition seems to do a better job of capturing what the substantive theorist seeks. 
It captures the thought that, if what is important is that the agent chooses in accordance 
with the value specified, the agent should also be committed to this value, and there 
should be a connection between the agent's belief about the prospective choice and the 
value, and her making of this choice. No substantive account has drawn out the precise 
nature of these requirements, when offering claims of the form: 
(RelChoice) A necessary condition for autonomous choice is that the 
agent's choice is in accordance with value v. 
I have set out in considerable detail what the proponent of a substantive account appears 
to be committed to as true of autonomous agents, with respect to their commitments, 
beliefs, and the role of these states in causal explanations of their choice. These more 
detailed demands, it seems, must be incorporated into a substantive account - otherwise 
the agent need not have proper appreciation for the value specified, nor need their 
beliefs or appreciation of the value play any role in the agent's choice. 
Having set out what substantive accounts must be committed to, if they are to 
have a plausible rendering of the way that the specified value enters into the conditions 
for autonomous choice, in the next section I argue that given these commitments, 
substantive accounts cannot play the role that has been intended, in terms of making 
sense of what is intuitively problematic about certain agent's choices. 
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4.6 Problems with the fully specified substantive condition 
Recall that the stated aim of the substantive theory of autonomy is to make sense of 
intuitions about which choices are non-autonomous. Specifically, the substantive 
condition is posited by way of making sense of what is particularly problematic about 
certain choices (for contraceptive risk, for deferential roles, say). Note, then, that the 
substantive theorist is not merely after a diagnosis (of the agent's choice as non-
autonomous): she is after a distinction - between these troubling choices, and those that 
are intuitively autonomous. Now, this means that there is a presumption that a range of 
choices are autonomous, in a way that the particular choices at issue are not. 
Now, the substantive theorist is motivated to capture the following two 
intuitions, each of which has informed the accounts that we have considered in previous 
chapters, respectively: 
(II) choices that are informed by and accord with oppressive norms are non-
autonomous. 
(12) choices for deferential roles are non-autonomous. 
The key thought is that, distinctions should be drawn between agents whose choices are 
relatively unproblematic, and those agents who choose in accordance with oppressive 
norms. For example, a substantive account should be able to distinguish between the 
cases supposed to be intuitively problematic: 
(1 a) Lana chooses a role of deferential housewife 
(1 b) Santa chooses to take contraceptive risk, because she believes that it is 
unfeminine to carry contraception (showing oneself to be a sexually active 
agent). 
And those that are not: 
(2a) Dorian chooses accountancy 
(2b) Frieda chooses to use contraception, because she b~lieves. this is the 
best way to protect against pregnancy and sexually transmItted dIseases. 
Granting the substantive theorist the intuitions about the troubling cases, we should 
want to say that the first set of choice are troubling in a way that the second set are not. 
Thus the account should be able to generate claims that respect this distinction. This is 
, 
demanded, in particular, if we are concerned that those choices deemed to be 
autonomous are those entitled to the relevant normative benefits. I have noted, however, 
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that some theorists reject this demand on their account of autonomy. The claims in the 
following do not rely upon the acceptance of the relationship between autonomy and the 
normative roles it may play. 
Recall that the substantive theorist might maintain that she is concerned not 
with this political and social aspect of autonomy, but rather with a notion more akin to 
personal authenticity, or some thicker sense of full self-determination. Even given this, 
we might nonetheless maintain that most choices are not inauthentic in a problematic 
way: Stoljar's intuition is that there is something distinctively problematic about the 
women's choices that are informed by oppressive norms. Most of our choices don't 
trigger such intuitions, and should not be diagnosed as problematic (non-autonomous, or 
inauthentic) by the substantive condition. But in any case to accommodate this concern, 
we can stipulate that the non-troubling choices, above, are authentic and fully self-
determining. Dorian has been committed to accountancy all his life - he deeply believes 
in keeping the books straight and wants to ensure, in the small ways he can, that this is 
so. Frieda, likewise, is deeply committed to bodily integrity and control over 
reproductive choice. Each has been able to consider fully other options and values. 
These choices should be seen to be unproblematic, both in terms of autonomy, or full 
self-determination, or personal authenticity. We need to see, then, whether the 
substantive theorist is able, with the fully specified condition, to distinguish between 
choices of this kind and those that are intuitively troubling. 
Can the substantive condition, once fully specified do this? Certainly, a 
substantive account may be able to explain why choices (la) and (lb) are non-
autonomous: indeed, it is with a focus on such cases that the conditions are formulated. 
Consider case (la). Suppose that the value in question is that of self-respect. Lana might 
be committed to this value, and might believe her choice to be in accordance with it. But 
the substantive theorist will hold that the choice is not in fact in accordance with the 
relevant value, so the conditions set out in (HRC) are not all met. 
Or, consider case (1 b). Suppose the value in question is the true and good. Santa 
might value the true and the good, and believe her choice to be in accordance with this 
value but insofar as she does not in fact choose in accordance with this "alue, she will 
, 
not meet all the conditions in (HRC). Thus, each of these substantive accounts can, 
respectively, make sense of the claim that Santa's or Lana's choices are non-
autonomous. (Note that, it may be that each of these conditions can make sense of both 
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cases: if the role of deference is deemed to be inconsistent with the good, or if the 
choice to take contraceptive risk is deemed to be inconsistent with self-respect, then one 
condition might be adequate to diagnose the problem with each - setting aside, for now 
the problems that I have claimed face each of these conditions.) 
4.6.1 The problem of false negatives 
However, insofar as the substantive condition is intended to make sense of apparently 
intuitive discriminations we make between autonomous and non-autonomous agents, 
(HRC) is inadequate for this task. This substantive condition is not, I will argue, able to 
classify the intuitively autonomous choices of Dorian and Frieda as autonomous. Thus 
(HRC) yields false negatives. 
Suppose again that the value in question is the true and the good. Frieda might 
well be committed to this value, and might in fact choose in accordance with it. But 
even if we accept that the agent believes that her choice is in accordance with this value, 
it is not clear that this belief plays any role in her choice. Frieda's belief that using 
contraception is consistent with the good and non-oppressive might not playa role in 
her making this choice. Or suppose that the value in question is self-respect: Dorian may 
well be committed to this value, and she may in fact choose in accordance with it. But 
again, granting that he believes that the choice accords with the value, it is not clear that 
this belief plays any justificatory role in his choice: the belief that accountancy is 
consistent with self-respect might not playa role in his deliberations about what career 
to pursue. At best, then, the substantive theorist would have to reserve judgment about 
whether the choices of Dorian or Frieda are autonomous. But this is counter-intuitive; 
the kind of intuitive sway that the substantive theorists rely upon is precisely that, unlike 
run-of-the-mill - or even exemplary authentic, as we stipulated - choices such as 
Dorian's and Frieda's, there is something troubling about choices such as Santa and 
Lana's. The inability to make the kind of positive adjudications about such agents that 
are intuitive can be referred to as the problem of false negatives. With this problem the 
substantive account cannot say anything about what is held to be distinctively 
problematic about the choices at issue. Intuitions about the non-autonomy of the 
troubling choices are explained, but intuitions about the unproblematic choices are 
violated. 
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4.6.2 Response: counterfactuals 
An obvious response is available to the substantive theorist. She might complain that we 
can make good sense of the justificatory role that the agent's belief about the 
consonance of her choice with the relevant value plays in bringing about her choice. All 
that is required in order to show that the agent's commitments and beliefs have an 
important role in bringing about the choice in such a way as to satisfy (HRC) is that the 
following counterfactual be met: 
(d) were the agent to believe that option 0 conflicts with value v, the agent 
would not choose it. 
Taking this counterfactual into account (HRC) can classify agents such as Dorian and 
Frieda as autonomous in choice: their commitments and belief about the relevant value 
can be seen to playa tacit role insofar as were their respective choices not in accordance 
with the value, they would not so choose. This indicates a background policy, or filter, 
of some kind, according to which the commitments to the value and beliefs about the 
accordance of the choice with the value play an important filtering role. This condition 
takes into account the agent's tacit beliefs and the justificatory role they play in her 
actual choice. Plugged in, this gives us the following structure for substantive accounts: 
(HRC*): it is necessary for autonomous choice (jointly sufficient, with 
content-neutral conditions) that: 
a) the agent is committed to value v, 
b) the agent believes that her choice is in accordance with this value, and 
c) her choice in fact is in accordance with this value 
d) her belief that the choice is in accordance with the value is (at least) 
part of the story for her so choosing, such that were she to believe 
otherwise - that is, believe that the choice conflicts with the value -
she would not so choose. 
Thus specified, the substantive account may be able to take into account the way in 
which the intuitively unproblematic choices of agents such as Dorian or Frieda, accord 
with the relevant value in a way that meets (HRC*), and so are autonomous. The 
problem of false negatives can be avoided, and the discriminations between the two 
kinds of choices can be made. 
4.6.3 Counter-response: the problem of false negatives returns 
Thus modified, however, many of the agent's choices of concern to the substantive 
theorist will meet this counterfactual epistemic condition. Consider the case in which 
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the agent is committed to value v, but that her choice fails to accord with it. For 
instance, Lana chooses to take contraceptive risk and is committed to the value of the 
true and the good. As Stoljar sets out the case, such an agent in fact chooses in 
accordance with the false and the oppressive - and because of the falsity of her beliefs, 
her autonomy is thwarted. 
It is very plausible of such an agent that were she to believe that the choice 
conflicts with the value of the true and the good she would not so choose. Indeed, in 
claiming that the falsity of the norm is what prevents the agent from seeing how 
problematic it is, Stoljar at least implies that, were such an agent to have true beliefs, 
she would reject the guidance of the norm and choose differently. 
Similarly for the agent who 'misunderstands' or fails to 'effectively apprehend' 
the value of self-respect. The problem, at least in part, as characterised by Hill, is that 
the agent does not have the right beliefs about the relation between the choice and the 
value. Were she to believe that the option conflicted with the value specified - as the 
counterfactual condition states - we can plausibly suppose that she would no longer 
choose it. With respect to this counterfactual, then, it is plausible that many of those 
agents that the substantive account has sought to classify as non-autonomous could in 
fact meet this condition. 
Thus if the substantive theorist is to make sense of the intuitions that drive the 
positing of the condition, it is the world-guided condition that must do the diagnostic 
work. But in scrutinising (WRC), I claimed that we should reject the world-guided 
condition as necessary for autonomous choice. Insofar as the substantive theorist relies 
on the world-guided condition as a necessary condition, the problem of false negatives 
will remain. Recall Gus the Kantian and rude Betty; circumstances were such that Gus 
and Betty failed to choose in accordance with the specified values. Yet it is counter-
intuitive to maintain that they are non-autonomous in their choice. 
Misfortune and Rude are both cases in which changes in the world are such that, 
had the agent made the choice at a different time, or in a different context, under the 
same episternic and deliberative conditions, the choice's status would alter from 
autonomous to non-autonomous due to some change in the world. Cases in which 
mistakes are made due to changes in circumstance are surely pervasive - sufficiently 
pervasive that it is implausible to think that such a condition can be necessary for 
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autonomous choice. Once again, then, the problem of false negatives arises. Insofar as 
the condition is offered with the aim of making discriminations about which choices are 
and are not autonomous, such a condition seems unable to make the intuitive 
discriminations aimed for. 29 
4.7 Summary and conclusions 
I argued that work was required to get clear on exactly what the substantive condition 
demands. However, once the different readings of the condition are drawn out, we see 
that such a condition is unable to make intuitive discriminations between autonomous 
and non-autonomous choices. We should note that such a conclusion is not specific to 
the details of a particular substantive account that posits a particular value. For any 
value that is specified, it is implausible that an agent will meet the conditions set out by 
(HRC*) in very many cases. Thus substantive accounts face the problem of false 
negatives: such a view diagnoses many choices that are intuitively autonomous as non-
autonomous. A substantive conception of autonomy is therefore ill-placed to capture the 
very intuitions that it is intended to make sense of. 
Further, if a theorist does intend her account to figure in any of the normative 
frameworks, we should note how unacceptable this conclusion is: if an account of 
autonomy is to be well-placed to play the key normative roles of grounding respect, 
identifying the candidates for political participation, and protecting from paternalism, it 
should respect the intuition that, for the most part, our choices are autonomous and 
should not be intervened with. Insofar as a substantive condition counts a great many of 
our choices as non-autonomous, many deliberatively competent agents will fail to make 
choices that are protected from interventions, do not count in processes of collective 
29 It is worth noting that, were we to accept the world-guided condition as necessary (I have 
argued we should not) a further problem presents itself: it will sometimes - perhaps frequently -
be very difficult to determine whether a choice does accord with a particular value. The 
complexity of the world means that sometimes - perhaps often - we are clueless about whether a 
certain value is consistent with a choice or not. Is the choice to eat organic consistent with the 
good? Or should one buy from fair-trade farmers? And so on. That this is so when the value in 
question is utility has been argued for at length by James Lenman. (See Lenman, J. (2000) 
'Consequentialism and Cluelessness' Philosophy and Public Affairs 29(·.0, pp.342-370.) But we 
can well imagine that this will be so of other values: it will not be clear, due to what Lenman 
refers to as the 'massive causal ramifications' that all our actions have. whether a certain choice 
is in accordance with the value of the good, the non-oppressive, self-respect, and so on. 
Complexities in the world may not just obscure things for the age~t delib~rating ex ante, ~ut for 
the theorist adjudicating ex post, about the autonomy of a chOice. This makes the kind of 
intuitive discriminations the substantive theorist is aiming for ewn less likely, with the 
incorporation of a world-guided necessary condition. 
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decision making and so on. Thus whilst there may nonetheless be something 
problematic about those choices that are informed by oppressive values, we should not 
hold that this is a problem with the autonomy of the choice.30 
4.7.1 Further options for substantive conditions? 
I have looked at, broadly, three versions of the condition: an epistemic version, world-
guided version, and a reading that incorporates both epistemic and world-guided 
conditions. My argument against the incorporation of a substantive condition will only 
succeed as long as these readings are exhaustive. If there are other understandings of the 
substantive condition, then these might yet be adequate for making the distinction 
between intuitively non-autonomous and autonomous choices. What might further 
understandings look like? It is instructive, at this point, to note that the renderings of the 
condition I have set out mirror the literature that discusses whether the conditions for 
knowledge are internal or external.31 A brief look to the views in this debate will help us 
see what further options might remain for the substantive theorist.32 
Those who hold that the conditions for knowledge are internal hold that the 
justification for a belief must be accessible to the agent, upon reflection. Namely, she 
must have certain (second order) beliefs about her (first order beliefs about her) 
evidence for p, for her belief that p to amount to knowledge. Note the structural 
similarity of this view to that of (ERC), according to which an agent must have certain 
beliefs about her choice, for that choice to be autonomous. Externalists about 
knowledge, in contrast, hold that the agent need not have access to her justification for 
the belief that p - rather the justification for the belief can be external. If the agent 
consistently forms true beliefs ('tracks the truth'), say, then insofar as p is in fact the 
case, the agent's belief that p can count as knowledge. Note the structural similarity of 
this view to that of (WRC), according to which the agent's choice is autonomous if it in 
30 In this, my conclusion is consonant with that of Clare Chambers, who remarks of such cases: 
"what is wrong is best perceived not as an issue of individual choice, flawed reasoning, or 
psychology but of the society in question" (Chambers, C. (2008) Sex, Justice and Culture: The 
Limits ojChoice, Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania University Press, p.265). (Her concern is primarily 
with how liberalism might be equipped to criticise oppressive and unequal social arrangements, 
even when participation in those arrangements is (autonomously) chosen. Her conclusion is that 
liberals have the resources to criticise such inequalities and call for change in the social 
arrangements. However, she claims that the values that enable us to do so must be (primarily) 
equality, justice, and prevention of harm, rather than promotion of auto~o~y). 
31 I am grateful to Joe Morrison for encouraging me to consider these slImlanhes. 
32 In setting out these positions, I am drawing on characterisations from Pritchard, D. (2005) 
Epistemic Luck, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
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fact accords with (,tracks ') the value. Thus in (ERC) and (WRC) we have two starkly 
contrasting views, one internalist one externalist. In the epistemological debate we find 
a middle ground, in which we find views that focus on the agent's reliability or 
sensitivity. 
Might an analogue to these middle ground views be available to the substantive 
theorist? Let us consider a sensitivity view, which holds that the agent's belief that p 
counts as knowledge if it is sufficiently sensitive to changes in the world (understood in 
terms of whether, in near possible worlds in which p is false, the agent does not believe 
that p). Could substantive constraints be built into the conditions for autonomous choice 
by incorporating a sensitivity condition? 
Views that bear structural similarity to these sensitivity accounts are to be found 
in the literature on autonomy and self-governance. Indeed, Fischer and Ravizza hold 
that an agent can be understood to be 'reasons-responsive' in her choice, c, if, in a 
possible world in which there is sufficient reason to choose otherwise, the agent does 
not choose C.33 Might such a view be of use to the substantive theorist? She could 
modify her condition to hold that: 
(R -RRC) an agent's choice is autonomous if an agent has proper 
appreciation of the value v, where 'proper appreciation' requires that, in 
some possible world in which there is sufficient reason to choose in 
accordance with value v, the agent so chooses. 
Such a condition captures the thought that the agent can be sensitive to what is 
important about the value v, although she may not always choose in accordance with it 
- due to overriding factors, or having made a mistake, and so on. 
Likewise, a 'reliability' VIew focuses on the agent's general reliability, over 
time, in forming true beliefs (though on occasion, she may make mistakes). If an agent 
is sufficiently reliable, her true beliefs constitute knowledge (though not on the occasion 
that she has made a mistake). An analogous view may focus on the agent's reliability, 
over time, in acting in accordance with the specified value (even though on occasion, 
she might fail to do so). If she is suitably reliable, her choices can be regarded as 
autonomous (were the analogy strict, we might have to claim that, on occasions on 
33 See Fischer, 1. & Ravizza, M. (1998) Responsibility and Control: A Theory of ,\foral 
Responsibility, New York, Cambridge University Press. esp. at Chapter 2 and 3. 
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which she has made a mistake, she is non-autonomous in choice. But gIVen that 
autonomous choice is not factive in the way that knowledge is, this pressure is 
somewhat dispelled). 
If the substantive theorist adopts such a sensitivity or reliability condition, 
however, they have given up a great deal. Indeed, the main requirement of the 
substantive condition, (RelChoice) is dropped: a condition for autonomy is no longer 
that the agent must choose in accordance with the value v. Rather, the 'normative 
substance' of the account is built in by placing demands on the agent's capacities - their 
sensitivity to the value, or reliability in choosing and acting in accordance with it. The 
focus, then, is shifted from the agent's choice onto the agent's capacities; what matters 
is not whether or not the agent's choice is in accordance with the value, but rather 
whether or not the agent could choose in accordance with it, or has the capacity to 
appreciate the value. Such a view would be similar to that described by Benson, which 
"incorporates normative content but does not constrain directly the types of actions 
agents might autonomously perform, or the content of the motives or values that lead 
them to act". 34 
Once we move away from the demand that the choice accords with the value, 
towards a more nuanced incorporation of demands for appreciation of the value, we 
move towards a distinctive kind of view. Such a view does not substantively constrain 
the objects of autonomous choice. Rather, it focuses on the competence of the agent: 
such views are concerned with the conditions for autonomous agency. In the next part of 
the thesis, I consider some such views, and their attempts to incorporate relational 
conditions for autonomous agency. 
The conclusion of this part of the thesis is thus a negative one. We can leave 
behind the attempt to incorporate relational content by positing substantive conditions 
for autonomous choice - I have argued that such conditions are unmotivated and cannot 
serve the purposes for which they are intended. Further, if we seek an account that can 
playa role in the normative frameworks that account for autonomy's value, we should 
not accept one that incorporates value-laden conditions. In the next part of the thesis, 
then, I look at an alternative way to incorporate relational conditions into a conception 
of autonomy: by offering relational conditions for autonomous agency. 
34 Benson, P. (2005b) 'Feminist Intuitions and the Nonnative Substance of Autonomy' in Taylor, 
1.S. (ed.) Personal Autonomy, Cambridge University Press, pp.124-142. See p.125. 
Chapter 5. Relational accounts of autonomous agency: 
Benson and Oshana 
This part of the thesis is concerned with the conditions autonomous agency. Rather than 
specific choices, we are here concerned with the capacities that an agent has and her 
ability to exercise them on a range of occasions. A commonsense understanding of 
autonomous agency can be stated as: 
(AGENCY) an agent is autonomous when she has the capacities, and the ability 
to exercise the capacities, that are necessary for self-governance of her 
deliberation, choice and action. 
In this chapter I will consider two ways of developing this commonsense understanding. 
First, I will look at whether we can understand the account from Paul Benson as one that 
offers constitutively relational conditions (section 5.1 - 5.4). Whilst I will argue that his 
account should not be understood as offering constitutively relational conditions, there 
are nonetheless important points to draw from examining his view. I will then tum to 
Marina Oshana's relational account (section 5.5). Her account shows one clear and 
distinctive way of building constitutively relational conditions into an account of 
autonomous agency. However, I will argue in this chapter that her constitutively 
relational condition is unmotivated on two counts. 
5.1 Benson's account of autonomous agency 
Like Stoljar, Benson motivates his condition for autonomous agency by pointing to 
agents who intuitively lack autonomy, but with whom the content-neutral conceptions 
(of the kind I outlined in Chapter 2, above) find no fault. Looking to the interaction 
between the agent and the social relations in which she stands, Benson claims, can help 
us make good sense of the non-autonomy of agents in such instances. It looks like this 
kind of view might be a good candidate for a constitutively relational account of 
autonomy. I'll examine whether this is so. 
First, I set out a case that motivates Benson's relational condition. Then I will 
consider the way in which Benson's account might be understood as incorporating a 
constitutively relational condition. However, we will see that the most plausible 
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rendering of the condition is as causally necessary. It is instructive to consider this 
account, however, as two important points come to light: fIrst, that an account can 
incorporate some values, or 'normative substance' into the account without 
substantively constraining the objects of autonomous choice (as those accounts 
considered in the previous part of the thesis do). Second, we see that an account that 
posits causally, rather than constitutively, relational conditions for autonomy can 
nonetheless be well positioned to take into account autonomy's social aspects. An 
account that remains focused on the psychological states of the agent need not appeal to 
the imagery of the inner citadel ... [ which] suggests a picture of autonomy 
as relegated to the background of social life - a characteristic that emerges 
behind an invisible partition that isolates each individual from the rest, 
overlooking entirely the social and relational dimensions of self-
government. 1 
This charge comes from Oshana, but we shall see it to be unfounded. 
5.1.1 Benson on 'gaslighting , 
Benson argues that content neutral accounts are unable to make sense of certain cases 
that appear to be clear failures of autonomous agency. A central case in Benson's 
argument is: 
Gaslighted2 [America, the end of the 19th century]: Ingrid is diagnosed 
with hysteria by her well meaning but mistaken husband, who is also a 
doctor. Ingrid does not dispute or resist her husband's diagnosis; she 
believes his judgement is informed by and made "on the basis of reasons 
that are accepted by a scientifIc establishment which is socially validated 
and which she trusts". As a result, Ingrid "ends up isolated, and feeling 
rather crazy". Although her competences in deliberation are perfectly 
adequate, Ingrid no longer trusts her competences as an agent; in 
particular, her competence to respond to reasons - "she has ceased to trust 
herself to govern her conduct competently".3 
1 Oshana, M. (2006) Op. Cit. p.51. 
2 Gaslight: "to manipulate (a person) by psychological means into questi?ning his or he~ own 
sanity" (http://www.oed.com/). Benson's example is a significant reworkmg of the plot m the 
1944 film Gaslight (in the film the gaslighted is not well-intentioned). 
3 Benson, P. (1994) Op.Cit. See pages 655-657 for his description of this case. The unquoted text 
is a paraphrasing of his description. 
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This case infonns the condition for autonomous agency that Benson sets out in his 
(1994) paper, and builds on in later work (in particular, in his 2000, 2005a and 2005b4). 
An agent such as Ingrid, Benson claims, fails to be an autonomous agent. Nonetheless, 
she is able to meet a range of content-neutral conditions for autonomous agency. It is 
plausible that Ingrid will meet the conditions set out by structural content-neutral 
accounts of autonomy. For example, Ingrid retains reflective competence, and a sense of 
her values, and may retain executive and regulative power over her will; moreover, it is 
plausible to suppose that Ingrid will endorse the way in which she came to fonn this 
attitude towards herself (on the basis of advice from her trusted doctor and husband).5 
The problem with a character such as Ingrid cannot be explained by the existing 
content-neutral accounts, Benson claims. Rather, despite the adequate functioning of her 
autonomy-relevant capacities for reflection and deliberation, the agent lacks a sense of 
her own competence in the exercise of them, and her worthiness to do so. As a result, 
even when she puts these capacities to use, "she is quite disengaged from her actions".6 
When she chooses and acts, she doesn't trust that she is doing so competently, and feels 
unsure that she could account for her actions to others. This disengagement is a defect 
that undennines autonomous agency, Benson claims. We can now turn in more detail to 
Benson's characterisation of such a failure, and the condition for autonomy that he sets 
out accordingly. 
5.1.2 Benson's condition 
Although Ingrid's capacities for autonomous agency are intact, Benson claims that as a 
result of her lack of confidence in her abilities, Ingrid's "identification with the 
possession and exercise of those powers [of reflection on and regulation of action] ... 
has been threatened by her revised view of her own competence.,,7 She does not trust 
her abilities, even though they are in fact fully functional. 
4 See Benson, P. (2005a) 'Taking Ownership: Authority and Voice in Autonomous Agency' in 
Christman,1. and Anderson, 1. (eds.) 2005, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp.lOl-126; see 
also Benson, P. (2005b) Op.Cit., and Benson, P. (2000) Op.Cit. 
5 See chapter 2 for overview of structural content-neutral conditions. In particular, I am here 
referring to a coherence condition, a reflective competence condition, and a historical condition. 
See Christman, 1. (1991b) Op.Cit.; See Watson, G. (1975) Op.Cit.; See Frankfurt, H. (1971), 
Op.Cit.; respectively, and Christman, 1. (1991b) again for a historical condition. Note that, in his 
(2005a), Benson rejects some of the content-neutral conditions considered in chapte~ ~; namely, 
those Frankfurtian endorsement conditions that make ambivalence autonomy undermmmg. 
6 Benson, P. (1994) Op.Cit p.656. 
7 Ibid, p.657. 
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The thought is that an autonomous agent must have a sense of her own 
competence as an agent, and this requires having a sense of one's competence to grasp 
and engage with reasons. The attitude in particular that Benson identifies as 
incompatible with autonomous agency, insofar as it impairs identification with one's 
capacities, is the agent's sense of being "insufficiently worthy to relate with others 
because of the normative expectations that the agent judges to apply to those relations".8 
Gaslighted Ingrid, taking herself to be unhinged, does not feel she can engage in 
relations with others according to the norms she believes to govern those relations, 
Benson claims. Put briefly, she does not believe that she can engage in social relations 
in which others hold her as competent to account for her actions. This is because, having 
been made to 'feel crazy', she does not trust her grasp of the standards that others hold 
her to, or her competence to meet those standards, or to engage with others. 
Accordingly, Benson claims that: 
the sense of worthiness to act which is necessary for free agency involves 
regarding oneself as being competent to answer for one's conduct in light 
of normative demands that, from one's point of view others might 
appropriately apply to one's actions.9 
The point here is put in terms of the agent's sense of her worthiness. Later, Benson talks 
of the agent's sense of her own authority. Autonomous agents possess, he claims, 
attitudes towards their own socially situated authority to construct, stand 
by and speak for their reasons for acting. 10 
The two relevant attitudes - of authority and worthiness - are connected ill the 
following way: 
standards for agents' authority to construct and potentially answer for 
their reasons for acting enter into autonomy by way of the attitudes 
toward their own competence and worth through which agent's claim 
h h · 11 suc aut onty. 
On Benson's later view, then, the thought is that a necessary condition for autonomous 
agency is that the agent takes herself to have authority to account for her actions. 
Having this kind of authority requires that the agent has a sense of her own competence 
8 Ibid, p.660. 
9 Ibid. p.660. 
10 Benson, P. (2005b) Op. Cit. p.133. 
II Ibid, p.136. 
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and worth; this competence and worth grounds her claim to such authority. Indeed, on 
his later view (2005a) Benson emphasises that an agent must actively take authority: 
we should conceive of this authority as depending, in part, upon an active 
process of authorisation that autonomous agents enact upon themselves. 12 
Authorising oneself in this way, Benson makes clear, can amount to having a certain 
attitude towards oneself. It might also amount to explicit vocalisations - we can imagine 
Ingrid reassuring herself "I do have my own reasons. I can address others on equal 
terms, and give them these reasons" - but it need not. Rather it requires having a certain 
kind of self-regard: a sense of one's competence, and worth or authority to speak for 
one's actions. Thus Benson demands, in addition to the requisite content-neutral 
conditions, a condition, of the form: 
(ReIAgencyl) A necessary condition for autonomous agency is that the 
agent has authority as an accountable agent; that is, she holds herself to 
be competent to answer for her actions (according to the normative 
standards of the social context). 
Part of the project of this thesis, recall, is to consider what a constitutively relational 
condition for autonomy might look like. The task of the following section will be to 
consider whether we should understand a condition such as (RelAgency 1) as a 
constitutively relational condition for autonomous agency. I will argue that it is most 
plausibly understood as attending to the potential causal impact of social relations on 
autonomous agency. 
5.1.3 Benson and constitutively relational conditions 
When first setting out his account, in his (1994) paper, it certainly looks as if Benson is 
intending to offer a constitutively relational condition for autonomous agency. He writes 
that his view goes beyond those in which "the character of our interpersonal or social 
situation, or of our conception of it, can only affect our free [autonomous] agency 
accidentally, by virtue of its potential influence on our capacities to express what most 
. h d ,,13 matters to us III w at we 0 . 
12 Benson, P. (2005a) Op.Cit, p.114. 
13 Benson, P. (1994) Op.Cit, p.666. 
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If relational conditions are causal, then the impact of social relations on 
autonomous agency can be merely 'accidental'; certain social relations mayor may not 
cause an agent to lose her sense of competence, her sense of her authority to account for 
her actions. But if relational conditions are constitutive of autonomy, then their impact 
will not be merely contingent. The failure of certain social relations to obtain just will 
be a failure of autonomous agency; for the agent who fails to stands in those social 
relations fails to be autonomous. Given this, then, there is reason to suppose that Benson 
is aiming for a constitutively relational understanding of autonomy. Indeed, in his later 
version, which focuses on the agent's attitude of self-authorisation, Benson writes, of 
content-neutral conditions that: 
they do not recognise any inherent, constitutive connection between 
agential ownership and persons' social relations. They entail the notion that 
persons can own their motives independently of their socially structured 
authority to stand by what they do. My proposal contrasts with the 
constitutive individualism of other theories. 14 
Again, whilst not explicit, this is suggestive of the claim that Benson is offering a 
constitutively relational account. But what would this, in fact, demand for autonomous 
agency? What social relations, on Benson's view, would be constitutive of autonomy? 
Benson focuses on the agent's authority to account for her actions. Is standing 
in social relations in which an agent is regarded as authoritative in this way necessary 
for autonomy? No: Benson holds rather that it is the agent's attitude towards her 
competence and worthiness that grounds her authority. Indeed, he is emphatic that 
"agents' authority arises through their self-authorisation". 15 It is not necessary that the 
agent is regarded as authoritative by others - although such a failure of regard may 
eventually erode the agent's sense of her own authority, as he acknowledges. 
Might we say, then, that agents ought to stand in social relations in which they 
are regarded as competent and worthy in order to secure autonomous agency? Again, 
Benson himself claims that we should not see such relations as constitutive of 
autonomous agency: 
that interpretation seems to rule out the freedom of any persons W?o are not 
aware of, or committed to, the conventional social norms by whIch others 
are likely to assess their conduct [hence to whom the agent does not feel 
14 Benson, P. (2005a) Op. Cit. p.I08. 
15 Ibid, p.lIO. 
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competent to answer to]. Likewise, it might seem to preclude the freedom 
of any who have tried to separate themselves from most common forms of 
human community and social practice.16 
Insofar as an agent repudiates convention or society, she may not stand in social 
relations in which she is regarded as competent or worthy to answer to others (either 
because she is not regarded as competent, or because she does not stand in any social 
relations, so is not held by others in any regard). But, Benson writes: 
Such agents lack the knowledge, commitments, or bonds that are 
prerequisites of their being answerable to others for their actions ... but this 
in no way has to threaten their freedom [ autonomy] .17 
Rather than claim that others must regard the agent as competent, Benson emphasises 
that it is the agent's 'subjective sense of normative competence' that is required for 
autonomous agency. It is consistent with having such a sense of competence and worth 
that an agent cannot, in fact, answer for her actions; nor need she be regarded by others 
as competent. 
It is clear, then, that Benson's view should not be understood as a constitutively 
relational account of autonomous agency. Whilst he attends to the role that interpersonal 
relationships play in impacting upon the agent's sense of competence and her authority 
to answer for her actions, we should not infer from this that there are constitutively 
relational necessary conditions for autonomous agency. It is not necessary that an agent 
stand in relations in which she is regarded as authoritative; nor is it necessary that an 
agent stand in relations in which she is regarded as competent. Such social relations 
may, contingently, impact upon an agent's sense of competence; but an agent may have, 
and be quite confident in, her capacities for autonomous agency, and regard herself as 
authoritative to account for her actions, whilst failing to stand in such social relations (or 
indeed any social relations at all). We can accept (RelAgencyl), and acknowledge that 
Ingrid's autonomy is undermined, in gaslighted; but this is not due to her failing to stand 
in some social relations that are constitutive of autonomy. Rather it is due to the causal 
impact of the social relations she occupies upon the self-regarding attitudes necessary 
for autonomy. 
16 Benson, P. (1994) Op.Cit. at p. 661. 
17 Ibid, p.662. 
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5.1.4 Nonnative content and social sensitivity 
There are two important points to draw from Benson's account. The frrst point harkens 
back to the issues considered in the previous three chapters. There I considered attempts 
to offer value-laden conditions for autonomy. With Benson's account, we see that one 
can incorporate 'nonnative substance', as he puts it, into an account of autonomy 
without substantively constraining the contents of autonomous choice. Rather, Benson 
builds in some nonnative substance with his demand that the agent has a sense of 
worthiness and competence in her ability to account for her actions. Thus he 
acknowledges the value of an agent's sense of competence and worthiness to account 
for her action. 
However, his account does not simply demand that an agent must choose in 
accordance with the value of her own agency, or some other value (such as those 
considered in chapters 2-4). Rather, Benson brings to light that the value of this sense of 
competence is an enabling one: without such self-authorisation, agents are alienated 
from their agency. But incorporating value or 'nonnative content' in this way does not 
require restricting autonomy such that it is consistent only with those choices that 
accord with particular values. An agent may fail to choose in accordance with some 
specified value, but nonetheless remain sure of her competence and worthiness to 
account for her action to others. 
As we have seen, Benson rejects the intuition, from Stoljar, that agents who 
choose in accordance with false and oppressive nonns are non-autonomous (and I think 
he is right to do so). With his condition, we are able to acknowledge that agents who act 
for reasons we consider to be bad reasons - such as those based on false or oppressive 
nonns - can nonetheless be autonomous agents insofar as they meet any required 
procedural conditions and have the relevant sense of worth, meeting (RelAgencyl). 
The second point concerns the worry raised at the beginning of this chapter. 
Benson's account focuses on the psychological states of the agent; namely, the (content-
neutral) procedures she undertakes in deliberation, as well as her attitude towards her 
competence to engage in such procedures. This view, then, falls into the class of views 
that focus on the psychological states of the agent. Oshana in part motivates her 
constitutively relational view (to be considered shortly) with claims about the 
inadequacy of views which focus on the psychological states of the agent. She claims 
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that these views 'cordon off the notion of autonomy from the social relations in which 
the agent stands: 
the emphasis of [the psychological state] accounts on the subjective point 
of view [of the agent] reflects the belief that safeguarding the autonomy of 
persons consists in safeguarding what is symbolically described as the inner 
citadel. 18 
We saw her concern that focusing on such an 'illl1er citadel': 
suggests a picture of autonomy as relegated to the background of social life 
- a characteristic that emerges behind an invisible partition that isolates 
each individual from the rest, overlooking entirely the social and relational 
dimensions of self-govemment.19 
She goes on to express the concern that such a view "ignores the socially 
embedded character of human identity".20 Having considered Benson's view, which 
focuses on the psychological states of the autonomous agent as conditions for 
autonomy, we can now see that such concerns are unfounded. It is worth briefly 
considering each of Os han a's concerns in tum. 
First, the focus on the agent's sense of competence and worth to account for her 
actions means that securing autonomy involves (amongst other things) that she secures 
a certain attitude. But this does not preclude attention to social relations: indeed, insofar 
as certain social relations may erode the required sense of competence (as Benson's 
example indicates), his view enables the identification of the kinds of social relations it 
is worth securing if one cares about fostering autonomy: namely, social relations in 
which agents hold each other in mutual regard as competent and accountable agents. 
Second insofar as the attitude that Benson identifies is one which, as he notes , 
is "sensitive to others' attitudes towards the agent,,21 there is no reason to suppose that 
an account of autonomy that attends to the agent's psychological states is one which 
isolates individuals and overlooks the relational elements of self-governance. 
18 Oshana, M. (2006) Op. Cit. p.51. 
19 Ibid, p.5l. 
20 Ibid, p.51. 
21 Benson, P. (1994) Op.Cit, p. 659. 
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Finally, Benson's focus on the sensitivity of agent's sense of competence to 
others attitudes acknowledges that core mental states of the agent are affected by the 
situation in which they are embedded. Indeed, he emphasises that persons are social 
beings, noting that by highlighting the relevance of social relations to self-governance, 
we can explain why individuals "have reason to care about maintaining their status as 
full [i.e. competent and accountable] participants in social relationships and 
practices".22 Insofar as failing to occupy such relations runs the risk of undermining the 
attitudes integral to autonomy, agents have an important stake in relations in which they 
stand. Benson concludes that "both the capabilities and attitudes this position demands 
concern interpersonal exchange ... There is nothing unduly individualistic about the 
conception of selfhood this view might suggest". 23 
Focusing solely on the psychological states of the agent, then, need not entail 
ignoring the social and relational aspects of autonomous agency. Such aspects may 
have an important causal impact upon autonomous agency. Thus Oshana's concerns can 
be addressed and rejected. Such concerns motivate Oshana's account, which demand 
that the agent occupy certain social relations in order to be autonomous. Her account, as 
we shall see, clearly gives relational conditions a constitutive role. I tum to consider it 
now; whilst one motivation for such an account has fallen away, it might nonetheless be 
true that an agent must occupy the relations she posits. However, I will argue in the next 
section that there is no good reason to suppose this is the case. Then, in the next 
chapter, I will argue that there is good reason to hold that it is not the case. 
5.2 Oshana' s account of autonomous agency 
Insofar as social relations are incorporated into an account in terms of the impact they 
may have on the agent's psychological state, the account is not constitutively relational. 
This is because it is plausible that the relevant psychological state can be held in the 
absence of social relations that foster it: the agent may be particularly robust; or the 
psychological state could be induced in some other way. 
Oshana's account, however, has a structure that is clearly constitutively 
relational. She demands that, in order to be an autonomous agent, an agent must stand 
in certain social relations. The central thought is that not only must the agent's 
22 Ibid, p. 667. 
23 Benson, P. (2005a) Op.Cit, pp.118-119. 
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psychological states be a certain way; the world must also .be a certain way.24 Thus her 
condition is 'extemalist', demanding as necessary for autonomy certain states external 
to the agent. The condition that Oshana argues for is: 
(RelAgency2) A necessary condition for autonomous agency is that the 
agent stand in social relations in which she has de facto power to choose 
and manage her life; in which her choices are from an adequate range of 
options; in which she has power counterfactually, such that she is able to 
maintain control over her life even in possible scenarios in which others 
attempt to intervene.25 
In the rest of the chapter, I will examine Oshana's argument for this condition, and note 
that there are some crucial premises that remain unmotivated. The preliminary 
conclusion of this chapter is that the considerations that allegedly push towards the 
adoption of a constitutively relational condition need not be heeded; there are no good 
reasons for adopting a constitutively relational condition. In the next chapter, I will 
argue that important considerations counsel against demanding that an agent occupy 
certain social relations in order to be autonomous. 
5.2.1. General intuitions 
Oshana argues for her relational condition by setting out some broad intuitions about 
autonomy, and then some cases in which, according to these intuitions, the agent is non-
autonomous. She then argues that her relational condition can best explain the intuitions 
about the particular cases, as well as the broader intuitions that she sets out. Here, then, 
are the general intuitions about autonomy that Oshana takes as a starting point:26 
24 I focus here on the social relations that are claimed to be necessary for autonomy. This is 
likewise the main focus of Oshana's discussion. But she also maintains that other natural 
phenomena may prevent autonomy from obtaining, insofar as they prevent the condition she sets 
out from being met: "certain natural phenomena - physical ability, for example - do not simply 
condition the exercise of global autonomy; by increasing or decreasing 'the range over which, or 
the ease with which, it can be enjoyed,' these phenomena yield autonomy of a more resilient or 
more enfeebled form" (2006, Op. Cit, at p.92). 
25 These conditions are set out in Oshana, M. (2006) Op Cit. pp. 83-90. Her setting out of social-
relational conditions here builds on her (1998) account of relational autonomy. See Oshana, M. 
(1998), 'Personal Autonomy and Society' The Journal of Social Philosophy 29 (1), pp. 81-102. 
26 In her (1998), Oshana sets out a different set of motivating intuitions: 
a. The autonomous agent is self-directed 
b. the autonomous agent is in control of her choices, actions. will 
c. the autonomous agent is in control of her external circumstances 
d. the autonomous agent can pursue, effectively, her choices or goals in action 
e. The autonomous agent is not subject to psychological or physical interferences 
(compulsions, constraint, coercion etc) 
f. Autonomy is "the good which paternalism fails to respect" 
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A) The control intuition: "Autonomous beings are in actual control of their own choice 
, 
actions and goals.,,27 
This is plausible. Oshana goes on to qualify the control intuition: "By this I mean that 
the person is in possession of the de facto power to govern herself,?8 By de facto 
power, Oshana means that the agent must have the power to decide what to do, from a 
range of live options. In addition, having this power involves that: 
o the agent face minimal interference 
o the autonomous agent acts for her own reasons 
o the autonomous agent has an adequate degree of self-contro1.29 
These latter three elements are relatively uncontroversial, and I will not comment upon 
them further here. 
B) The authority intuition: "Autonomous persons are in a kind of authoritative control 
of their own choices, actions and goals". 30 
This kind of control, Oshana claims, requires that an agent 'own' the management of 
her choices (in the sense that Benson demands, as discussed above). Moreover, it 
requires that the agent "not only have de jure control over her choices, actions, and 
goals but must enjoy a status against other persons or institutions ... having the relevant 
kind of authority guarantees that a person's life is free from the domination of others.,,3l 
The thought is that this kind of domination undermines autonomy by preventing the 
agent from having de facto power: insofar as another agent could intervene arbitrarily, 
even when she does not, she has "unwarranted power over him. He cannot govern 
himself,.32 
I paraphrase from Oshana, M. (1998) Op. Cit. esp. pp.81-82. Note that these intuitions, without 
modification, are too strong: intuition c cannot be satisfied by the most self-directing agent. 
Intuition f is one that I focus upon in more detail in the next chapter. The intuitions stated here 
cover a lot of ground, and one might wonder whether Oshana is concerned with a range of 
aspects of autonomy: choice, agency and action. The intuitions she sets out in her (2006) mark a 
significant refmement of these, so I focus on her later claims only. 
27 Oshana, M. (2006) Op.Cit. p. 3. 
28 Ibid, p.3. 
29 I paraphrase from Oshana, M. (2006) at pp. 3-4. 
30 Ibid, p. 4. 
31 Ibid, p.4. 
32 Ibid, p.90. 
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The two intuitions from which Oshana starts, then, hold that the agent must 
have control over her choices and actions, and that the agent must be authoritative over 
them. In cashing these out, we see that Oshana has in mind that a certain kind of control 
and a certain kind of authority are required: de facto control, and non-dominated 
authority. Oshana intends these intuitions to be ones that "are not controversial" and 
claims that "they are ideas held ... by laypersons and academic philosophers alike".33 I 
will show that they are in fact controversial, and that weaker understandings of both of 
these conditions are available to us: these weaker understandings do not require 
constitutively relational conditions for autonomy. 
Before looking in more detail at the examples, it is worth marshalling the 
following concern: even at a first glance, the condition that Oshana sets out and the 
intuitions that drive it look to be concerned with a different sense of autonomy than that 
at issue in the previous chapters. 'Autonomy' is sometimes used to refer to a particularly 
valuable way of life - a life with a good range of options, say. But this is not the sense 
with which we have thus far been concerned; rather, we have been concerned with the 
nature of the choices, and the kind of capacities, that agents must have if they are 
entitled to the normative benefits of respect, protection from paternalism, and so on. It 
might be suggested that Oshana is concerned with the former sense of autonomy, rather 
than the latter (an objection she refers to as "the apples and oranges objection": both are 
fruit, but they are different kinds of fruit). 
However, whilst at some points Oshana appears to talk of a different sense of 
autonomy, she explicitly states that her concern is with the same sense of autonomy that 
we are here concerned with, and that her account is offered as a rival account to those 
that focus on the psychological states of the agent, such as Benson's: 
this [social relational account] is not autonomy of a different sort than the 
autonomy that the psychological authenticity accounts analyse .. The 
advocate of autonomy as psychological authenticity is not attemptmg to 
explain something other than the autonomy of persons ... in all instances 
. h f 34 the object of concern IS t e status 0 persons. 
It is clear, then, that Oshana intends to be offering conditions that fill out the same sense 
of autonomy as that with which Benson, and this thesis, is concerned. 
33 Ibid, pp.3-4. 
34 Ibid, pp. 93-94 (my emphasis). 
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5.2.2 The examples 
Oshana argues for her relational condition by way of example. She claims that, in 
accordance with the general intuitions she sets out, the agents in the examples are 
intuitively non-autonomous. Then she argues that only her constitutively relational 
conditions for autonomous agency can make sense of the non-autonomy of the agents. I 
will first set the key examples out, showing how they are intended to support Oshana' s 
relational account. Then I will tease out the different understandings of the control 
intuition that we might adopt. I will show that weaker versions of the intuitions stated 
above are available to us, and deliver starkly contrasting verdicts about the example 
cases, and about the need for constitutively relational conditions for autonomous 
agency. 
The deferential wife 
Oshana imagines a woman, named 'Harriet', who has chosen the role of deferential 
homemaker and wife. Harriet meets all the procedural conditions that might be required 
for autonomous agency: 
let us assume as well that Harriet finds her life gratifying and has no 
wish to alter it. There is nothing she values more or wants more than to 
be the angel in the house . . . she possesses all the autonomy 
competences.35 
Despite meeting the demands for reflection and deliberation upon her preferences and 
their origin, and having the relevant capacities for autonomous agency, Oshana holds 
that nonetheless such an agent fails to be autonomous. Whilst this claim is in line with 
the view of Thomas Hill Jnr., considered in Chapter 3, Oshana rejects the thought that 
the deferential individual's non-autonomy is to be explained by reference to the contents 
of her choice: 
the substantive element of social-relational autonomy is not generally 
found in the object of the person's desires, and in any event Harriet's lack 
of autonomy is not due to her lamentable desires ... her lack of autonomy 
is due to her personal relations with others and to the social institutions of 
h . '6 er soclety.-
35 [b'd 58-59. The phrase 'angel in the house' is from Woolf, V. 'Professions for Women' a spee~h ~~fore the National Society for Women's Service, (1931), in Woolf, V. The Virginia 
Woolf Reader, Leaska, M. (ed.). (1984), at p.278. 
36 Oshana, M. (2006) Op. Cit. p.59 
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In particular, the social relations that thwart her autonomy are ones in which "afford her 
less recognition and independence than she deserves and than she might otherwise 
have".37 She goes on: 
Let us assume that the social relations Harriet is party to, given her role 
as homemaker, afford her less financial flexibility, less social mobility, 
and fewer opportunities for intellectual and creative development than 
she could have were these relations otherwise. Suppose, too, that in her 
relationship with her spouse she makes none of the important decisions 
... Absent too are economic and political institutions that might empower 
homemakers.38 
Why is it that social relations such as these prevent an agent from being autonomous? 
These relations and institutions prevent the agent from having the right kind of control 
over her choices and actions. Focusing in on a particular choice may be helpful here. Let 
us suppose that Harriet chooses, in deference to her husband and in accordance with his 
wishes, to take a holiday in Luxembourg. She prefers this option also, and is perfectly 
happy with the choice. But in so choosing, Harriet lacks de facto control of her choice: 
holidaying in Luxembourg was in fact the only option she had available to her. This, 
along with the fact that she is not afforded recognition and independence, means that 
she lacks counterfactual power - had she wished to holiday in Lebanon instead, she 
could not have so chosen. Were her husband to attempt exert control over her and 
interfere with her choice (forcing her to abide by his wishes for a trip to Luxembourg 
rather than Lebanon) she would not be able to maintain control over her choices. 
Thus the social relations in which she stands are such as to ensure that the agent 
fails to meet (RelAgency2). That condition, recall, demanded that: 
(RelAgency2) A necessary condition for autonomous agency is that the 
agent stand in social relations in which she has de facto power to choose 
and manage her life; in which her choices are from an adequate range of 
options; in which she has power counterfactually, such that she is able to 
maintain control over her life even in possible scenarios in which others 
attempt to intervene. 
Harriet lacks de facto power, and lacks the power to maintain control over her life in the 
instance that her husband (or perhaps another) were to attempt to intervene. Recall that 
Harriet meets all the procedural and content-neutral conditions. Thus to explain the 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid, pp.58-59. 
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intuition that she is non-autonomous, Oshana claims, we must appeal to the relational 
condition (RelAgency2): it is only because Harriet fails to stand in social relations - that 
ensure her recognition and independence that would secure power and authority - that 
she lacks autonomy. 
The monk 
Suppose a monk chooses and occupies his role with all the competences required for 
autonomy. Whilst in his role as a religious devotee, "the religious order has power over 
him sufficient to compel him to behave in a certain way,,39 (although they may never 
exercise this power). However, the monk is able to decide, on a yearly basis, whether or 
not to remain in this role. Such an individual, Oshana claims, is non-autonomous. Once 
again, this cannot be explained by conditions that pertain to his psychological states, or 
by reference to the substantive content of his choice. Rather, the social conditions that 
he occupies are such as to prevent him from being autonomous. In his role of religious 
devotee, he lacks de facto power: "his monastic superiors preserve authority in the 
interim, for his life is ruled by them on a daily basis" .40 Again, it will be useful to focus 
on a particular choice. Suppose at the beginning of the week, the monk chooses, in 
accordance with monastic practice, to undertake a vow of silence. The monk lacks de 
facto power, because this is the only option that he has. Were he to choose otherwise (to 
chatter away to himself and to attempt to with others) his choice would not be effective 
- we can suppose that he would be pulled up and disciplined by the monastic superiors 
- this other option is not a 'live' one. Moreover, were he to attempt to choose otherwise, 
he would lack the authority to prevent others from intervening: the monk is not in a 
position to maintain control over his choices should the monastic superiors attempt to 
intervene. 
Thus the social relations in which the monk stands, whilst in the monastic order, 
prevent him from achieving autonomy, on Oshana's view. She notes that we should 
concede that the monk has 'potential autonomy', due to the fact that, annually, he has 
the authority to leave the monastery, and reinstate himself in social relations in which he 
has de facto power and authority. But "the fact that the monk can annul his status as 
non-autonomous does not mean he is self-governing,,41 Oshana claims. Note that 
competences of the agent remain the same whether he is in the monk role or not. So the 
39 Ibid, p.62. 
40 Ibid, p.63. 
41 Ibid, p.63. 
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intuition that the monk is non-autonomous whilst in the role of religious devotee can 
only be explained by the relational condition: lack of actual power and authority is what 
explains the non-autonomy of such an individual, Oshana claims. 
Oshana's argument, then, can be understood as follows: in accordance with the 
broader intuitions (about control and authority) the deferential wife and the monk are 
intuitively non-autonomous. The content-neutral conditions that focus on the 
psychological states of the agent cannot make sense of their non-autonomy. Both 
individuals lack de facto power and the authority to maintain control if others were to 
attempt to intervene. Having such power and authority requires that the agent stand in 
certain social relations. Thus relational conditions - those which shore up the power and 
authority that these individuals lack - are necessary for autonomous agency. 
In the following section, I reconstruct the argument in more detail. In doing so, 
we will see more clearly the role that the control and authority intuitions are playing. I 
will then tease out a different understanding of the control intuition. It is not 
uncontroversial to accept the stronger understanding of the control intuition that informs 
Oshana's judgments about the non-autonomy of the deferential wife and the monk. I 
will argue that the stronger understanding that she endorses lacks independent 
motivation. 
5.2.3 Examining the argument 
There are two parts to Oshana' s argument: fIrst, the claim that the agents in her 
examples are non-autonomous, as informed by the 'uncontroversial' intuitions; second, 
the claim that the non-autonomy of the agents cannot be explained without her 
constitutively relational condition. We have already seen, in earlier chapters, that it is 
not uncontroversial to hold that agents such as the deferential wife are non-autonomous, 
and that it is diffIcult to substantiate such a claim. I will here argue that the more general 
intuition that informs Oshana' s judgment on this is also controversial. 
A reconstruction: 
More formally, Oshana's argument appears to have this form: 
I) autonomous agents have control over their choices, will, and action (the 
control intuition) 
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2) certain roles (e.g. a deferential role) are incompatible with the agent having 
this kind of control over her choices, will and action. 
3) such roles (e.g. deferential roles) are incompatible with autonomous agency. 
This is the first part of the argument. From there, Oshana goes on to explain that it is 
because the relational conditions fail to obtain that the agent is non-autonomous: 
4) these roles are compatible with the intemalist, psychological conditions 
being met. 
5) any failure of autonomy must therefore be because the required relational, 
or 'externalist' conditions fail to obtain (that is, the conditions that demand 
that social conditions are such that the agent has adequate 'live' options 
available, and the authority to pursue some other than that she in fact takes). 
6) A necessary condition for autonomous agency is the constitutively 
relational condition (which demands that social conditions afford the agent 
de facto power). 
However, it is not clear that we should accept the first part (1-3, above) of the argument. 
Recall the intuition pertaining to the control that autonomous agents have, and which 
informs premise 1: "Autonomous beings are in actual control of their own choice, 
actions and goals.'.42 This is plausible, and uncontroversial as Oshana claims. But we 
will see that the way she cashes this intuition out in terms of de facto power is not 
uncontroversial. There are two ways to understand the notion of control. The first notion 
of control is at work in Oshana' s argument. The second notion is weaker. If this notion 
of control figures in Oshana' s argument, then she cannot secure either the claim that the 
agents in her examples are non-autonomous, nor that the conditions for autonomous 
agency are constitutively relational. Oshana fails to provide good reason not to endorse 
only this weaker sense of control. 
5.2.4 Two kinds of control 
Oshana's concern is that the deferential wife Harriet and the monk lack a certain kind of 
control. Now, it is very plausible to hold that agents who occupy deferential or 
subservient roles do have a kind of control over their choices and actions, on some -
perhaps many - occasions. They have the kind of control that compulsives lack, or that 
42 Oshana, M. (2006) Op.Cit. p.3. 
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we lack if we have a bodily spasm, or suffer alien arm syndrome.43 Oshana appropriates 
(somewhat liberally, as she acknowledges) from Fischer and Ravizza the terminology of 
guidance control, and the contrasting notion of regulative control.44 The former kind of 
control, that deferential individuals and the monk plausibly possess, involves a kind of 
guidance. The agents' choices are causally connected, in the appropriate way. to their 
actions, and their actions to the events in the world, in a way that makes it appropriate to 
say that the agent was in control of her action. 
Having guidance control means having the ability to govern one's choices and 
actions, on the basis of one's motivational states, such that one is 'in the driving seat' 
with respect to one's action. That is, one's mental states and bodily movements are not 
bypassed in the production of action, but are related appropriately to it. This kind of 
control is possible even if an agent cannot do otherwise than the action she in fact does. 
Regulative control involves not merely that the agent can guide her choices and 
actions, but that she could guide her choices and actions other than as she in fact does; 
that she has the power not only to bring about the state of affairs she in fact does, but 
that she has the power to bring about an alternate state of affairs. Regulative control, 
then, requires that the agent has other 'live' options other than the option the agent in 
fact takes (in contrast to guidance control, which does not). So we have a distinction 
between two kinds of control: 
43 This is a syndrome in which the limb of the sufferer is experienced as behaving 'on its own' as 
if an alien body; 'its' actions are one's out of the agent's control, and the agent is alienated from 
it. See Lewis T.M.; McClain M.; Pittenger A. (1997) 'Alien Hand Syndrome and Sensory 
Ataxia: A Case Study of a Unique Presentation of the Disorder', Archives of Clinical 
Neuropsychology, 12 (4), pp.357-358. 
44 See Fischer, 1. & Ravizza, M. (1998) Gp.Cit. Fischer and Ravizza talk of guidance control 
being possessed by a 'mechanism' for choice and action - deliberation, say. This detail need not 
concern us here, and we can talk more generally of the kind of control the agent has, rather than 
her 'action producing mechanism'. 
Moreover, Fischer and Ravizza talk about 'ability to do otherwise' in the metaphysical 
sense - that is, whether it is metaphysically possible, given the state of the world and the laws for 
the agent to do otherwise. Oshana is not concerned with this sense, but is most plausibly 
concerned with whether the agent could rationally or prudentially do otherwise, given her social 
context and the relations in which she stands to others; that is, whether the options are 'live' 
ones. For instance, she is concerned with whether, if the agent chose to do otherwise, she would 
face significant sanction or economic hardship. For instance, she demands that an individual 
should be able to pursue goals and values "different from those who have influence and authority 
over her, without risk of reprisal sufficient to deter her in this pursuit" (1998, Gp. Cit. p.87). Of 
course, the agent could choose otherwise, and risk reprisal - but that there is a risk of reprisal 
means doing so may not be prudent; the option is not a 'live' option insofar as there remains such 
a risk. We should see Oshana as concerned with a social analogue to this metaphysical notion. 
III 
Guidance control: having the ability to guide one's choices and actions 
on the basis of one's motivational states, such that these state~ 
appropriately cause the agent's choice and action. The agent is 'in the 
driving seat' with respect to her action. 
Regulative control: having guidance control over what one does, and 
having the ability to exercise guidance control over an action other than 
the one the agent in fact performs (that is, the ability to do otherwise). 
The following analogy helps to bring out the contrast: 
Sally's car is a 'driver instruction' automobile with dual controls. We can 
imagine that the instructor is quite happy to allow Sally to steer the car to 
the right, but that if Sally had shown any inclination to cause the car to go 
in some other direction the instructor would have intervened and caused 
the car to go to the right. 45 
Although Sally could not do otherwise than tum right, then, there is still a sense in 
which she is in control of turning right - this is the sense involved in guidance control. 
In contrast "Regulative control involves a dual power: for example, the power freely to 
do some act A and the power freely to do something else instead" (for example, the 
power to tum left and the power to turn right).46 
Of these two kinds of control, which does Oshana have in mind in the control 
intuition? Having considered guidance control, Oshana writes that "personal autonomy 
requires control of a more vigorous variety. To claim autonomy is to claim that a person 
has the power to determine how she shall live,,47 Indeed, Oshana' s complaint about the 
Harriet and the monk is that social conditions do not permit the agent the power to 
choose or do otherwise. Thus Oshana demands a kind of regulative control for 
48 autonomous agency. 
Now, this kind of control is more demanding than guidance control. Whereas 
guidance control requires only that the agent has a certain relation to her action, 
regulative control demands this and that she could have chosen and done otherwise. 
Many philosophers hold that agents can be autonomous whilst possessing only guidance 
45 Ibid, p.32. 
46 Ibid, p. 31. 
47 Oshana, M. (2006) Op.Cit. p.83. 
48 Indeed in her (2003) ('How much should we value autonomy?' in Autonomy Frankel Paul, E., 
Miller J~., F.D., Paul, J. (eds.) Cambridge University Press, pp.99-126) Oshana makes explicit 
that guidance control is not sufficient for autonomy, but that rather regulative control is required. 
See p. 101. 
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control.
49 
Understood in this way, then, the control intuition is not uncontroversial and 
is not accepted by laypersons or philosophers alike as Oshana contends. If the claim that 
regulative control is required for autonomy is to be accepted, we need to see that it is 
well motivated. 
5.2.5. Is regulative control required? 
However, this aspect of Oshana's argument is supported by little argumentation. There 
appear to be two strands of thought at work in motivating her commitment to regulative 
control. The first thought is that the alternative is inadequate. Oshana writes that "when 
we say a person is self-governing because she is in control of her actions and choices , 
we are saying more than that the person's actions coincide with the preferences and 
values that are her own. We are saying that the person has the power to determine how 
she shalllive".50 
Now, it is right to maintain that self-governance and control amount to more 
than this. But to demand that control consists in more than the mere coincidence is not 
yet to demand that it must be regulative control: Oshana here presents us with a false 
dilemma. We can maintain that control at a minimum should consist in non-accidental 
coincidence of the agent's action with her preferences and values. Or, we may demand 
that there should be a reliable, non-deviant, causal link between the agent's preferences 
and values, and the action that the agent performs.51 Both of these claims amount to 
more than mere coincidence of the agent's preferences and action. If the agent is 
coerced into performing an action that happens to be consistent with - perhaps even 
49 For instance, compatibilists maintain that an agent can be autonomous whilst she cannot do 
otherwise. One might maintain that compatibilists are primarily concerned with metaphysical 
freedom - whether the world is such as to pennit alternate possibilities. Oshana on the other 
hand is concerned with whether autonomy requires that social conditions are such as to pennit 
alternative actions. It is possible that one might hold that the metaphysical ability to do otherwise 
(regulative control) is not required, but the agent must believe that social conditions are such that 
she could do otherwise. In response, we can say that insofar as she could not do otherwise, she 
lacks the de facto power to do otherwise, and hence can have only guidance control. It may be 
that social conditions are such as to lead the agent to believe that she cannot do otherwise. But 
this may thwart autonomy only insofar as the agent then fails to meet some of the content-neutral 
conditions: lack of endorsement or identification with her action, say. See Frankfurt. (1969) 
'Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility', The Journal of Philosophy, 66 (23) pp.829-
839 for such a view. 
50 Oshana, M. (1998) Op. Cit p.82. 
51 See Davidson, D. «(1980), Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford University Press p. 78) for an 
example of deviant causal chains in bringing about actions. In his example a climber 
contemplates letting go of a rope and ditching his companion. His nervousness at such a thought 
causes his grip to loosen and the rope to drop. The causal chain from his thoughts about letting 
go and his loosening his grip is a deviant one. 
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promotes - the values that she holds, she may not have the kind of control necessary for 
autonomy (namely, if it is not her endorsed motivational states that bring about the 
action).52 Or, recall the example from chapter 1, in which Gina accidentally knocks cola 
into her basket, in accordance with her grocery-shopping plans and choices. Gina's 
action coincides with preferences that are her own. But this coincidence is accidental. 
When she is self-governing, we are saying more than that her actions coincide with her 
preferences and values. We can say that there is a non-accidental causal relation 
between the agent's preferences and values, and her decision and action. 
This first thought, then, does not support the claim that regulative control is 
required for autonomy. Rather, it supports the claim that self-governance requires more 
than accidental coincidence of preferences with action. Guidance control can satisfy this 
requirement; when an agent has guidance control, as we have seen, her motivational 
states appropriately cause the agent's choices and actions. 
The second thought that Oshana relies upon in support of her commitment to 
regulative control is the thought that characters such as Harriet and the monk are non-
autonomous. If we grant this is so, it can be explained only by the claim that they lack 
regulative control - due to the social conditions in which they stand. But these 
intuitions themselves are controversial, as I will show in more detail. Unless the control 
intuition, or the claim that the agents in the case studies are non-autonomous, is 
supported by independent argument, her account suffers from being question-begging in 
a problematic way. This is made clearer if we consider the following expanded 
reconstruction of the argument: 
Argument 1 ' 
1) autonomous agents have control over their choices, will, and action such 
that they have the ability to do otherwise than they in fact do (the first 
control intuition, modified to regulative control) 
2) certain roles (e.g. a deferential role) are incompatible with the agent having 
control over her choices, will and action such that she has the ability to do 
otherwise than she in fact does. 
3) such roles (e.g. deferential roles) are incompatible with autonomous agency. 
52 Although in discussing such an example, Frankfurt, H. (1969) C!p. C~t. note~ that it will 
sometimes be difficult - even impossible - to tell whether the agent lS bemg motivated by her 
own (in the relevant sense) desires and preferences. or the presence of the coercion. 
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4) these roles are compatible with the internalist psychological conditions 
being met. 
5) any failure of autonomy must therefore be because the required relational or 
'externalist' conditions (that is, the conditions that demand that social 
conditions are such that the agent has adequate 'live' options available, and 
the authority to pursue some other than that she in fact takes) that supply the 
agent with ability to do otherwise fail to obtain. 
6) A necessary condition for autonomous agency IS the constitutively 
relational demand for social conditions that supply the agent with ability to 
do otherwise. 
The conclusion reached states that autonomous agency requires that social conditions 
supply the agent with ability to do otherwise (which Oshana sometimes puts in terms of 
the agent having de facto power). The first premise, initially, stated: 
1) autonomous agents have control over their choices, will, and action (the 
control intuition) 
When we expanded this premise so that it accords with the sense of control Oshana has 
in mind, and it reads: 
1) autonomous agents have control over their choices, will, and action such 
that they have the ability to do otherwise than they in fact do (the control 
intuition, modified to regulative control) 
Thus, when expanded, we see that the conclusion reached in 6 is in fact assumed by the 
first premise, with the modified control intuition. The conclusion that autonomy 
requires that the agent has the ability to do otherwise (as permitted by certain social 
relations) only follows given the assumption (in premise 1), that the control required for 
autonomy involves the ability to do otherwise. If Oshana is concerned with regulative 
control, as she appears to be, the argument for her constitutively relational condition is 
question-begging. 
What happens if we start with the weaker sense of control? Can the relational 
condition be secured starting from a premise that assumes only guidance control as 
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necessary for autonomous agency? If this is the kind of control at Issue, then the 
argument for the constitutively relational conditions looks like this: 
Argument 1 " 
1) autonomous agents have guidance control over their choices, will, and 
action (the control intuition, modified to guidance control) 
2) certain roles (e.g. a deferential role) are incompatible with the agent having 
guidance control over her choices, will and 
3) such roles (e.g. deferential roles) are incompatible with autonomous agency. 
4) these roles are compatible with the intemalist conditions being met. 
5) any failure of autonomy must therefore be because the required relational or 
'extemalist' conditions (that is, the conditions that demand that social 
conditions are such that the agent has adequate 'live' options available, and 
the authority to pursue some other than that she in fact takes) that supply the 
agent with ability to do otherwise fail to obtain 
6) A necessary condition for autonomous agency IS the constitutively 
relational demand for social conditions that permit ability to do otherwise. 
However, if we start with a premise that assumes only guidance control is required for 
autonomy, then Oshana cannot establish that the constitutively relational condition 
(ReIAgency2) is necessary for autonomous agency. First, the argument is unsound: 
premise 2 of this argument is false - occupying a role of subservience is not 
incompatible with having guidance control. Second, the premises (5 and 6) that make 
reference to the relational, extemalist conditions that permit ability to do otherwise do 
not follow from earlier premises - it does not follow from the (false) claim that 
guidance control is incompatible with certain roles that this is because of the failure of 
certain social conditions or relations that supply ability to do otherwise. Given that 
guidance control does not require the ability to do otherwise, it will not follow from a 
(false) premise about the incompatibility of certain roles with this kind of control that a 
necessary condition for control is the ability to do otherwise. 
Might Oshana escape this line of argument by insisting that her argument need 
not start from the control intuitions? Rather, we can start from the intuition that the 
monk and the deferential individual, Harriet, are not autonomous - such roles are 
incompatible with autonomous agency. Because agents who occupy such roles 
nonetheless meet the intemalist conditions, their non-autonomy must be explained by 
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the failure of certain social conditions to obtain: the absence of feasible options removes 
the agent's ability to freely choose and manage her life. If the argument starts from the 
intuitions about the agents, then she can avoid the charge of question-begging. 
However, running the argument in this way means that a great deal of weight is 
placed on the intuitions about the agents in question. As noted, there are many who are 
unswayed by the claim that such agents are non-autonomous. For example, Andrea 
Westlund writes that 
While I share Oshana's conviction that many relations of subordination 
(including this one) are substantively criticisable on feminist and other 
grounds ... if (ex hypothesi) a fundamentalist woman does freely and 
authentically accept a condition of social and personal subordination, it 
seems equally problematic to assume that her condition as subordinate, in 
and of itself, undermines her status as self-governing agent. It may be 
that standard internalist views leave something to be desired in their 
handling of such cases. But if we want to construct the most formidable 
test case for an internalist view, we need to be more attentive to possible 
differences [in degrees of autonomy] between self-subordinating 
characters. 53 
Likewise, Benson has suggested that groups of individuals who act in accordance with 
oppressive norms might be internally diverse, with some agents who so choose showing 
a far greater engagement with their reasons for action than others.54 His point carries 
over; there may be significant differences between individuals who choose to occupy 
certain social positions of subordination, and some may strike us as more autonomous 
than others. Gerald Dworkin is another prominent theorist who denies the intuition that 
agents who occupy roles of subordination are therefore non-autonomous.55 
Given the contention surrounding the claim that agents in such roles are 
autonomous, to start the argument from such intuitions is unsatisfactory. Of course, 
Oshana could attempt to substantiate the intuition. But if she does so by appeal to the 
control intuition, then as we have seen, her argument will be question-begging. Perhaps 
an alternative way of substantiating the intuition is to appeal to the lack of options such 
agents are presented with. For instance, Oshana might bolster the intuition with a claim 
that: 
53 Westlund, A. (forthcoming) 'Rethinking Relational Autonomy', p. 5. 
54 See Benson, P. (2005b) Op.Cit. 
55 See Dworkin, G. (1988) Op.Cit. 
117 
the self-governing individual must have access to an adequate assortment of 
options. ... Because self-governance is governance over matters of central 
importance to human life, the options available must be relevant to the 
development of a person's life and they must be ones a person can genuinely 
hope to achieve. 56 
Now, the claim that an agent must have an adequate range of options cannot be 
motivated by the claim that this is required to ensure the agent regulative control, in the 
sense with which she is concerned - we will return, with another iteration, to the 
question-begging concern. But the claim that an adequate range of options are required 
need not only be justified in this way; it has independent intuitive plausibility. 
However, if Oshana' s argument moves in this direction, it becomes much less 
clear that she is able to maintain her rejection of the 'apples and oranges' objection. 
Those who offer accounts of autonomy that appeal to the psychological states of the 
agent (internalist accounts) are concerned with the range of options the agent has only 
insofar as this prevents the agent from meeting the internalist conditions. In making the 
range of options necessary for autonomy independently from the impact of the range on 
the internalist conditions, Oshana tends towards an understanding of autonomy; one 
concerned less with self-governance, and more with a particular, valuable way of 
conducting one's life. Indeed, of this sense of autonomy Oshana notes that "not 
everyone will include an autonomous life [namely, one that includes the social roles and 
conditions she specifies] among the goals that she regards as integral to well-being".57 
With this claim, we see that she views autonomy as a valuable way of life, rather than as 
a capacity that entitles agents to some important normative benefits. 
In this, Oshana departs from a conception of autonomy which plays a role in 
grounding respect, identifying candidates for political participation and protection from 
interference: the notion of autonomy that plays these roles extends to all agents, even if 
they adopt conceptions of the good or social positions other than those which ensure a 
range of options, and other than those consonant with the value of substantive 
independence. It is plausible that a range of options will be involved in a flourishing 
life, and one legitimate use of the term 'autonomy' is to such lives. But this is not the 
way in which the internalist theorists are using the term: they are talking apples, Oshana 
oranges. 
56 Oshana, M. (2006) Op.Cit. pp.84-85. 
57 Ibid, p.104. 
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To summarise: unless Oshana can establish with independent argument that 
regulative control is required for autonomy, then the claim that Harriet and the monk are 
non-autonomous need not be accepted. The claim that social conditions need to be such 
as to secure a range of options over which the agent has de facto power cannot be 
substantiated. The intuition that the agents themselves are non-autonomous is 
insufficiently strong to provide an independent starting point for the argument. And if 
Oshana substantiates the intuition with reference to the value of having a range of 
options (which is, plausibly, valuable) then she has made a significant departure from 
the sense of autonomy at work in the psychological, internalist accounts; the' apples and 
oranges' objection returns. There is no good reason, then, to accept the first two clauses 
of the relational condition (RelAgency2). What of the claim pertaining to the agent's 
power counterfactually, such that she has the authority to maintain control in the 
possible event that others attempt to intervene? 
The following considerations count against this condition. First, recall that the 
authority intuition is connected to the control intuition in the following way: being 
subject to the potential intervention of others undermines autonomy because it prevents 
the agent from having the range of 'live' options that the autonomy requires. If only 
guidance control is required for autonomy, and other options are not required, then 
insofar being under the threat of potential intervention (' domination' by others) 
undermines autonomy it does not do so by removing the agent's de facto power, 
understood as the ability to freely act otherwise. If the authority intuition is relevant to 
autonomy (which I think it is), it is not relevant in the way that Oshana sets out; namely, 
it is not relevant because of its connection to the range or feasibility of options that the 
agent has. 
A second consideration arises, which will be addressed in more detail in the 
next chapter. Briefly put, it is plausible to hold that in cases in which interventions of 
others are problematic, one of the claims we should wish to make is that the intervention 
is problematic precisely because it overrides the agent's autonomy. Arguably, agents 
retain their status as autonomous beings when subject to intervention, and therefore 
when subject to the possibility of intervention; it is rather that this status is not respected 
(and subsequently their liberty, well-being, interests, and so on are thwarted). It is (in 
part) because agents are autonomous that some interventions, or threatened 
interventions, are problematic. If such interventions or potential interventions remove 
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autonomy, such claims cannot be made. This thought will be returned to in greater detail 
in chapter 6. 
Finally, it is worth noting that once again, a weaker understanding of the 
authority intuition is available; namely, one which focuses on the kind of 'intrapersonal 
authorising' of an agent's deliberation, choice and action. Autonomous persons have 
authoritative control of their choices and actions, on this understanding, when they see 
their choices and actions as 'their own', and issuing from the deliberative processes that 
they endorse. This is the kind of authority that Benson has in mind when he writes that 
autonomous agents have the 'authority to construct, stand by, and speak for their 
reasons for acting,.58 This weaker notion of authority, which focuses on the agent's 
sense of accountability for her actions, may well be necessary for autonomy; but it does 
not demand that the agent stand in certain social relations. 
Neither the authority nor the control intuitions are uncontroversial, then. Oshana 
has given us insufficient grounds to endorse the strong readings of these intuitions that 
inform her constitutively relational condition (ReIAgency2). 
5.3 Substantive concerns 
I have argued that the considerations that motivate Oshana' s constitutively relational 
condition need not be heeded: first, the psychological 'internalist' accounts do not paint 
a picture of autonomy as isolated from the impact of social relations. We saw as much 
in looking at Benson's account. Second, the claim that autonomy requires social 
relations that provide a range of live options and de facto power (namely, ability to do 
otherwise) can only be secured insofar as the requirement for regulative control is 
motivated. But it is not. Moreover, to independently motivate the intuitions without 
recourse to regulative control - and rather to the value of a range of options - is to 
return to face the 'apples and oranges' objection. Third, the weaker kind of control -
guidance control - involves more than the accidental coincidence of preference and 
choice, as Oshana demands. Finally, there is reason to doubt that the authority intuition 
that informs her relational condition need be accepted in its strong form. 
This removes much of the motivation for positing constitutively relational 
conditions. In this section, I briefly return to the concern about values in an account of 
58 Benson, P. (2005b) Op.Cit. p.133. 
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autonomy that I raised at the beginning of Chapter 4, and the relation between 
constitutively relational conditions and value-laden content. 
We have seen Christman's concern that incorporating values into an account of 
autonomy has troubling consequences, in terms of the exclusion of those who fail to 
subscribe to the stipulated values. He has argued that Oshana's account in particular 
faces this objection. Now, Christman thinks that this problem is one that will face any 
account that attempts to incorporate constitutively relational conditions for autonomy. It 
is one thing, he says, to hold that social relations are causally necessary for autonomy, 
and thus 
to claim that social conditions that enable us to develop and maintain the 
powers of choice ... are part of the background requirements for the 
development of autonomy .... 59 
However, he claims that we should reject constitutively relational conditions for 
autonomy, because to demand certain social relations means also demanding of agents 
that they commit to a certain value perspective (namely, one that sees those social 
relations as valuable) in order to meet the standards for autonomy. The move is 
ultimately problematic, Christman claims, because 
viewing [social] relations as constitutive of autonomy implies that certain 
values ... are valid for individuals even if they authentically and freely 
reject them.60 
That is to say - it is troubling to require certain social relations for autonomy, because 
this has the consequence that those who have, on the basis of competent deliberation, 
rejected the set of values that those social relations enshrine can nonetheless be 
evaluated and excluded from the class of autonomous agents according to whether their 
lives cohere with the values that they have rejected. For example, Christman maintains 
that Oshana's constitutively relational account imports value commitments: 
views like Oshana' s rest upon the claim that certain value commitments -
such as the view that I must obey my superiors unconditionally - are 
conceptually inconsistent with autonomy.61 
59 Christman, 1. (2004) Op.Cit. p.152. 
60 Ibid, p. 152. 
61 Christman, 1. (2006) Op.Cit. p.15l. 
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Such a consequence, he claims, is not compatible with the liberal commitment to there 
being a plural set of inconsistent but reasonable values according to which one might 
live. Rather, her account privileges the value of substantive independence. 
It is further problematic, because maintaining that only those agents who 
subscribe to certain values are autonomous risks excluding from the range of normative 
benefits that attach to autonomy many individuals who are otherwise competent and 
capable of self-governance. For instance, agents who fail to stand in social relations that 
permit them the ability to do otherwise (having chosen this or not) will not, on such a 
VIew, possess 
the status marker of an independent citizen whose perspective and value 
orientation gets a hearing in the democratic processes that constitute 
legitimate social policy.62 
Such agents will not be candidates for political participation. Nor will they be protected 
from paternalistic interventions, for should an agent fail to occupy the social relations 
that Oshana demands, then: 
her lack of relational autonomy - should we accept that view - would 
allow other agents and representatives of coercive social situations to 
intervene to relieve her of this burden and to restore her autonomy (at 
I . .. I ) 63 east III pnnClp e . 
Finally, Christman mentions the role of autonomy in grounding respect, and Friedman 
clearly articulates the concern that value-laden views may pose problems for this 
dimension: 
An account of autonomy that is too demanding will prompt persons to 
regard a greater number of others as failures at personhood and thereby 
reduce the number of others they regard as respect worthy.64 
Constitutively relational conditions for autonomy, in short, do not appear to be well-
placed to play the normative roles that account for autonomy's value. At least - this will 
be so if it is correct that constitutively relational conditions are committed to the claim 
62 Ibid, p.157. 
63 Ibid. p.157. 
64 Friedman, M. (2003) Op.Cit, p.23. 
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that an agent is autonomous only insofar as she chooses and lives in accordance with 
some value. 
So, insofar as Oshana's view incorporates the value of independence, jUdging 
the autonomy of agents according to the degree to which their lives instantiate this 
value, she incorporates into her view "an ideal that those who choose strict obedience or 
hierarchical power structures have decided to reject".65 Those who reject this idea may 
not secure the normative benefits, as set out above. Note that in addition to these 
problems of exclusion, such views require 
that the content of the judgments [or choices] in question reflect a high 
regard for personal independence or other values of the sort that views 
such as Oshana' s demand of the autonomous agent. 66 
If constitutively relational views end up placing constraints upon the contents of what 
can be chosen autonomously (rather than on the social relations which those who 
qualify as autonomous agents must stand), we will return to the kind of concerns, 
considered in Chapter 4, facing those views which place substantive constraints on the 
contents of autonomous choice; namely, the problem of finding a satisfactory way of 
constraining choice without ruling out a significant portion of those agents deemed to be 
un-controversially autonomous (what I called the problem of false negatives). 
5.3.1 The scope of Christman's objection 
I have set out Christman's claim that we should not accept any account that offers 
constitutively relational conditions, insofar as they incorporate values or ideals. 
His claim is that we should reject constitutively relational conditions for 
autonomy: 
It is . . . an ultimately problematic move . . . to claim that being 
autonomous means standing in proper social relations to surrounding 
others and within social practices. 
Now, an important point to note here is that Christman is not merely rejecting value-
laden conditions; he also claims that we should not accept any constitutively relational 
conditions for autonomy. This is because Christman conflates value-laden conditions 
65 Christman, J. (2004) Op. Cit, p.151. 
66 Ibid, p. 151. 
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with constitutively relational conditions. Elsewhere he characterises relational 
conceptions of autonomous agency as those 
according to which persons are autonomous only when they have 
particular kinds of value commitments.67 
But insofar as it is possible to give relational conditions for autonomous agency that do 
not incorporate any values, Christman's concern can be avoided. And it seems at least 
possible that one could offer value-neutral constitutive conditions. For example, one 
might hold that an agent must stand in social relations in which she is a party to the 
exchange of reasons for action - a demand possible from the perspective of any value 
commitment.68 Such a view need not 'smuggle in' any values nor demand that the agent 
has chosen any particular value commitment or way of life. Perhaps these constitutively 
relational conditions are not, in fact, ones that we should accept for autonomy. But 
insofar as they are not value-laden, any objections to them will not be grounded in 
concerns such as Christman's.69 
In the next chapter, however, I will argue that there are other reasons for 
rejecting constitutively relational conditions for autonomous agency. So even if value-
neutral conditions for autonomous agency can be given, we should not accept them. But 
I will go on to argue, in Chapter 7, that there are constitutively relational conditions for 
autonomous action which do not incorporate any substantive value commitments. 
Christman's conflation of relational conditions with value-laden commitments, then, is a 
mistake. 
5.4 Summary 
In this chapter, I started by considering whether Benson's view might provide us with 
constitutively relational conditions for autonomous agency. I argued that it should not 
be so understood, but that important lessons can be learnt from his account nonetheless: 
namely, that value can be incorporated without directly constraining choice; and that 
67 Christman, J. (2006) Book Review: Marilyn Friedman, Autonomy Gender, Politics (2003), in 
The Journal o/Value Inquiry, 40, pp.137-143, see p.139. 
68 Westlund, A. (2003) Op.Cit argues for such a condition. 
69 Westlund, A. ('Rethinking Relational Autonomy', forthcoming) argues that constitutively 
relational accounts need not be value-laden, using her own view as an example. However, her 
view of autonomy - which gives central place to an agent's disposition to engage with critical 
perspectives - appears to me to be merely causally rather than constitutively, relational, in a way 
similar to Benson's. 
124 
views which focus on the psychological states of the agent can take into account the 
impact of social relations upon autonomy. This removed some of the motivation for 
Oshana's constitutively relational account, which I then considered. I argued that her 
view was further lacking in motivation: the claim that regulative control is required for 
autonomous agency remained unargued for. Without any independent support for this 
claim, the argument for her constitutively relational condition is question-begging. 
Finally, I set out the concern from Christman that constitutively relational conditions 
smuggle in values. Insofar as this is so, they are unable to playa role in the normative 
frameworks that in part explain its value. 
I suggested that this conflation is mistaken: it is at least possible that one might 
offer constitutively relational conditions without incorporating value-commitments. 
Christman's concern will not address such views. In the next chapter, I offer an 
objection that faces all relational or 'externalist' accounts of autonomous agency, 
whether or not they incorporate substantive value commitments. 
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Chapter 6. An argument against constitutively relational 
conditions for autonomous agency 
In the last chapter, I looked at two attempts to take into account the way that social 
conditions might be constitutive of the conditions for being an autonomous agent. The 
first attempt, by Benson, most plausibly amounted to the claim that social relations 
might have a causal impact upon the sense of competence of autonomous agents. The 
second view, from Oshana, involved the claim that agents cannot be autonomous unless 
they occupy certain social conditions; those which enable a range of options and secure 
certain powers for the agent. Having considered specific problems with each of these 
views, in this chapter, I will offer a general argument against constitutively relational 
conditions for autonomous agency, namely, any condition that has the form: 
(RelAgents) A necessary condition for being an autonomous agent is that the 
agent stands in social relations S 
Focusing on the role that autonomy plays in the normative framework of protecting 
from paternalism, I will argue that no account which incorporates a constitutively 
relational condition can play this normative role. This will motivate the tum, in the next 
part of the thesis, to consider the relational conditions for autonomous action. 
6.1 Paternalism and autonomy 
An account of autonomy, recall, should be able to play important normative roles: I 
have mentioned three of these, namely, the roles of grounding respect, identifying the 
candidates for political participation, and those who should be protected from 
paternalistic interventions. In this chapter I will focus on the latter framework: that in 
which the notion of autonomy is supposed to play the role of marking out those agents 
who should be protected from a certain kind of intervention. 
One of the intuitions that Oshana is alIlling to capture, with her relational 
account, is that "autonomy is the good that paternalism fails to respect".! Likewise, 
! Oshana, M. (1998) Op.Cit. p.82. 
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Christman holds that "the idea of autonomy set[s] the boundaries of ... anti-paternalism 
in principles of justice".2 He goes so far as to claim that "all agree ... that another 
function of the concept of autonomy is to mark out the parameters within which a 
person is [or should be] immune from paternalistic intervention". 3 
Assuming for now that this is correct (I will later say more to substantiate this 
assumption), I want to look in more detail here at paternalism, and its relation to 
autonomous agency - namely, the features in virtue of which autonomous agents should 
be protected from paternalistic interventions. My aim is to show that an account which 
incorporates a relational condition such as (ReIAgents) makes reference to the wrong 
kind of features to play this role. Thus insofar as we want the class of autonomous 
agents to be coextensive with the class of agents entitled to protection from paternalism, 
we should not accept a constitutively relational condition for autonomous agency. 
6.1.2 Paternalistic interventions 
When is an intervention a paternalistic one? We already have part of the answer from 
Oshana: an intervention into a choice or action is paternalistic when the intervention 
fails to respect the autonomy of the agent. But we want to know more about how such 
an intervention fails to respect the agent's autonomy, and how this kind of intervention 
differs from other cases in which autonomy is not respected. 
a. Paternalism vs. other wrongdoing 
Lying, deceiving, stealing are all ways of interfering with another's action, and arguably 
constitute failures of respect for autonomy. The Kantian diagnosis of the problem with 
such interferences is that, in (say) lying to another, that agent is treated not as an end, 
but as a mere means. Insofar as the lie is intended to be part of a manipulation of the 
agent for the ends of the liar, the agent is used for the furthering of the ends of the liar. 
Moreover, the agent cannot consent to being used in such a way - in virtue of being lied 
to the agent does not know, so cannot share, the ends of the liar. Likewise, if an agent is 
stolen from, she is not respected as an end - her goals and aims - in particular, those 
with regard to her property - are not respected, but disregarded.4 These kinds of 
2 Christman, J. (2004) Op.Cit. p.147. 
3 Ibid,p.157. 
4 See e.g. Korsgaard, C. (l996b) Op.Cit for such claims. But see Buss, S. (2005) Op.Cit and 
Parfit, D. «2002) 'What we Could Rationally Will: I. Rational Consent', The Tanner Lectures on 
Human Value. pp.287-369, http://www.tannerlectures.utah.eduJlectures'atoz.html#p esp. at p. 
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autonomy-violation, then, are clear ways of failing to respect the autonomy of an agent; 
such wrong-doing disregards the agent's own plans and determinations. 
Paternalistic interventions can be distinguished from these kinds of autonomy-
violations, because paternalistic interventions are motivated by the good of the agent _ 
they are intended to further the interests of the agent. As Dworkin puts it, paternalistic 
interventions are those which involve "interference justified by reasons referring 
exclusively to the welfare, good, happiness, needs, interests or values of the person 
being coerced".5 In one sense, then, the interventions are benevolent; they appeal to the 
interests or good of the agent who is subject to the coercion or the intervention. In what 
way, then, should we understand such interventions as violations of autonomy? 
b. The wrong of paternalism 
Whilst the interests of the agent are made reference to m cases of paternalistic 
intervention, there is nonetheless a violation of autonomy. This is because, in such 
interventions, one agent "substitutes their judgment for another person's. There is an 
usurpation of decision making".6 The agent's own judgment about what will serve her 
interests, or further her good, or about what should constitute her ends or goals, is 
replaced (for the purposes of determining what course of events comes about) by the 
judgment of another (the paternalist). The intervention of the other, then, is in this sense 
against the will of the agent, even though it is motivated by concern for her interests. 
Thus the autonomy of the agent, in determining her choices and actions, is undermined. 
Her choices are not respected, and her decisions about the actions that she seeks to bring 
about are overridden. 
297) for complications concerning the matter of autonomy-violation and treating as a mere 
means. 
5 Dworkin, G. (1972) Op.Cit at p. 65. Note that Dworkin characterises paternalistic interventions 
as those that are exclusively motivated by reasons pertaining to the good, or welfare or interests 
of the agent. This understanding is narrower than that used by Joel Feinberg, who maintains that 
an intervention is paternalistic so long as one of the reasons for intervention makes reference to 
the welfare of the agent (this may not be the decisive reason, and there may be other reasons): "it 
is always a good and relevant (though not necessarily decisive) reason in support of a criminal 
prohibition that it will prevent harm (physical, psychological or economic) to the actor himself' 
(Feinberg, 1. (1986) Harm to Self: The Moral Limits a/the Criminal Law, Volume Three, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, p.4). 
For another formulation of paternalistic intervention that is closer to Mill's original 
injunction against paternalism, see Richard Arneson, (1980) 'Mill Versus Paternalism', Ethics, 
90 (4), pp.470-48. I here work with Dworkin's narrower conception, the reasons for this strategy 
will be apparent in the following. A useful discussion of the different understandings can be 
found in Clare Chambers' (2008) Op. Cit. Chapter 6. 
6 Dworkin, G. (1983) Op.Cit. p.107. 
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Some of those who argue that paternalism can sometimes be justified consider 
whether the benefits of overriding an agent's choice can be outweighed by the problems 
of autonomy-violation. It is worth noting that Mill claimed that the balance of costs and 
benefits would (almost) never fall on the side of paternalism - this thought in part is 
motivated by the claim that the agent knows her own interests, and what will serve 
them, better than any other.7 This claim seems to be falsified on a not irregular basis; we 
are often poor judges of what will serve our interests best, perhaps as a result of 
misinformation, or wishful thinking and other forms of motivated irrationality, or 
failures of self-knowledge. One might hold, however, that the moral harm of 
paternalism is sufficiently great that it is never justified - or justified only rarely; such 
as when severe harm will befall the agent, or when the agent's life is at stake. Let us 
characterise a paternalistic intervention as follows: 
an intervention in the choice and action of an autonomous agent, exclusively for 
the sake of the agent's good, which does not treat the agent as if she is capable 
of making her own decisions. 
It is important to note that there are two ways of understanding the reference here to 
intervention which involves failing to treat the agent 'as if she were capable of making 
her own decision'. On one reading, to so treat an agent may be to treat her as if she lacks 
the capacity to make a competent decision; she is treated as one might treat a small child 
or a patient in a coma. On another reading, to so treat an agent may be to treat her as 
lacking the epistemic state - in terms of the beliefs she is possessed of - to make her 
own decision. An example of the first: Myrna recognises that Ignatius has made a 
decision of his own, but attributes little value or significance to his exercise of agency. 
She overrides Ignatius' decision as she would that of a young child. An example of the 
second case: Dorian sees that Timmy doesn't realise that the bridge he is about to cross 
will collapse and that he will henceforth plummet to his death; Dorian stops him from 
crossing, so that he can inform him of the circumstances. (An alternative possibility is 
that the agent is recognised to have the relevant capacities, but is temporarily unable to 
7 See Mill, l.S. Gp. Cit. "with respect to his own feelings and circumstances, the most ordinary 
man or woman has means of knowledge immeasurably surpassing those that can be possessed by 
anyone else", at p.207. It is also important to note that Mill's opposition to paternalism extended 
to the claim that the only case in which intervention with an individual's action is justified is in 
cases in which harm will come to others. The permission for such interventions is enshrined in 
his harm principle: "the only purpose for which power can rightfully be exercised over any 
member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others" p.135. Note, 
finally, that I say 'almost never', because Mill held that on occasions on which an agent chooses 
to forsake his freedom (for example, by selling himself into slavery), paternalistic interventions 
may be justified. 
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exercise them, due to (for example) drunkenness. I do not explore this case in detail 
here: it is plausible that such a case can be understood as one of 'soft' paternalism, as I 
set out below). 
Now, in line with these two ways of understanding the sense in which one may 
treat another as lacking competence to decide, Dworkin distinguishes between 'hard' 
and 'soft' paternalism.s 'Soft' paternalism involves interventions or impositions in cases 
in which the agent acknowledges - or would acknowledge - her fallibility, or recognises 
the potential for minor cognitive deficiency on her part, such that she would 
acknowledge that the course of action imposed upon her or into which she is coerced is 
one that she would, deficiencies aside, assent to. 'Hard' paternalism, on the other hand, 
is the imposition of or intervention with a course of action, when it cannot be said of the 
agent interfered with that, with further reflection, or more acquaintance with the facts, 
she would consent to it. In cases of 'hard' paternalism, then, we have one agent 
imposing some course of action, informed by some conception of the good, on another 
agent who stoutly rejects that conception, and the action justified by it. 
6.1.3 Aside: clearing up a dispute 
Note that Dworkin and Christman appear to use the term 'paternalism' differently: 
Christman holds that all autonomous agents are - or should be - immune to paternalistic 
intervention. This suggests that his view is that all paternalistic interventions are 
unjustified. 
On the other hand, Dworkin holds that, whilst "there must be a violation of a 
person's autonomy for one to treat another paternalistically",9 some interventions can 
nonetheless be justified. On this view, there will be some cases in which the good that 
the agent accrues as a result of the intervention is sufficiently great to justify the 
overriding of their autonomy. Thus there seems to be a disagreement about what 
paternalism in fact is. 
However, clarification of the claims at stake helps us see that there is, in fact no 
substantive dispute: Dworkin's considered positioniO is that only soft paternalism can be 
justified - interventions can only be justified in cases in which the agent, under 
8 See Dworkin, G. (1972, 1983), Op.Cit. 
9 Dworkin, G. (1972) Op.Cit. p.123. 
10 Dworkin, G. (1983) Op.Cit. p.112. 
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motivationally similar circumstances, would consent. Christman's conception of 
autonomy includes a counterfactual: an agent is autonomous when she meets (among 
other conditions) the condition demanding that (holding constant the agent's significant 
motivational states) were she to reflect on the acquisition of the motives upon which one 
acts, she would endorse it.!! 
With these two considerations in mind, we can thus see the views of Christman 
and Dworkin aligning, despite the tenninological differences: intervention cannot be 
justified in cases in which one agent, (A), imposes a course of action, as informed by a 
conception of the good upon another agent, (B), where (B) does not, cannot and would 
not accept that conception of the good, nor the actions that it endorses in the case at 
hand. In cases in which the agent would endorse the intervention, she is autonomous in 
acting in accordance with the intervention, on Christman's counterfactual view. In cases 
in which the agent would not endorse the intervention, she is not autonomous on 
Christman's view, so is paternalistically coerced. And the intervention is a 'hard 
paternalistic' one, so cannot be justified, for Dworkin. It is with these cases of 'hard 
paternalistic' intervention that I will be concerned in the following. 
6.1.4 The 'core case' 
Christman and Dworkin, amongst others, are agreed that there are certain cases in which 
intervention with the agent's action, for the sake of her own good, are not justified. 
These are cases which have the structure of 'the core case'. It will be useful to have this 
case set out: 
Agent A and agent B are both reflectively competent agents. Agent B is 
subject to coercive intervention or imposition, exclusively for the sake of 
her own good. Were she to have further facts, or were she to reflect 
further she would not consent to this intervention. The action imposed 
upon her, by A, enshrines a conception of the good to which B does not, 
and would not, upon further reflection, subscribe. 
This is a clear-cut case in which one agent is imposing her conception of what is good 
for another upon that agent. What is important for present purposes is to identify in 
virtue of what features, broadly, intervention in the core case is unjustified. It will be 
instructive to see if the relational conception is adequately placed to account for what is 
II And Christman's view, like Frankfurt's involves a dispositional view of desires and motives: 
X desires p if X pursues (under certain circumstances) p. This is a weak sense of motive, 
pertaining purely to the motivational 'push', rather than any phenomenal sense of desire or urge. 
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problematic about the core case. If it cannot, then whatever else is said about the other 
, 
more disputed territory (that of 'soft' paternalism), relational conceptions of 
autonomous agency will be unsuitable for this theoretical purpose. There are two 
plausible claims that the relational theorist should be able to make: 
i) the intervention in the core case is unjustified12 
ii) the intervention in the core case is unjustified because it violates the 
agent's autonomy. 
Let us start by noting that in the core case, what is objectionable is that one agent is 
intervening with the choices and actions of another, although (as stipulated) the choices 
of each display the same 'formal features'. That is to say, the agents both have certain 
capacities, such as those for rational belief formation and choice. The agents are 
deliberatively adept, and are not in a position in which further reflection or facts would 
lead to a revision of choice. The agent who is subject to intervention has made a 
decision that is as good - procedurally speaking - as the decision of the intervener. It is 
due to the substantive content of the decision that the intervention is deemed to be 
justified by the intervener. In so intervening, there is a usurpation of decision-making; 
A's decision usurps B's. 
Now, I have already endorsed the claim that we should not accept an account 
according to which a consideration in determining the autonomy of a choice is whether 
or not the choice accords with some substantive value. Combined with this thought, we 
have the claim that in the core case it is in virtue of the procedural 'formal features' that 
each agent possesses that the intervention appears intuitively unjustified. (And, 
conversely, it is when these formal features are lacking - when the agent lacks 
deliberative competence or reliable belief forming capacities - that intervention is most 
likely to be justified.) Thus it is the agent's competence at decision making - her 
capacity for self-governance in deliberation and choice - that is important in 
12 Danny Scoccia rejects this thought, arguing that there are some cases in which hard 
paternalism can be justified (namely, cases in which non-terminally ill sound of mind individuals 
choose to end their lives). See Scoccia, D. (2008) 'In Defense of Hard Paternalism' Law and 
Philosophy 27, pp.351-381. For those who think that hard paternalism can sometimes be 
justified, a weaker version of these claimed can be utilised: 
i) there is pro tanto reason against intervention in the core case 
ii) there is pro tanto reason against intervention in the core case because the 
intervention violates the agent's autonomy. 
It should be clear in setting out my arguments that they apply to these weaker claims also. 
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detennining whether an intervention for the agent's own good IS unjustified, and 
paternalistic. 
We saw earlier that theorists wish to claim that such paternalistic interventions 
are violations of autonomy. We can now see that this claim, in part, involves the claim 
that the intervention is unjustified because it does not treat the agent as capable of 
making her own decision. And the claim that the intervention is unjustified is informed 
by the thought that the substantive content of a decision is not sufficient to warrant the 
overriding of an agent's judgment. When an agent has decision making capacities, and 
exercises these in coming to a decision, this decision should not be replaced by the 
decision of another who also possesses the capacities and abilities to make reflective 
decisions on her own behalf. 13 
Now, it is important to note that the features that are infonning both the claim 
that the intervention in the core case is unjustified, and that it is unjustified because it 
violates the agent's autonomy, are 'internalist' features. 'Intemalist' features are those 
which pertain to 'what goes on in the agent's head', as it were; aspects of her 
psychology, or competence in practical deliberation. 
Insofar as it is the notion of autonomy that is doing work in making sense of 
why the intervention is unjustified, then, it is an intemalist conception of autonomy.14 
That is, the agent's psychological competences - her ability to deliberate and choose -
are what make the usurpation of her choice and violation of her autonomy by another 
agent, objectionable. This is the crucial point, and the point that poses problems for the 
relational conception of agency. 
6.2 Relational conceptions and the core case: the problem of 'externality' 
I want to now consider whether a conception of autonomous agency that incorporates a 
constitutively relational condition of the form: 
(RelAgents) A necessary condition for being an autonomous agent is that the 
agent stands in social relations S 
13 The kinds of values that autonomous choice embodies - such as symbolic choice, for example, 
as discussed in chapter 1 - may be bound up with the value of making one's own choice, and the 
disvalue of it being over-ridden. 
14 The kinds of conditions that are offered by internalist conceptions are those discussed in 
chapter 2 - competence, conditions, structural and procedural conditions, for example. 
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can make sense of the two plausible claims about the core case: 
i) the intervention in the core case is unjustified 
ii) the intervention in the core case is unjustified because it violates the 
agent's autonomy. 
The relational condition, recall, is intended to supplement the necessary procedural 
conditions, thus yielding jointly sufficient conditions for autonomy. It will be instructive 
to consider these claims with reference to a specific relational conception - thus I will 
consider what Oshana's conception of autonomy, which incorporates the relational 
condition (RelAgents2), below, can say with regards these two claims. 
(RelAgents2) A necessary condition for being an autonomous agent is that 
the agent stand in social relations in which she has de facto power to choose 
and manage her life; in which her choices are from an adequate range of 
options; in which she has power counterfactually, such that she is able to 
maintain control over her life even in possible scenarios in which others 
attempt to intervene. IS 
On this view "autonomy calls for a measure of substantive independence from other 
persons and from social roles and traditions of a variety deemed to be inhospitable to 
autonomy".16 Autonomous agents must stand in social relations that ensure this measure 
of substantive independence. 
Let us consider, then, what Oshana's relational condition has to say about 'the 
core case', in which an agent, B, has her decision overridden by another agent, A, 
despite the two agents both possessing the relevant capacities and deliberative abilities. 
If this case is to be considered, as I believe it ought to be, as an instance of paternalism, 
and if we are to hold that paternalism violates an agent's autonomy, then we must be 
able to say of this agent that she is autonomous, and is not being treated as such, albeit 
for the sake of her own good. Can the constitutively relational conception of 
autonomous agency deliver the claims that i) this intervention is unjustified, and that ii) 
it is unjustified because it is a violation of autonomy? 
15 These conditions are set out in Oshana, M. (2006) Op Cit. pp. 83-90. I discussed the details of 
her view at length in the previous chapter. It is worth noting here that Oshana' s reference to 
intervention is to arbitrary interventions - so does not itself rule out paternalistic intervention. 
16 Oshana, M. (2006) Op Cit. p.72. 
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I deal with ii) first. At first glance, it is simply not clear what an account that 
incorporates a condition such as (ReIAgents2) can claim. The relational theorist will 
need more information about the social context in which the agent is operating, namely, 
whether the conditions present an adequate assortment of options, enable protection of 
rights and powers, and so on. Only then can she determine whether or not the agent is an 
autonomous agent, and only then could the claim be made about the intervention being a 
violation of autonomy (or not). For example, Oshana will want to know not simply 
about the agent's competence as a deliberator, but also about whether the agent stands in 
certain social conditions - those which ensure a certain range of realistic, 'live' options, 
and a level of protection from the interference of others. 17 
Suppose, then, that we take all the cases that have the structure of the core case, 
such that a deliberatively competent agent's decision is overridden, for the sake of what 
another takes to be in her interests. A constitutively relational conception of autonomous 
agency will only be able to hold that these cases are instances of paternalism in some of 
the cases that have the structure: namely, those in which the agent stands in the kind of 
social relations specified. 
That is to say, there will be some cases in which the agent meets all of the 
internalist conditions - manifesting structures, or having undergone procedures, that 
meet the requirements for deliberative competence, rationality, and so on - but fails to 
be (according to the relational conditions) autonomous. In such cases, the relational 
theorist cannot maintain ii) that the intervention is unjustified because it is a violation of 
autonomy. Because she is not judged to be autonomous, an agent in such a case will not 
be accorded the normative benefits, one of which is that her decisions and choices 
should not be overruled, and that the decisions of others should not usurp those of her 
own. 
Thus a constitutively relational conception of autonomous agency does not 
seem to be appropriately placed to diagnose one of the central claims about what is 
wrong with interventions in instances that have the structure of the core case - namely, 
that an agent's autonomy is not respected. This is because such constitutively relational 
conceptions place externalist social-relational conditions upon autonomous agency -
17 This is not to say that the social conditions of the agent may not interfere with the agent's 
meeting of the procedural conditions. Insofar as the social context plays this role, though, we 
have a different kind of condition, as I spell out in more detail shortly. 
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requiring that for an agent to be autonomous, not only must the agent be a certain way 
(according to certain internalist specifications); the world must also be a certain way.IS 
This leaves open the possibility of an agent who meets all of the internalist 
specifications nonetheless failing to be autonomous, and so failing to accrue the 
normative benefits to which autonomous agents are entitled. In particular, the relational 
theorist of this kind cannot say, for all instances of the core case that the agent is treated 
paternalistically and that such interventions are unjustified violations of autonomy. This 
problem is illustrated in Fig.1, below. In sum, the problem lies in the fact that the core 
case could fall outside the set of all agents who meet the constitutively relational 
conditions for autonomous agency. This is the 'problem of externality': the relational 
conditions are externalist. Thus an agent may fail to meet these relational conditions, 
whilst meeting the internalist conditions relevant to determining whether paternalistic 
intervention is unjustified. 
Fig.l 
g-----------------------------------------------------------
--------
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--------
• 
6.3 Three options 
Core case 
All humans 
All agents who meet the 
intemalist conditions. 
All agents who meet the intemalist and extemalist conditions. 
I have shown that, given the structure of an account that incorporates the relational 
condition (ReIAgents), it is possible that the core case might fall into the class of those 
18 On Oshana's view this demand is not restricted to the social world; she argues that natural 
phenomena can also be an impediment to autonomy. She writes: ."the number and significance of 
options made available in the environment of the person ~e. salIent c~ncerns for autonomy, and 
if a person is to be autonomous .. . myriad impediments Wlthin the ~nvlfonme~t o.f the agent mu t 
be contained. These include imper onal natural impediment and Clfcum tantlal lfllpedlment , a 
well as interpersonal impediments" (2006, Op Cit. p.92). 
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agents who are not, according to the relational account, autonomous. In this section, I 
set out the options that present as a result. I argue we should take the option that 
involves rejecting the relational conception of autonomous agency. 
Option A: If one wants to maintain that autonomy should protect against paternalistic 
intervention, such that all such interventions are unjustified because they violate 
autonomy, one should reject a conception which incorporates 'externalist' conditions 
such as (RelAgents). Thus we reject the claim that the conditions for autonomous 
agency are constitutively relational. This is option (A), and it is the option that I think 
we should take. I argue for this by showing that the other options that face the relational 
theorist are not feasible. 
Option B: The relational theorist could nonetheless maintain that the interventions such 
as those in the core case will be unjustified, even if they are not all violations of 
autonomy. Thus claim i) could be maintained. This response could maintain that whilst 
the agent is not autonomous, she nonetheless has some claim - due to her deliberative 
competence, or due to some other value - not to have her decisions overruled for the 
sake of her own good. Let us call this option (B). 
The thought here is this: why not simply reject the claim - upon which it was 
suggested that all agreed - that it is autonomy that protects from paternalistic 
intervention, and that renders such interventions as those in the core case unjustified? 
One could hold, then, that autonomous agency is relational and maintain that the wrong 
of paternalism is, say, the overriding of the decisions of deliberatively competent, if not 
autonomous, agents. 
This appears to be one of the strategies endorsed by Oshana, in her defence of 
her social relational view against objections from liberalism. She notes that the social-
relational account she offers "is not comprehensive in the variety of lifestyles it permits 
[as autonomous]." Thus the concern arises: "there is the risk that the voices on the 
fringe - especially on the fringe of social and political power - shall be silenced,,19 -
these voices may be overridden, and subject, then, to paternalistic interventions. 
In response, Oshana suggests that we might maintain that such individuals have 
de jure autonomy - that is, they have a right to a voice, to make their own choices 
19 Ibid, p.99. 
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without interference. Such a right may well be grounded in the deliberative competences 
of the agent. But, Oshana claims, "autonomy demands more of a person and of her 
environment than does de jure autonomy".20 Thus we can hold that agents who fail to 
meet the condition set by (RelAgents2) nonetheless have a right to autonomy, in the 
sense of a right to be left to govern themselves. That the agent is not protected from 
paternalistic intervention "would follow only if one result of denying [social-relational] 
autonomy is that de jure autonomy, or the right to be heard, is denied".2! We can then 
maintain that it is wrong to intervene with the choices of individuals such as agent A, 
because to do so is a violation of her right to autonomy, whilst accepting that they lack 
(social-relational) autonomy. 
Alternatively, we might maintain, Oshana suggests, that "values such as liberty 
give us grounds to consider limits to state interference,,;22 on this basis - an 
individual's right to liberty - non-paternalistic policies could be held, whilst still 
insisting that the individual lacks autonomy. Autonomy in the relevant (social-
relational) sense need not be what grounds entitlement to protection from paternalistic 
intervention - some other value may play this role. 
This response has costs, however. The normative frameworks of respect, 
participation, paternalism and autonomous agency are intimately connected. As such, 
anyone claim cannot be easily detached. Rejecting the claim that it is autonomy that 
sets the bounds of paternalistic intervention, then, would require rethinking the 
relationships between autonomy and respect, and those between autonomy and 
legitimate political participation. Whilst doing so may yield a notion of autonomy that 
can posit constitutively relational conditions, I submit that it would also rob the notion 
of autonomy of much normative significance. Not only would autonomy not protect 
from paternalism; nor would it identify those agents who deserve respect, nor those who 
are candidates for political participation. No longer would the concept of autonomy play 
the normatively important roles that motivated feminist theorists to retain and refigure 
it. 'Autonomy' would not ground respect, or protect from paternalism, or entitle agents 
to a voice in collective decision-making processes. 'Autonomy' would designate a class 
of deliberatively competent agents who stand in certain social relations (some of those 
20 Ibid, p.IOO. 
21 Ibid, p.lOl. 
22 Ibid, p.118. 
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agents may not themselves value those social relations). 'Autonomy' would lose much 
of what accounts for its value. 
Indeed, Oshana acknowledges that "[relational] autonomy [in her sense] is one 
among a multitude of values" and that "not everyone will include an autonomous life 
[namely, one that includes the social roles and conditions she specifies] among the goals 
that she regards as integral to well-being".23 Insofar as autonomy is conceived of as just 
one value that mayor may not be chosen - just one component of well-being that is not 
necessary for a good life - we see that she departs from a conception of autonomy 
which plays a role in grounding respect, identifying candidates for political participation 
and protection from interference: the notion of autonomy that plays these roles extends 
to all agents, even if they do not take up the entitlement to political participation, or if 
they adopt conceptions of the good other than those deemed desirable, or other than 
those that are consonant with the value of substantive independence. A life that is 
autonomous in Oshana's sense may indeed have value for those who choose it. But it is 
not the same core value that a notion of autonomy with its attendant normative benefits 
has for agents. It may well be that other values also counsel against paternalistic 
interventions. But we should hold that these are additional, not alternative 
considerations to those supplied by autonomy. Thus we should not take option B. 
Option C: Now, a proponent of the relational conception could argue that the intuitions 
about the core case are wrong: the relational conception makes the correct diagnosis, 
and some agents who meet the internalist conditions are nonetheless non-autonomous, 
and so not protected from paternalistic intervention. For instance, suppose that in the 
UK, there exists a small subculture of fundamentalist religious adherents. Within this 
subculture women have a subordinate role, in accordance with the group's interpretation 
of the religious doctrines. Women do not have access to education, lack freedom of 
movement, and do not work outside the house. Violations of the prescriptions face 
severe punishments. Suppose that an agent endorses the restricted domestic role that she 
occupies, and does so having carefully considered and researched (despite lack of access 
to fonnal education) alternative ways of living. Indeed, she takes her religious 
commitments to be integral to her identity. Let us suppose also that she meets all the 
requirements of deliberative competence, then.24 
23 Ibid, p.l 04. 
24 In her (2008) Clare Chambers scrutinises the social conditions in which choices for such 
restrictive lives are made, arguing that liberals have the resources to criticise those practices that, 
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Nevertheless, whilst she is deliberatively competent in her endorsement of her 
restricted role, she lacks an adequate range of options, and is not allowed to pursue 
values other than those enshrined by the teachings of the religion without fear of 
recrimination, and so on. Thus, according to the relational view, she is non-autonomous. 
Overriding her choice, then, may be justified. Having argued that her account still has 
the resources to make sense of the right to non-interference, Oshana then suggests that 
such a right may not, in fact, be respected in to all those who lack social-relational 
autonomy: 
I believe a case can be made that strong [hard] paternalistic intervention is 
sometimes needed to preserve autonomy that is threatened by a competent 
and deserving person's self-regarding conduct, even where the target of the 
paternalistic gesture has not behaved in ways that clearly permit 
infringements of autonomy.25 
This proposal is justified by the fact that, contra Mill's claim that individuals' interests 
will best be served by allowing them to make their own choices, it is rather 
in a person's interests to be autonomous .... a person who lacks [relational] 
autonomy stands on weaker ground when claiming consideration from others 
and is less likely to be accorded the presumption of consideration human 
agents are due. The failure of people to decide accurately about their 
autonomy might offer one reason in favour of paternalistic interferences, even 
when a person has decided in what he believes is his best interest. The right to 
[relational] autonomy will be a good that must be preserved, even when it is 
the aim of the individual to destroy this right in none but himself.26 
even if autonomously chosen, are an impediment to equality or justice. Note that I am here 
concerned only with paternalistic interventions - namely, those justified exclusively by reference 
to the welfare of the agent. This does not rule out intervention (of some kind) tout court. As 
Chambers argues, some interventions with individual liberty - and usurpations of autonomy -
may be justified with reference to the values of equality and justice. See esp. her chapter 6. 
That intervention of some kind, based on such other values, is permissible may garner 
further support from the consideration raised by Danny Scoccia: namely, that our preferences 
and desires may not be autonomously formed, or at least, are formed in and shaped by particular 
social contexts. (See Scoccia, D. (1990) 'Paternalism and Respect for Autonomy' Ethics, 100 
(2), pp.318-334.) If those contexts are unequal, then this may lead to patterns of desire for 
options that perpetuate that inequality. Thus, whilst an intervention motivated by the agent's 
welfare alone may be a failure of respect, an intervention on the basis of values such as justice or 
equality may be called for, and justified. This matter is one that I cannot fully address here. 
25 Oshana, M. (2006) Op.Cit.p.115 
26 Ibid, p.116 Note that this claim is strong; to demand that relational autonomy must be 
preserved suggests that states may be required to prevent individuals from becoming (e.g.) 
monks or deferential wives. This is implausible, and indeed, is in tension with the claim we have 
just seen from Oshana - that autonomy is one value amongst others. I believe that this tension is 
generated by an underlying problem; namely, Oshana's susceptibility to the 'apples and oranges' 
objection. Whilst attempting to give an account of autonomy in the sense at issue in this thesis 
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There are two points to be made here, the first pertaining directly to Oshana's argument; 
the second to its implications. First, then, to Oshana' s claim that it is in the interests of 
an agent to be autonomous, in the social-relational sense that she sets out: it may well be 
that individuals who stand in the social relations she demands for autonomy have 
satisfactory lives in which many of their interests are met. But the claim that failing to 
stand in such social relations erodes grounds for consideration and respect, and destroys 
an individual's right to autonomy, cannot be substantiated insofar as agents so located 
maintain a right to autonomy. As we have just seen (and as Oshana herself 
acknowledges), lacking social-relational autonomy does not entail that one lacks the 
right to autonomy, in the sense of the right to a voice, and to non-interference in one's 
choices. Furthennore, we have also just seen that Oshana's social-relational notion of 
autonomy is hived off from the de jure autonomy that (on the basis of deliberative 
competence) grounds respect, candidacy for political participation, and so on. Thus 
there is no reason to suppose that choosing a role that does not involve social-relational 
autonomy will erode the basis of respect. (Indeed, it is plausible to suppose that 
intervening with an agent's choice, even for the sake of social-relational autonomy, may 
be more likely to tend towards the erosion of respect.) 
Second, I think that once one acknowledges what the claim that paternalistic 
intervention in the choices of deliberatively competent agents may be justified entails in 
practice, it is clearer that we should not accept it. Recall again the agent who endorses 
her social role of subordination. If this agent is non-(social-relationally) autonomous, 
and so not protected from paternalistic intervention, then her decisions and 
endorsements can be ignored and overridden; or she may be coerced into leaving the 
subculture that she occupies, and certain courses of action - enforcing participation in 
education programs, preventing her from practicing in or attending religious meetings, 
say - may be imposed upon her. This seems to me to be unpalatable. To override an 
agent's decision, especially when that decision concerns matters that she takes to be 
central to her identity, will likely be experienced as a significant hann. Despite being 
well-motivated, such an intervention, then, may be significantly detrimental to 
subjective well-being. 
(self-governance such that the agent is entitled to nonnative benefits), she in fact offers a view of 
autonomy that is concerned with a particular conception of the good, associated with substantive 
independence. 
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Moreover, if the relational theorist is to maintain that agents so positioned may 
nonetheless retain a right to autonomy, such interventions will also constitute a 
significant failure of respect. Whilst one might deem the relations that the woman 
chooses to be detrimental to proper regard for her qua agent, one must also acknowledge 
that such interventions fail to respect the expressed preferences of the woman. Both the 
role that she occupies and intervening action appear to threaten the 'presumption of 
consideration' to which persons are due. But that the agent has made sober and careful 
choices, and that her preferences and subjective sense of well-being will be significantly 
thwarted, counsels, in my view, against overriding or usurping the agent's choice. 
Paternalistic interventions, fortunately, are not the only ways of responding to 
such scenarios. Whilst overriding an individual's choice appears unpalatable, other 
courses of action might be justified; such as engaging in dialogue, exploring the 
possibility of egalitarian interpretations of the religious texts, creating support networks 
for women who may choose to leave the community, and so on?7 Given the availability 
of other options, to treat individuals as non-autonomous, and to override their decisions 
in this way seems only to compound any perceived oppression.28 Failing to respect the 
deliberatively competent agents, and the choices and decisions of these individuals, 
even when one takes those choices to be gravely mistaken, is not the route to 
empowering and enabling. Thus we should not take option C.29 
6.3.1 A misunderstanding? 
A natural thought would be to claim that the proponent of a relational condition, such as 
(RelAgents) intends that the relational condition specifies conditions that are necessary 
27 Clare Chambers (2008) proposes an 'equality tribunal' that might deal with complaints of 
unequal and harmful treatment in particular cultural or religious groups. She emphasises, 
however that interventions would be 'demand led': "the tribunal would not intervene in ... , 
proceedings until it had been asked to do so by those concerned" p.136. 
28 See Narayan, U. ((1997) Dislocating Cultures: Identities, Traditions and Third World 
Feminism, New York, Routledge) for discussion of how imposition of certain practices 
(motivated to further the good of a group of agents) can worsen the situation of those whom the 
imposition intends to help. See also Saul, 1. ((2003) Feminism: Issues and Arguments, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press) for discussion. 
29 An objection to marshall: why not simply build an anti-paternalist condition into the relational 
condition - those agents who are autonomous are those who are protected from paternalism? 
This is an unsatisfactory move that goes beyond the claim that agents who are autonomous are 
entitled to protection from paternalistic intervention. We should not accept the proposed claim, 
as a consequence of building a relational anti-paternalistic condition into an account is that 
agents who are not respected, and are thus paternalistically treated, are not autonomous agents. It 
should be clear that this claim is problematic, and that rather we should say that such failures of 
respect are problematic precisely because the agent is autonomous. 
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for the agent to meet the internalist conditions. Thus it simply cannot be the case that the 
agent would meet the internalist conditions, but fail to meet the externalist conditions , 
as set out in figure 2. If this is what the relational conceptions are intending, then there 
is no reason to think that the relational conception will be ill-equipped to pick out those 
agents who should be protected from paternalistic interventions. 
Fig.2 
[fSI-------------------------------------------------------------------
--------
---------
• 
Core case 
All humans 
All agents who meet the 
extemalist conditions . 
All agents who meet the extemalist and intemalist conditions. 
It should be clear, however, that this is certainly not the manner in which 
Oshana is intending her condition: she is offering a condition that supplements the 
intemalist necessary conditions, rather than specifies a precondition for their 
achievement. Moreover, any account which has the structure illustrated in Fig.2 would 
be plausible only when construed as offering causal conditions for autonomy: certain 
social conditions might cause the agent to fail to meet the intemalist conditions (so 
claimed Benson). Thus construed, however, the condition cannot also be a necessary 
condition, insofar as it is plausible that agents can, on occasion, be sufficiently resilient 
to possess the kinds of deliberative competences necessary for autonomous agency in 
the face of difficult social conditions. But such resilient characters do exist - as 
emphasised by Diana Meyers, who points out the high degrees of self-governance 
exercised by agents in conditions of oppression (as discussed in Chapter 2).30 And as 
such, these characters pose a counter-example to relational conditions being necessary, 
constitutively or causally, for the intemalist conditions obtaining. 
30 Meyer . D. (2000) Op.Cit. p.152. 
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6.4. Conclusions 
I have argued that an account that incorporates a constitutively relational condition for 
autonomous agency is unable to play the desired role in protecting agents from 
paternalistic intervention. It is worth noting how my objection to such relational 
conceptions differs from the concern that Christman has. 
We saw Christman's concern that accounts of autonomous agency that 
incorporate constitutively relational conditions cannot play roles such as those I have set 
out. However, his argument rests on the claim that such conceptions are value-laden, 
smuggling into the account, in the specification of the social relations that are necessary, 
some ideal of autonomous agency. We saw, first, the charge that Oshana' s conditions in 
fact require that agents occupy positions that enable substantive independence. Second, 
we saw Christman's conflation of all constitutively relational conditions with value-
laden conditions: 
relational accounts of autonomy [ are those] according to which persons 
are autonomous only when they have particular kinds of value 
commitments.31 
Christman's concern, then, holds only insofar as it is true that the specification of 
certain relational conditions imports values into the account. But I have suggested that it 
is at least conceivable that one could offer a constitutively relational condition that did 
not smuggle in such ideals. Insofar as this is a possibility, Christman's objection is not 
telling against all constitutively relational conceptions of autonomy. 
My concern, however, is importantly different, and as such poses a problem for 
all constitutively relational conceptions of the conditions for being an autonomous 
agent. As I have argued, such conceptions simply incorporate the wrong kind of 
condition - an 'externalist' condition - to play the role of delineating the problems in 
cases of paternalistic intervention. It is the capacities of the agents that are relevant to 
establishing the wrong of paternalism, and as such internalist conditions are required. 
The set of agents who meet the internalist and constitutively relational conditions 
(which demands internalist and externalist conditions be met) will be a subset of those 
who meet the internalist condition. Accordingly some agents who are deliberatively 
31 Christman, 1. (2006) Op.Cit. at p.139. 
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competent will not be (relationally) autonomous - the desired claims about unjustified 
interventions cannot then be generated. 
My conclusion, therefore, is that insofar as we want to maintain a conception of 
autonomy that can play a role in delineating the bounds of paternalism, we ought not 
accept a constitutively relational conception of autonomous agency. This does not mean, 
however, that there are not constitutively relational conditions to be discovered 
elsewhere. Indeed, in the next chapter I will argue for some constitutively relational 
conditions for autonomous action. 
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Chapter 7. Relational conditions for autonomous action 
In the previous chapters in the thesis, I have argued against the incorporation of 
constitutively relational conditions for autonomy; more precisely, for autonomous 
choice and for autonomous agents. Insofar as my arguments hold, are we thereby 
committed to accepting that the notion of autonomy has merely causally necessary 
conditions; that social relations might only "affect our free agency accidentally, by 
virtue of its potential influences on our capacities"? 1 In this chapter, I show that we 
should not rest content with this claim. 
I have separated out examination of the conditions for autonomous choice, for 
being an autonomous agent, and for acting autonomously. An agent may have certain 
autonomy-related capacities as an agent; capacities that enable her to engage with the 
world, to reflect upon her motives, to reason and deliberate. She may exercise these 
capacities in making her choices and decisions; such decisions being the outcome of 
self-governed deliberation. But we can now ask whether, when an agent with the 
autonomy-relevant capacities, and has made an autonomous choice, she is then able to 
act upon her choices. 
In this chapter I show how we can go beyond the claim that there are merely 
causally relational conditions for autonomy, by setting out ways in which, for the 
exercise of autonomy - namely, for autonomous action - certain constitutively 
relational conditions must obtain. I will claim that this is so for the exercise of 
autonomy in a range of actions. I sketch four kinds of actions for which there are 
constitutively relational conditions. The fIrst two conditions are drawn from claims in 
the existing philosophical literature. The latter two conditions I set out are the start of a 
structure for thinking more clearly about how oppressive social contexts can thwart 
autonomous actions. I will not provide a complete account of these here, but show the 
benefIts of such an account, once fully specifIed. I thus provide the foundations and the 
justifIcation for pursuing further this line of thought. 
I Benson, P. (1994) Op.Cit. seep. 666. 
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7.1 More on autonomous action 
Theorists have expressed a range of intuitions about what autonomy, with respect to 
action, involves. For example: 
o "the autonomous person must be permitted to act on her own behalf,.2 
o agents must not only be able to "discern what they really want and care about" -
they must also "improvise ways to express their own values and goals". 3 
o an autonomous agent must be able to act in such a way as to "reflect, or mirror, 
the wants desires and cares that [she] reaffirms when attending to them", and 
further, her actions must also "accord with them, and especially promote 
them".4 
o being autonomous requires "conceiving of goals and policies on my own and 
realising them". 5 
Each of these claims contains reference to an agent's action, and expresses the thought 
that an autonomous agent must be able to do something. In particular, she must be 
effective in the executing of her commitments or intentions. Berlin demands something 
stronger even than this - that the agent should be able to (at least sometimes) realise her 
goals. Being autonomous in action, then, is a crucial aspect of autonomy. But despite 
the intuitions about autonomous action that are expressed, there has been little detailed 
discussion of the necessary conditions for this aspect of autonomy. Yet it is here, I shall 
argue, that we can most clearly see that there are relational conditions for autonomy. 
In these claims, we fmd expression of the thought that autonomous agents are 
able to act, and sometimes to achieve their goals in doing so. Now, there is an enormous 
variety in human action, and it would be surprising if the conditions for the performance 
of each action were the same. I next set out two kinds of action for which there are 
relational conditions; these two views are obvious and plausible, and should need little 
argumentation. I then set out the two further kinds of action for which constitutively 
relational conditions are required, and which, with development, provide a useful 
framework for thinking about the threats to autonomous action in oppressive contexts. 
2 Oshana, (2005) 'Autonomy and Free Agency' in Personal Autonomy, Taylor, I.S. (ed.); 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p.l84. 
3 Meyers, D.T. (2002) Op.Cit. p.19. 
4 Friedman, M. (2003) Op.Cit. p.6. 
5 Berlin, I. (1969) 'Two Concepts of Liberty' in his Four Essays on Liberty, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, p.13l. 
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7.1.1 Joint actions 
Consider all the actions that we intend to do in concert with others: joint actions. Joint 
actions are clearly relational: we cannot perfonn them without standing in certain social 
relations, namely, the relevant social relations with the co-operating individuals. For 
example, building a house together, or playing in a football team are cases in which 
agents with shared ends act together. For these joint actions to be perfonned, certain 
social relations must obtain. Put simply, another must partake in the joint task of 
building a house with you, or sufficiently many must play football. 
For some joint actions - such as two agents lifting a piano upstairs - it may be 
true that each agent, A and B, has certain complex beliefs about the intentions of the 
other (each believes that the other intends to lift the piano), and their beliefs about each 
others' intentions (A believes that B believes that A intends to lift), and so on (neither 
would lift the piano if she didn't believe the other would toO).6 
But the social relations that constitute joint action (as Christopher Kutz argues) 
need not be interactive and communicative to this degree.7 For other actions that are 
joint - such as building the Great Wall of China - the participants may not directly 
communicate, or have beliefs about the intentions and beliefs of each other. Two 
builders, at different ends of the wall, may never communicate, and their actions may 
not be interdependent. It is nonetheless true that the agents are acting together, rather 
than merely in parallel. On this 'minimalist' understanding of joint action, agents act 
jointly insofar as they each act with 'overlapping participatory intentions'. That is to 
say, each must act with the intention to do her part of the collective goal (where the 
conception of this collective goal is overlapping).8 A virtue of this understanding is that 
6 Tuomela, R. and Miller, K. (1988) 'We Intentions' Philosophical Studies 53 pp.367-398. 
7 The literature on joint or collective action is vast. One of the central issues is how to bridge the 
gap between what is true of the individual participants, and what is true of the group. This 
requires specification of the content and form of the intentions of the participants in joint action. 
See Kutz, C. (2000),Acting Together' Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (1) pp.l-
31, for a good overview of the current debate and an argument for the minimalist position that I 
mention here. See also Bratman, M. (1992) 'Shared Cooperative Activity' The Philosophical 
Review, 101(2), pp.327-341; Velleman, D. (1997) 'How to Share an Intention' Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 57(1) pp.29-50; Gilbert, M. (1990) 'Walking Together: A 
Paradigmatic Social Phenomenon' Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 15, pp.I-14: Gilbert, M. 
(1992) On Social Facts, Princeton University Press, esp. chapter 4; Miller, S. (1992) 'Joint 
Action' Philosophical Papers voI21(3) pp.275-297; Tuomela, R. (2005) 'We-intentions 
Revisited' Philosophical Studies 135(3) pp.327-369, for other views in the literature. 
S Kutz, C. (2000) Op. Cit ppA, 10-11. 
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it can characterise both well coordinated and interdependent joint actions, as well as 
those in which there is little direct communication and cooperation. Insofar as we accept 
this unified analysis of joint action, then, we will accept the following constitutively 
relational necessary condition for such actions:9 
(ReIActionJA) a necessary condition for autonomous joint action is that 
the agent stands in social relations in which there are other agents with 
overlapping participatory intentions. 
The joint action is in part constituted by social relations; namely, by the relationships 
between the members of the group each of whom acts with an overlapping participatory 
intention. For example, suppose an agent intends 'that she do her part in the collective 
act of building the wall'. For her brick laying to amount to this, others must also act 
with suitably similar participatory intentions. Insofar as the agent conceives herself as 
acting jointly with others (as expressed in her participatory intention), she will not 
perform the action she intends (a joint one) if there are no other cooperating agents. 
Whether or not this particular kind of social relation holds, then, can determine whether 
or not the agent is able to do what she intends. This is more than a merely causal 
connection between social relations and autonomous action; the social relations are 
constitutive of the intended action.lO 
7.1.2 Social forms and autonomous action 
Social relations, broadly speaking, are constitutive of another kind of action. Certain 
(perhaps very many) actions are only possible within certain social contexts, or 'social 
forms', where by this is meant not only certain attitudes, practices and behaviour, but 
also the conceptual framework through which certain actions are understood, and the 
meaning or significance of these actions. I I Joseph Raz writes that: 
9 If one accepts a different account, there will be different conditions specified; but insofar as the 
action is ioint it will be in part constituted by social relations. 
10 A further way in which actions might be relationally constituted is when one's projects involve 
not merely joint actions, but rather are bound up with other agents. This point is made by Susan 
Mendus, who writes: "a mother will not characteristically see her own aims and projects as 
distinct and separable from those of her children. Similarly, people who are married will see their 
projects as theirs collectively". (See Mendus, S. (1999) 'Out of the Doll's House: Reflections on 
Autonomy and Political Philosophy' Philosophical Explorations, 2(1), pp.59-70, at p.67). That 
one's projects are constituted relationally is similar to the claim about joint action - though at a 
broader level of generality (projects, rather than specific actions). 
11 Raz, 1. (1986) The Morality of Freedom, Oxford University Press. He writes that social fonns 
include 'shared beliefs, folklore, high culture, collectively shared metaphors and imagination, 
and so on' at p.311. 
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one cannot practise medicine except in a society in which such a practice 
is recognised. Notice that in principle one may be born into a society with 
no medical practice or knowledge endowed with an innate knowledge of 
medicine. One could then cure many diseases, but one could not be a 
medical doctor .... A doctor participates in a complex social form, 
involving general recognition of a medical practice, its social 
organisation, its status in society, its conventions about which matters are 
addressed to doctors and which not. 12 
The thought is that the practical identity of 'medical practitioner' only makes sense in 
the context in which a social institution of medicine exists. Extending Raz's point to 
action, we can say that medical practitioners are only able to act in that role in a social 
context in which there is a social form of practicing medicine. There will be some 
actions - prescribing a course of antibiotics, say - that will only be available in a 
context in which certain social relations hold; namely, those social relations that 
enshrine a particular way of practicing medicine. Absent such a social form, the action 
of prescribing, say, simply cannot be performed. This is not simply a terminological 
difference, of the same action being differently referred to. Rather, the action itself is 
different; what it is to prescribe, constitutively, is different from what it is to give drugs 
outside of the social form of current medical practice. 
Raz is clear that this is not only true of practical identities and practices that are 
formally institutionalised, such as that of medicine. For example: 
Bird watching seems to be what any sighted person in the vicinity of 
birds can do. And so he can, except that would not make him into a bird 
watcher. He can be that only in a society where this, or at least some 
other animal tracking activities, are recognised as leisure activities, and 
which furthermore shares certain attitudes to natural life generally.13 
Once again, Raz may be understood to be talking of the social constitution of an agent's 
practical identity as a bird watcher. Such an identity can only be held in social contexts 
in which the relevant practices, with the respective roles, are enshrined. But it is again 
clear that certain actions - particular actions that are part of those practices - will 
likewise be possible only where the relevant social form is instantiated. For example, 
actions, such as that of 'going on a twitching holiday' 14, will only be possible in 
12 Ibid p.3lO. 
13 Ibid, p.311. 
14 'Twitch, v.: To participate in the activity of a 'twitcher' (sense 4); to watch obsessively for or 
spot rare birds. Also trans., to observe (a rarity). slang.' At 
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instances in which certain social relations hold; those in which bird observing is 
regarded as a hobby. Thus it is clear that there are constitutively relational conditions for 
the autonomous performance of such actions (although Raz does not explicitly specify, 
it should be clear that the range will be very broad indeed): 
(RelActionSF) a necessary condition for certain autonomous actions is 
that the agent occupies social relations (or 'social forms') that enshrine 
the practices in which the action is embedded. Is 
Now, this point can be understood as an almost trivial point about the social 
embeddedness of action: actions are conceived of and performed in social contexts. But 
the point is of most interest if we consider the possibility of agents moving across 
contexts in which different social forms are operative; certain actions may be possible in 
some contexts but not others. Thus the exercise of autonomy will extend to different 
possibilities in different contexts. For example, a doctor, travelling to an isolated tribal 
community in which no practice of medicine familiar to us exists, may intend to 
prescribe a course of antibiotics. But insofar as the social relations do not instantiate the 
institution or practice of prescribing drugs, writing on a prescription pad will not 
amount to the action of prescribing. Once again, the social relations playa constitutive, 
rather than merely causal, role in autonomous action. The presence or absence of certain 
social forms, in any given context, will enable or thwart an agent's ability to act. 
7.1.3 The social constitution of institutional authority 
With the notion of social forms in mind, we are now in a position to set out a further 
way in which social relations might constitute certain actions. Some social forms 
involve institutional roles, and the agents operating in those roles must be authoritative 
http://dictionary.oed.com! cgil entryl 502 60726?query type=word&queryword=twitching&frrst= 1 
&max to show=10&sort type=alpha&search id=YDWN-npKf4H-2444&result place=l 
accessed04/06/08 
15 In earlier chapters, I asked whether there are relational conditions for autonomous choice. 
Should we accept this condition as necessary for autonomous choice also? I think not: whilst 
most formulations of choice will specify the objects of choice in the terms of the social forms in 
which the agent stands, this need not be so. Let us change Raz's example: suppose a doctor from 
the UK is transported to a community in which the social form of medicine does not exist (an 
isolated tribe community, say). He might then choose to write a prescription, believing this 
possible, although the medical practice as it exists in that community does not include giving 
drugs in this form. We might say that he can choose to do this; but he cannot execute this choice. 
Strictly speaking, then, this condition is only necessary for autonomous action. To make this 
claim more precise, work is required on the rational constraints on intention and choice, with 
regards what an agent believes to be possible (and in what sense). For discussion on such 
constraints, see Bratman, M. 'Intention, Belief, Practical, Theoretical' (ms.) forthcoming in 
Timmerman, 1. Skorupski, 1. and Robertson, S. Spheres of Reason, Oxford University Press. 
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to so act. II> For example, to arrest, to sentence, to marry, to assess all these actions can 
be parts of circumscribed roles, and to perfonn such actions requires a certain authority. 
A framework for thinking about this is provided by Alasdair Macintyre's ohservation: 
What makes [e.g.] an officer an ofticer is not only that he holds a 
commission from some duly constituted authority; he must also he 
recognised as an officer by his subordinates, by his superiors, and by 
civilians. When this condition ceases to hold, there cease to be officcrs. 
Beliefs are partially constitutive of at least some central social institutions 
d . 17 an practIces. 
The social constitution of roles and their attendant authority is of import in identi fying 
further constitutively relational conditions for autonomous action. From Macintyre's 
comment here, we can identify two necessary conditions for being authoritative in an 
institutional role. 
a. Grounding conditions for authority 
First, to be able to act in the role of an officer, an agent must meet what we can refer to 
as the' grounding conditions' of authority in a particular role. I S For example, an officer 
must 'hold a commission'. Likewise, a doctor must have the relevant qualilications as a 
doctor, and be employed in such a role. These grounding conditions are intended to 
indicate aptitude in a particular role. That an agent meets the grounding conditions will 
often be 'marked' .. perhaps by being elected to an official role, such as the commission 
of officer. This enahles others to identify that the grounding conditions arc mct; this is 
important, given the other necessary conditions for acting in such roles. 
b. Recognition of authority 
Second, we can tum to MacIntyre's comment about the constitutive role of belief. The 
claim is that the beliefs of other~· of, say, subordinates, or superiors, or civilians, in the 
ease of the officer are relevant to the existence of, and engagement in, eertain social 
If> To clarify: my aim here is to show how, givt:l1 tht: t:xistence of certain institutional roks tht: 
engagement in which requires authority, social relations are constitutive of this authority and 
hence of the ability to act in such roles. This is by no means an endorsement of" those roles, or of 
the authority that attaches to them (some such roles arc valuable teacher, doctor others are 
more contentious ~ military onicer, say. I remain neutral on this issue here). 
17 Macintyre, A. (1973) 'The Essential Contestability of Some Social Concepts' Ethics R4 (I), 
pp.I-9 See p.3. 
18 This terminology is from Hanrahan, R. and Antony L, (2005) 'Because I said so: towards a 
feminist theory of authority' llvpatia, 20(4), pp.59-79. There, they write: "A properly grounded 
authority is, in etTect, an authority who can be expected to make good decisions. She is someone 
who wields her authority for the proper purposes and in a way that genuinely facilitates those 
purposes." p. 71. 
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practices, or social fonns. This constitutive role is two-fold; fIrst, MacIntyre appears to 
be making a general point about the role of offIcer; the practices that are deemed to fall 
under this role's jurisdiction. 
Second, MacIntyre makes reference to the way that beliefs of others are 
relevant to the authority of an individual operating in that role. For an individual to 
count as an offIcer, he must be recognised as such by the relevant others - subordinates, 
superiors, civilians, for example. To stand in the role, and to be able to engage in the 
practices of the role, the offIcer "must also be recognised as an offIcer" by relevant 
others. Meeting the grounding conditions provides the individual with a claim to this 
recognition; she can hold that others ought to recognise her as authoritative in that role. 
19 
If MacIntyre is right about this, then social relations will be constitutive of 
actions that attach to certain institutional roles. When a role requires that agents 
operating in that role have a certain authority, the actions that attach to that role can be 
perfonned only if others recognise the authority to so act. That is, the following 
relational condition for autonomy can be accepted: 
(ReIActionl) a necessary condition for authoritative action in institutional 
roles is that the agent is recognised as authoritative in that role. 
c. Treating as authoritative 
Whilst MacIntyre's insights here are instructive, I think it is important, however, to go 
beyond his claims; namely, to note that recognition of an individual (or group) as 
authoritative is neither necessary nor suffIcient for authority, and that rather treatment 
as authoritative in a role is necessary (and can be with the grounding conditions, jointly 
suffIcient). Beliefs about the practices that make up a role, and about the authority of 
certain individuals to engage in those practices are an important part of the story; but 
they are only a part. First, we can say that it is not enough that others recognise the 
authority of agents in particular institutional roles; such a recognition or set of beliefs 
will not have any role in shaping social relations unless they are manifested in 
behaviour. Recognition that an agent meets the grounding conditions for authority is not 
19 I am for now accepting the claim that the belief about the agent's authority is necessary; later 
we will see that it is not necessary - agents can be authoritative in a role if they are treated as 
such, and being so treated can be a matter of 'going though the motions' in the absence of a 
belief that the agent in fact is authoritative. 
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sufficient for the constitution of that authority. It is important that sufficiently many 
others must treat those agents as authoritative.20 That is to say, sufficiently many others 
must engage in practices and patterns of behaviour that acknowledge and accommodate 
the authority of the agent in the institutional role. Accepting this claim, in fact, removes 
the force of MacIntyre's claims about the beliefs of others constituting their authority. 
Others may treat an agent as authoritative without in fact believing that the agent has 
authority. So recognising the authority of an individual is not necessary for the 
constitution of that individual's authority.21 Thus we should revise the constitutively 
relational condition, from MacIntyre, to: 
(ReIAction2) a necessary condition for authoritative autonomous action 
in institutional roles is that the agent is treated as authoritative in that 
role; that is others must engage in, or be disposed to engage in, patterns 
of behaviour that acknowledge and accommodate the competence and 
standing of the agent in that role. 
The following example, from Doris Lessing's The Grass is Singing, serves to illustrate 
this framework; the failure of the relational condition (RelAction2) to obtain deprives 
certain agents of the authority to act in the prescribed institutional roles. 
Arrest: Set in the farming communities of South African apartheid, Lessing's novel 
unfolds the complicated circumstances of a murder. The events leading to the murder, 
and the relationships between the parties involved, are wholly tainted with the vicious 
racism of the time. In the following passage Mary Turner's body has been found on 
the veranda, stabbed. Upon arrival at the scene, the police officers fmd her husband, 
Dick Turner wandering madly around the bush, and Moses, the 'houseboy', who 
offers himself up for arrest. Waiting for the arrival of the Sergeant, the black police 
officers are unable to take command at the scene: 
They snapped the handcuffs on him [Moses] and went back to the house to 
wait for the police cars to come. There they saw Dick Turner come out of 
the bush by the house ... He was off his head, talking crazily to himself, 
wandering in and out of the bush with his hands full of leaves and earth. 
They let him be, while keeping an eye on him, for he was a white man, 
20 Recall that Raz talked, in his discussion of the social fonn of practicing medicine, of not only 
the "general recognition of a medical practice", but also of "its conventions". With talk of 
conventions, Raz goes beyond the matter of mere beliefs about certain roles and the authority to 
engage in them; we have the notion of convention, or patterns of (mutually acknowledged) 
behaviour. 
21 Note that MacIntyre's point about the constitutive role of beliefs with respect to the authority 
(the practices legitimated) of roles (rather than individuals or groups acting in them) still stands. 
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though mad, and black men, even when policemen, did not lay hands on 
white flesh.22 
An attempt to arrest, for the black police officers, would not amount to a legitimate 
exercise of their authority qua police officer; rather, it would be a violation, an assault. 
The framework set out enables us to make sense of this: whilst the officers meet the 
grounding conditions for authority in the role of police officer, they are not, under 
South African apartheid, treated as having the authority to so act. The role of police 
officer, in this context, is itself racially stratified; the officers are not treated as 
authoritative when it comes to exercising police powers over white citizens. That the 
role of police officer is socially 'carved up' in this way should not be surprising, given 
that the rest of apartheid South Africa was also structured along hierarchical race lines. 
Black police officers were treated as authoritative in only some of the practices that 
white police officers were. The failure to be treated as authoritative undermines the 
authority of agents to operate in certain institutional roles. If we accept MacIntyre's 
claims about the social constitution of authority, then for actions that require authority 
of this kind constitutively relational conditions for the exercise of autonomy obtain: one 
cannot so act unless on stands in social relations in which being treated as authoritative 
in that role is assured. This kind of relational condition will hold for all of those actions 
that are undertaken under the remit of an institutional role (actions of military officers, 
police officers, doctors, teachers, social workers, factory workers, office assistants, 
stock brokers, and so on and so forth). 
7.1.4 The social constitution of social authority 
I now want to sketch out how the kind of relational condition identified in the previous 
section might provide us with a way of thinking about more everyday, non-role specific 
actions. I'll suggest that, if fully developed, this framework can yield a fruitful way of 
thinking about how oppressive social relations might thwart the exercise of autonomy in 
subtle ways. 
Suppose that operating as an autonomous agent is understood to be structurally 
akin to operating in an institutional role. We might say that certain actions fall under the 
remit of the 'role' of autonomous agent; performing those actions requires both that an 
agent has some kind of authority, meets some grounding conditions for that authority, 
22 Lessing, D. (1950) The Grass is Singing London, Harper Perennial, p.12. 
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and is treated by others as authoritative in that role. If all this can be plausibly filled out, 
then there will be a constitutively relational condition for exercising autonomy in those 
actions; agents must be treated as authoritative qua agent. 
In order that this be more than mere speculation, it is required that something be 
said about the following three aspects: the grounding conditions for authority; the kind 
of authority at issue and the appropriate treatment thereby; and the actions for which 
this authority is required. I'll very briefly say something about how I envisage each of 
these matters might be more fully substantiated. Finally, I will give some examples 
which, I hope, add support to this strategy by making plausible the claim that a kind of 
authority is indeed needed for actions that are not 'role-specific' or institutional. 
This is what Louise Antony and Rebecca Hanrahan have to say about the role of 
authority in interpersonal interaction: 
authority is a thoroughly social phenomenon, and earns its place in a 
properly ordered society by making possible various forms of cooperation, 
forms that are necessary if we human beings are to exploit our unique 
combination of capacities for knowledge and communication.23 
The idea here is that communicative and cooperative action requires relations of 
authority. We've seen that authority in institutional roles is socially constituted; much 
cooperation and communication will be served by these formal relationships of 
authority. But much communication and cooperation occurs outside of any institutional 
role; thus perhaps this kind of interpersonal interaction may be understood as part of 
what is distinctive about the 'role' of agents, for which a kind of authority is required?4 
If authority qua agent is required for operating in this role, how might we 
understand this authority? A look to an intrapersonal analogue may be instructive. 
Benson understands the notion of intrapersonal authority as integral to the conditions 
for being an autonomous agent. The kind of self-regard involved in the process of self-
authorisation that Benson emphasises is one according to which the agent has 
"ownership with regard to [her] conduct", and this amounts to the agent having a sense 
23 Hanrahan, R. and Antony L, (2005) Op. Cit. see p. 69. 
24 Indeed, Miranda Fricker gives a detailed account of the social relations that shape attributions 
of epistemic authority that characterise our practices of knowledge transmission. See Fricker, M. 
(2007) Op. Cit. 
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of her "social competence or worth ... regard for [her] abilities and social position".25 
Autonomous agents must "secure in their own minds their regard for their competence 
and worthiness to speak for themselves,,?6 First, there is the agent's sense of her 
competence; second, there is the agent's sense of her worth. This is an evaluative 
matter, pertaining to the agent's status qua agent, among others. 
A plausible interpersonal analogue, then, holds that being regarded as 
authoritative qua agent is a matter of being recognised fIrstly, as having certain 
competences as an agent; those competences in planning, reasoning, deliberative 
reflection and so on, as possessed by autonomous agents.27 But, second, there is an 
evaluative component, which involves being regarded as worthy, in Benson's terms. 
We might say that this involves a descriptive judgment that captures the 
grounding conditions for the authority; they ground the agent's claim to be regarded as 
worthy qua agent. If agent A makes such a judgment about agent B, she should, insofar 
as she is rational, take up a certain regard for that agent: as worthy of respect. 
Importantly, an agent, A, who makes this judgment about agent B should treat agent B 
as authoritative as an agent; they should act so as to accommodate and acknowledge the 
competence and worth of the agent, in particular with respect to her competence and 
worth to engage in communicative and cooperative actions. 
I've added some detail to the sketch of this way of understanding autonomous 
action as relationally constituted. In summary, (some of) the distinctive actions of the 
'role' of an agent are communicative and cooperative; for these actions, an agent must 
be treated as authoritative qua agent; being so treated involves being treated as 
competent and worthy to perform these communicative and cooperative actions; this 
authority has as its grounding conditions the competences and capacities that constitute 
autonomous agency. If this view is right, then a constitutively relational condition for 
autonomous action will be: 
~5 Benson, P. (2005a) Op. Cit pp.llO-111. 
~6 Ibid, p.115. 
27 See Bratman, M. «2005) 'Planning Agency, Autonomous agency', in Personal Au~onomy 
Taylor 1.S. (ed.) pp33-57) for the claim that planning is integral to our.agency. The .clalm that 
our capacities for reflection and reasoning are integral to our agency IS well-estabhshed. See 
Kant Op.Cit. for a statement of this claim; see Frankfurt, H. (1971) Op.Cit. for a more recent 
statement of the thought. 
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(RelAction3) a necessary condition for certain communicative and 
cooperative autonomous action is that the agent is treated as authoritative 
qua agent; that is, others must engage in, or be disposed to engage in, 
patterns of behaviour that acknowledge and accommodate the agent's 
competence and worth as an agent. 
Is this plausible? I offer the following examples by way of support for this claim. The 
following cases, I contend, are ones in which agents are unable to exercise their 
autonomy due to the failure of the relational condition (ReIAction3) from obtaining. 
Registration: In the following, we see an agent who is unable to register to vote. This, I 
submit, is because he is not treated as authoritative as an agent. The action of registering 
to vote is not an action that is 'role-specific' in the way that arresting or prescribing is; 
nonetheless a kind of authority is required for its performance. Under Jim Crow 
segregation in the US, this kind of authority was denied a whole class of citizens: many 
black citizens - as well as poor uneducated white citizens - were unable to register to 
vote - even after the legal disenfranchisement of black citizens officially ended. In 
Remembering Jim Crow, Leon Alexander describes his experiences, in 1910, of 
attempting to register to vote: 
I walked in and the registrar was in there. He started washing his hands. He 
washed his hands until two white people came in and he dried his hands off 
and came and waited on them. Then he went right back to washing his 
hands again. Finally he came over and just like this he said: "What you 
want boy?" I said, "I wants to register to vote." So he got out a registration 
form and laid it out there before me ... He came back and looked at it, 
balled it up and threw it in the wastebasket. All he said was, "You 
disqualified, you didn't answer the question" . 
. . . Somebody asked me where I had been. I told him I had been over the 
courthouse trying to register to vote. So one of them asked me: "Well did 
you have any luck?" I said, "No, they didn't even read the thing. He just 
picked it up and balled it up and throwed it in the waste-basket and told me 
I didn't pass. 
. .. So that's how my first voting experience went because this guy had no 
intention of registering me, not only no intention of registering me, he had 
no intention of registering any black to vote.28 
This action of registering to vote, then, seems to be an action that one must be treated as 
an authority to perform. It is a cooperative action that is only available to those treated 
as competent and worthy as agents. And it is certainly the case that Leon Alexander is 
28 Remembering Jim Crow, Chafe, W.H., Gavins, R., Korstad, R. (eds.) 2001, New York, The 
New Press, pp.277, 280. Detailed discussion of disenfranchisement and segregation laws can be 
found in Klannan, M.J. (2004) From Jim Crow to Civil Rights: the Supreme Court and the 
Struggle for Equality, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
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not treated as having the authority to so act, and thereby cannot. This case seems to be 
well explained by the framework I have spelt out, and provides illustrative support for 
it. 
Refusal: There has been much recent attention to women's ability, or lack thereof, to 
refuse in sexual contexts.29 Rae Langton has claimed that in such a context, norms of 
sexual communication may be operative such that "'no' means 'yes''': refusal is 
understood as coy permission, say (her concern is with pornography's role in bringing 
this about).30 In such contexts, women's attempted refusals may not amount to 
refusals.31 However, there are other contexts in which women's refusals appear to be 
'unspeakable' - and these in such contexts it is clearer that there are no norms that 
might muddy the matter of what is intended in the utterance of 'no' . 
Women's attempted refusals of medical treatments in pregnancy and birth is 
increasingly documented. On a website that enables women to share their experiences of 
traumatic treatment they received in giving birth, there are a number of distressing 
reports of utterances of 'No' which fail to count as refusals: 
I was repeatedly examined vaginally, even when I told them 'NO', [but] 
even when I said, "it hurts" even when I said "it bums" and they told me 
"No you can't feel that, it doesn't bum, you don't have nerve endings that 
far up". The doctor used an amniohook to break my waters without my 
knowledge or consent. ... Then when my son was born, they clamped and 
cut his cord, administered pitocin (again without my consent, I had already 
stated "No pitocin" during labour, I did not consent to the use of pitocin at 
all). And he began pulling at my placenta within minutes of my son's birth, 
29 My thinking about such cases in terms of autonomy was prompted by Westlund, A. 
'Women's autonomy in conditions of oppression' (unpubl. ms.). 
30 See Langton, R. (1993) 'Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts' Philosophy and Public Affairs 22 
(4) pp.293-330; Langton, R. and Hornsby, J. (1998) 'Free Speech and Illocution' Journal of 
Legal Theory, 4, pp.21-37; Langton, R. and West, C. (1999), 'Scorekeeping in a Pornographic 
Language Game' Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 77 (3), pp.303-319. For discussion of 
some of the problems facing these views, see Maitra, I. (2004) 'Silence and Responsibility', 
Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1), pp.189-208; Jacobson, D. (1995) 'Freedom of Speech Acts? 
A response to Langton' Philosophy and Public Affairs, 23(1) pp.64-79; Wieland, N. (2007) 
'Linguistic Authority and Convention in a Speech Act Analysis of Pornography' Australasian 
Journal of Philosophy, 85 (2), pp.435-456. 
31 Harris writes of the legal contexts in which women were denied the authority to refuse: in the 
US, even after the civil war, black women were 'unrapable' in law. See Harris, A. (1993) 'Race 
and Essentialism in Feminist Legal theory' in Weisberg, D. K. (ed.) Feminist Legal Theory: 
Foundations, Philadelphia, Temple University Press, pp.349-358. Her observation is offered as a 
criticism of Catherine MacKinnon's analysis of 'woman' as 'rapable'. See MacKinnon, C. 
( 1987) Feminism Unmodified, Harvard University Press. 
159 
I screamed at him "what are you doing, stop, I could haemorrhage", he said 
"no I gave you pitocin.,,32 
This case provides some support for the claim that authority is required to perform 
communicative actions such as refusal. One way of understanding this case is as one in 
which the action of refusing medical treatment requires authority - and, importantly, 
being treated as authoritative. The woman, who identifies herself as 'EB' utters 'no'. 
She attempts to refuse both examinations and the administering of drugs. (It is 
absolutely clear that the issue here is not one of misunderstanding; there IS no 
suggestion that the context is one in which, as is suggested in the case of sexual refusals, 
'no' means 'yes'.) But nonetheless, EB's refusals are not effective. Now, it might be 
that her utterances are recognised as refusals, but overridden, and hence she refuses but 
fails to achieve the effects she intends. However, in medical contexts, the doctrine of 
informed consent is presumed to hold (namely, that the patient's informed consent 
should be secured before medical interventions are performed).33 Given this, if the 
refusal is recognised as a refusal, we must understand the medical staff to be boldly and 
publicly flouting this doctrine. This may counsel against this understanding of the 
situation. An alternative way to understand what is going on here is in line with the 
framework I set out above. We can say that EB is not treated as an authority - as a 
competent and worthy agent - so that her utterance does not thereby count as a refusal. 
This is a plausible understanding, given Susan Bordo's observations on the regard in 
which pregnant women are held: 
in this culture the pregnant woman ... comes as close as a human being 
can get to being regarded, medically and legally, as 'mere body', her 
wishes, desires, dreams, religious scruples of little consequence and 
easily ignored in (the doctor's or judge's estimation of) the interests of 
foetal well-being.34 
I hope these examples have provided some support for the claim that a kind of authority 
is required for the performance of those communicative and cooperative actions that 
32 Posted on TrueBirth.com, Swimrn, D. 'More than a Traumatic Birth', comment from EB on 
February II th, 2008 5:31 pm. http://www.truebirth.com/200S/02110/more-than-a-traumatic-
birth!. The experiences of violation and trauma in pregnancy and birth are sometimes referred to 
as 'birth rape'. See also http://www.birthtraumaassociation.org.uklindex.htm. and Reed, A. 'Not 
a Happy Birthday' The F word: Contemporary UK Feminism. 
http://www.thefword.org.uklfeatures/200S/03/not a happy biro 
33 The status of this doctrine is itself contentious. For a detailed exploration, see Manson, N.C. 
and O'Neill, O. (2007) Rethinking Informed Consent in Bioethics, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press. 
34 Bordo, S. (2003) 'Are Mothers Persons?' in her Unbearable Weight: Feminism, Western 
Culture and the Body, California, University of Berkeley Press, pp.71-97 See p. 76. 
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have central role in much of what we do as agents. More detail is required in filling out 
the details of this framework. I believe that it is worth pursing this line of thought, and 
motivate this further by setting out, in the following, the virtues that could accrue to this 
relational understanding of autonomous action. 
7.2 Virtues of a relational conception of autonomous action 
I'll start first by considering the specific virtues that attach to the particular proposal that 
I have outlined. I will then set out the more general benefits of giving constitutively 
relational conditions for autonomous action; namely, that the problems I set out earlier 
in the thesis can be avoided. Finally, I will briefly suggest some further points of 
interest to be pursued if my proposal is fully developed. 
7.2.1. Diagnosis and remedy of thwarted autonomy 
The examples I have given present cases in which an agent's exercise of autonomy is 
thwarted by oppressive social contexts. I have suggested that attending to the socially 
constituted authority that is required for performing certain actions might be fruitful for 
making sense of such cases. If fully developed, we will have a framework for making 
sense of how oppressive social relations can undermine an agent's authority to act. In 
order to further develop the account, it will be important to attend to the kinds of social 
(and sometimes legal) norms that can undermine authority to engage in cooperative and 
communicative action. Recall that we said that sufficiently many others must treat the 
agent as authoritative: it will also be important to attend to the matter of how many is 
'sufficiently many', when it comes to treating an agent as authoritative - on occasion or 
more generally. 
I think this strategy will be useful not only for diagnostic purposes - for 
identifying occasions on which an agent's autonomy in action is thwarted - but for 
remedial tasks also. For example, we can think about how an agent's authority to act 
might be secured. One way is presented by Leon Alexander's continued account of his 
voting experience. He recounts how his initial failure to register was not the end of the 
matter, as he returned to the registrar with some friends: 
.. .I walked in, and they were standing in the hall when I walked up there. 
Same guy. He saw me and his hands got dirty again, so he went to the 
sink to wash his hands. So finally Tom Crawford and Ed Bean walked in, 
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and he dried his hands off and went to wait on them, and they told him, 
said, "He was here before we were. Why don't you wait on him?" He 
said, "Well, hell, I done disqualified him". Then Tom Crawford said "Let 
me see that paper that you threw in the wastebasket there". The registrar 
said, "who is you?" He still ain't reaching at the paper, so Crawford told 
him, ''I'm the district representative for the United Mine Workers, and I 
want to see that paper. I want to see what grounds you put on there that 
you disqualified him on" 
... He still wouldn't give him the paper ... and Ed Bean went around the 
counter and got the paper out of the wastebasket and he smoothed it back 
out. ... Bean said ''I'm going to give it to [the Governor] to show him 
what you are doing to blacks here in Jefferson County". ... So the 
registrar got another form and handed it to him. I filled it out. There 
wasn't any difficult questions on it. 1s 
His (white) friends, Bean and Crawford, are able to take up Alexander's cause and force 
the registrar to treat him as entitled to register. The manner in which the registrar 
engages with Alexander is imperfect; it would be nai·ve to suppose that the registrar's 
attitude shifts to one in which he regards Alexander with respect. But his going through 
the motions of the treatment to which authoritative agents arc entitled is enough to 
enable Alexander to act as he intends, which is a start. Thus we sec how agents 
perhaps individually, though more likely collectively - may be able to assert their 
authority, demanding (for each other) the treatment to which they arc entitled. Insofar as 
we accept the claim that authority is required for such cooperative and communicative 
actions, it will be important to attend to the ways in which agents can assl:rt their 
authority and entitlement to be treated as an autonomous agent. 
In chapter I, I set out the norn1ative benefits of autonomy, one of which was the 
entitlement to respect. I alluded to Darwall's notion of recognition rl:spect. This kind of 
respect means giving appropriate weight to the fact that the agent is a person taking 
the fact they are a person to constrain one's action in certain ways. The claim is that 
"various ways of regarding or behaving towards others, and social arrangements that 
encourage those ways, are inconsistent with the respect to which all persons are 
entitled.,,1" If we are able to develop an account of the socially constituted authority 
required for a range of interpersonal actions, we will have a view according to which 
being treated as a competent and worthy agent has a role in enabling action. i\. view 
such as this would go beyond Darwall's claims about the role of recognition and 
1S Alexander, L. Op.Cit. p.279. 
16 Darwall, S. (1977) 'Two Kinds of Respect' Ethics RR (1) pp36-49 See p.3n. 
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respect. Darwall emphasises that taking up this respect and holding persons in this 
regard is something we ought to do when we are deliberating about what to do - how 
, 
when our actions are to impact upon another, we ought to take that fact into account. On 
his view, treating another as having status or authority qua agent should constrain our 
actions; it has a negative role. 
However, if my proposal is followed through, we may see that having a certain 
respect for another - treating them as authoritative qua agents - is relevant not only to 
constraining our engagement with others. Rather, according to the proposal, it is 
important in enabling the actions of others. If treating as authoritative in part constitutes 
that authority, then treating another as such will require not only giving weight to 
factors that constrain one's own actions; it will also require taking up a positive role of 
acknowledgement and accommodation of the communicative and cooperative practices 
of agents. This has significance if we remember Friedman's concern (from Chapter 1) 
that whilst we might want to criticise those who afford too much value to substantive 
independence, the notion of autonomy could not generate the basis for such criticism. 
She holds that: 
a critique of substantively independent behaviour will have to be based 
on something other than the ideal of autonomy. We cannot fault 
autonomy theories for failing to do what might lie beyond their proper 
scope.37 
Already, the relational conditions for autonomous action show that there is reason to be 
sceptical of the value of substantive independence - if such independence means failing 
to stand in the social relations that enable joint action, say. Strictly speaking, an agent is 
dependent upon another if the performance of their action requires the cooperation of 
another - of an agent with the cooperative participatory intention, say; or perhaps, with 
an agent who treats one as autonomous. If we can develop the relational condition I 
have proposed, then we will have further autonomy-based reason to doubt the value of 
substantive independence. For substantive independence will preclude standing in the 
kinds of relations of dependency required for acting jointly. 
37 Friedman, M. (2003) p.93. 
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7.2.3 Benefits oflocating relational conditions with autonomous action 
I now turn to consider the more general virtues of locating the constitutively relational 
conditions for autonomy at the point of its exercise - namely, autonomous action. 
a. The problem of false negatives 
In chapter 4, I argued that those accounts which incorporated constitutively relational 
content into an account of autonomous choice faced the problem of false negatives; 
namely, choices that are intuitively autonomous came out as non-autonomous on the 
relational view. I want to here show that, first, incorporating relational content into an 
account of autonomous action does not face the problem of false negatives. Second, that 
with respect to my specific proposal, there may in fact be virtues to this approach. 
First, in identifying relational conditions for certain kinds of action, we are able 
to identify problem cases in which the absence of certain social relations prevents the 
agent from acting as intended: the joint action of (e.g.) playing football cannot be 
performed; or the doctor cannot prescribe, properly speaking; or the black police 
officers lack the (counterfactual) power to arrest white citizens. Given that the relational 
condition is posited to make sense of these failures, the problem of false negatives has 
no application here (there is not an action that is wrongly diagnosed as non-
autonomous; the agent's intended action is not performed at all). 
There is, however, one kind of case in which the claim that an action has not 
been performed has been met with objection. The objection may be understood as a 
particular instance of the problem of false negatives. This kind of concern has arisen 
with regards the case of failed refusals in sexual contexts, as mentioned above. There, I 
suggested that we might make sense of refusals, and the failure to perform a refusal, in 
terms of the authority required to refuse. Perhaps, I suggested, there are contexts in 
which agents are not treated as having the authority to refuse, and so cannot. 
Previous discussion of such cases has faced the following worry, as expressed 
by Alexander Bird: in a sexual context in which a woman utters 'no' we should want to 
say that, insofar as the 'no' is not heeded, a rapist "has committed a cognitive error of a 
morally heavily loaded kind. But all this can only be said if there is a refusal".38 The 
concern is this: unless we can say there was a refusal, we cannot generate the desired 
38 Bird, A. (2002) Op.Cit. p.7. His suggestion is that we should instead say that there is a refusal, 
but it is understood to be insincere. 
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claims about the degree of culpability that falls with the man who fails to heed the 
utterance of no. 
If we develop the outlines of the authority based account, as I have suggested, I 
believe this kind of problem can be adequately addressed. Insofar as an agent cannot 
perform a refusal because she is not treated as autonomous - as competent and worthy 
to perform that communicative action - we can identify an "error of a morally heavily 
loaded kind". To fail to treat someone as having the authority to which they are entitled 
is a significant moral failing. There is no reason, on this count at least, to insist that a 
refusal was performed.39 
b. The problem of value 
In Chapter 4, we also saw John Christman's concern that constitutively (rather than 
causally) relational conditions - conditions according to which "being autonomous 
means standing in proper social relations to surrounding others and within social 
practices" - imported values.40 But to make such a demand is essentially to demand that 
the agent hold certain value commitments; requiring that the agent stand in certain 
social relations amounts to the demand that she not choose, or exercise her agency, in 
accordance with certain values.41 
Relational theorists who adopt substantive or relational conditions, according to 
Christman "are in fact supporting a conception of autonomy which is an ideal of 
individualised self government".42 Indeed, he characterises relational conceptions of 
autonomy as those "according to which persons are autonomous only when they have 
particular kinds of value commitments".43 The problem with value-laden conceptions of 
autonomy, he claims, is that 
to say that she is not autonomous implies that she does not enjoy the 
status marker of an independent citizen whose perspective and value 
39 This is not to say that there are no complications for apportioning blame for (e.g.) sexist acts in 
conditions of gender oppression. For discussion, see Benson, P. (2004) 'Blame, Oppression and 
Diminished Moral Competence', in Moral Psychology: Feminist Ethics and Social Theory, 
DesAutels, P. & Walker, M.U. (eds.) Rowman & Littlefield, pp.183-200 
40 See Christman, 1. (2004) Op.Cit, at p. 158. 
41 This connection was made clearer with the discussion of Os han a's view, in chapter 6. 
42 Ibid, p.151 
43 Christman, 1. (2006), Op.Cit. p.139 
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orientation get a hearing ill the democratic processes that constitute 
legitimate social policy. 44 
The thought is that because autonomy comes with these normative benefits - regard as 
an agent whose views and choices are worth consideration, and who can participate in 
political processes (and, as we shall once again see, be protected from paternalism) - it 
is inappropriate to determine who is autonomous on the basis of the values to which 
each subscribes. A result of doing so would be that: 
authority is circumscribed to exclude voices who are otherwise competent 
and authentic in ways that procedural accounts of autonomy require.45 
A relational conception of autonomy that is value-laden, then, classifies agents as non-
autonomous for the wrong kind of reason. 
Now consider the kind of conditions that I have (in some instances tentatively) 
identified as constitutive of certain actions: 
(RelActionJA) a necessary condition for autonomous joint action is that 
the agent stands in social relations in which there are other agents with 
overlapping participatory intentions. 
(RelActionSF) a necessary condition for certain autonomous actions is 
that the agent occupies social relations (or 'social forms') that enshrine 
the practices in which the action is embedded. 
(ReIAction2) a necessary condition for authoritative action in institutional 
roles is that the agent is treated as authoritative in that role; that is others 
must engage in, or be disposed to engage in, patterns of behaviour that 
acknowledge and accommodate the competence and standing of the agent 
in that role. 
(RelAction3) a necessary condition for communicative and cooperative 
action is that the agent is treated as authoritative qua agent; that is, others 
must engage in, or be disposed to engage in, patterns of behaviour that 
acknowledge and accommodate the agent's competence and worth as an 
agent. 
These conditions are clearly constitutively relational. But they do not incorporate any 
values into the account of autonomy; they merely describe the kind of social conditions 
that must obtain if agents are to perform certain actions (it remains an open question 
44 Christman, 1. (2004), Op.Cit. p.157 
45 Ibid, p.157 
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whether the actions perfonned are valuable or not). Thus we can see that Christman's 
conflation of relational conditions with value-laden conditions is mistaken. 
Suppose we develop the authority condition I proposed, in outline, for 
communicative and cooperative actions (ReIAction3). Might one object that such a 
demand imports some ideal or other? One might hold that this condition imports value 
by demanding that agents hold, and act according to, certain values; namely, it demands 
that agents value the competence and authority of other autonomous agents. If this is so, 
and if (as I acknowledged) value laden conceptions are problematic, then this may be a 
reason not to further pursue this line of inquiry. 
Such a condition does not 'smuggle in' such values, however. Whilst it may be 
true that in order to perfonn certain actions, an agent must be treated as competent and 
authoritative, the relational account itself does not insist that agents hold this value in 
order to be classed as autonomous. (By way of contrast, recall that the substantive views 
we considered (in Chapters 2-4) demanded that agents valued substantive 
independence.) It rather describes a certain relation between action and social 
conditions: if certain actions are to be perfonned, then certain necessary conditions, 
involving the regard and treatment of others, must obtain. To perfonn certain 
cooperative autonomous actions, the agent must be treated as competent and worthy as 
an agent. This is not yet to require of all agents that they do treat others as competent 
and worthy (though I do believe that they ought to do so) in order to be, or choose, or 
act autonomously. It is rather to identify a relational condition that can enable or prevent 
other agents from acting autonomously. The ideal of mutual regard and treatment 
accordingly, is a moral demand, which holds independently of any considerations 
pertaining to the enabling role of such regard.46 The relational condition I have 
tentatively suggested, then, is purely descriptive, and does not require that agents 
subscribe to certain ideals or values (beyond those generated by the basic nonns of 
morality). Thus concerns about smuggling in values pose no barriers to the further 
development of this view. 
c. The problem of externality 
Christman claimed that the value-laden nature of relational conditions meant that a 
conception of autonomy that incorporated them could not play certain key roles. 
46 Of course, this claim requires argumentation, but I cannot give such an argument here. 
Korsgaard, C (1996a, 1996b) Gp. Cit. attempts to argue for this claim. 
167 
Namely, such a conception could not stand in the normative frameworks of protecting 
agents from paternalistic intervention. Recall that an agent who meets all the procedural 
requirements may choose to occupy social relations that do not accord her, for example, 
a certain range of options (this was one of the demands from Oshana). Such an agent is 
not autonomous, according to a constitutively relational account of autonomous agency. 
This means that she is not accorded the normative benefits that attach to autonomy. In 
particular, it means that 
despite her authentic, competent, and 'sober' acceptance of such situation 
(by hypothesis), her lack of relational autonomy - should we accept that 
view - would allow other agents and representatives of coercive social 
situations to intervene to relieve her of this burden and to restore her 
autonomy (at least in principle).47 
Now, this concern, for Christman, was parasitic upon the claim that relational conditions 
incorporated value-laden content. I have suggested, however, that we can identify 
constitutively relational conditions for autonomous agency that are not value-laden. 
However, that the conditions are value-neutral does not mean that this objection is 
immediately avoided. 
In Chapter 6, I argued that independently of whether any values were imported 
into a conception of autonomous agency, constitutively relational conditions are simply 
the wrong kind of condition to do the work in identifying those agents who should be 
protected from intervention. Whilst internalist conditions explained why agents should 
not be subject to coercive intervention, relational conditions incorporate externalist 
conditions. Thus we saw that such a relational conception could only pick out a subset 
of those agents who, intuitively, should be protected from paternalism. This was the 
problem of externality. This objection is targeted against relational conditions for 
autonomous agency. But might it undermine the project of developing further relational 
conditions for autonomous action also? 
It should be clear that it does not. This is because insofar as we accept (some of) 
the conditions set out above, we are accepting conditions that are constitutive of 
autonomous action. That is, when such relational conditions are required and fail to 
obtain, we do not have an action that fails to be autonomous (and hence not protected 
47 Christman,1. (2004) 0poCito po157. 
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from intervention, and so on). Rather, the action has not been performed at al1.48 It 
simply makes no sense to claim that, when such a condition is not met, the agent's 
action is non-autonomous, so can be interfered with. There is no problem combining 
this constitutively relational conception with an internalist account of the conditions for 
being an autonomous agent. Such an account could happily play the role of identifying 
those agents who are entitled to protection from paternalism. Moreover, I anticipate that 
further development of the relational condition I suggested would serve only to 
underline the importance of interpersonal respect and regard for competent and 
authoritati ve agency. 
7.3 Summary 
In the previous parts of the thesis, I set out what constitutively relational conditions 
might look like, and I argued against incorporating such conditions into a conception of 
autonomy. In this chapter, however, I outlined out some of the ways in which social 
relations can constitute autonomous action, and thus are necessary for the exercise of 
autonomy. We've seen, then, that social relations are connected to autonomy by virtue 
of more than their potential to causally impact upon the agent's capacities. Rather, the 
presence or absence of certain social relations can enable or prevent an agent from 
exercising her autonomy. 
In addition to setting out some obvious ways in which actions are socially 
constituted, I also suggested a framework for making sense of how oppressive social 
contexts may thwart autonomy. I suggested that we might see autonomous agency as 
involving a kind of authority to engage with others, in a way structurally similar, though 
substantively different, to the authority that attaches to various institutional roles. Much 
work is to be done in filling out the details of this kind of relational condition. However, 
I hope to have provided good motivation to further pursue this line of thought, by 
showing the virtues that I envisage attaching to this view, once fully developed.49 
48 Naturally this is a point at which matters of action individuation arise. The important poin~ for 
present purposes is that the intended action cannot be performed. I cannot here resolve. the t~ICky 
issues pertaining to action individuation. For discussion see Hornsby, 1. (1998), 'ActlOn', ill E. 
Craig (Ed.), Routledge Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. London: Routledge. Retrieved 04/02/08, 
from 
http://v.,ww.rep.routledge.com/article/VOOI 
49 I believe this view may also be informative in connection with other debates. In ~articular, I 
am interested to explore the relation between the claim that dependency on ?thers IS neces~ary 
for the autonomous performance of certain actions, and various formulattons of repubhcan 
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theories of freedom, which seem to require that the agent is not dependent upon, or dominated 
by, another agent. For fonnulations of these views, see Skinner, Q. (1998) Liberty Before 
Liberalism, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press; Pettit, P. (1997) Republicanism: a theol)' 
of freedom and government, Oxford, Oxford University Press; and for discussion, Dagger. R. 
(2005) 'Autonomy, Domination, and the Republican Challenge to Liberalism' in Autonomy and 
the Challenges to Liberalism, Christman, 1. and Anderson, 1. (eds.), Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, pp.117-203. 
I anticipate that explicating the connections and tensions would be a large task. so set 
this aside for future research. 
170 
Conclusion 
In this thesis I have explored the question of how autonomy might be relationally 
constituted. I argued against constitutively relational conceptions of autonomous choice; 
such conditions, I claimed, were unmotivated. I then argued against incorporating 
constitutively relational conditions into a conception of the autonomous agent. Such a 
conception is ill-placed to cohere with the normative framework of protecting from 
paternalism that accounts, in part, for autonomy's value. But in the [mal chapter, I 
showed how we could nonetheless go beyond the claim that social relations impacted on 
autonomy merely causally. The exercise of autonomy in a range of actions is constituted 
by social relations. I suggested a framework that focuses on the socially constituted 
authority of agents, as a way of fruitfully thinking about how social relations might 
hinder autonomous action, and set out the motivations for further pursuing this line of 
mqUlry. 
We started with the thought from Griffin that "Even if I constantly made a mess 
of my life, even if you could do better if you took charge, I would not let you do it. 
Autonomy has a value of its own".1 I hope to have, in the course of the thesis, clarified 
the ways in which autonomy is valuable. Autonomy is valuable in part due to the 
normative benefits to which it entitles agents. Moreover, if the suggestion I have made 
in the third part of the thesis can be further substantiated, it will be clear that autonomy 
has value because of its connection to the social relations in which agents stand. Being 
recognised as an autonomous agent - as having a kind of authority - enables agents to 
engage in a range of actions with others; namely, communicative and cooperative 
actions. If this is so, we can further understand, now, Griffin's objection to having his 
life taken over. For if an agent is not treated as an autonomous agent, and is not treated 
as an authority, 'in charge' of her life, her autonomy will be significantly curtailed. 
There will simply be a whole range of things that she can no longer do; namely, many 
of those things that we do with the help of, and in concert with, others. 
1 Griffin, 1. (1986) Op.Cit, p. 67 
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